Software Patents
    
    
    Read Baase Chapter 4 sections 5-7 which includes patents
    Some patent papers
    1. Simpson
      Garfinkel, Patently Absurd, 1993
    
    Garfinkel's article is pretty easy reading, pointing out some problems with
    software patents specifically. But maybe things were different in 1993?
    
    2.Richard
      Stallman on Patents, 2002
     
    
      Stallman is against software patents, of course. However, his case here is
      better than many open-source-related arguments; in fact, it is squarely
      aligned with the interests of software-development businesses.
      
    
    3.Paul Graham, a
      computer scientist and one of the partners of the venture-capital firm Y
      Combinator, wrote a 2006 essay Are
        Software Patents Evil?
    
     
    Graham makes the following claim early on:
    
    One thing I do feel
            pretty certain of is that if you're against software patents, you're
            against patents in general. Gradually our machines consist more and
            more of software. Things that used to be done with levers and cams
            and gears are now done with loops and trees and closures. There's
            nothing special about physical embodiments of control systems that
            should make them patentable, and the software equivalent not.
    
    
    Is this true? 
    
    Graham also says,
    
    Frankly, it
            surprises me how small a role patents play in the software business.
            It's kind of ironic, considering all the dire things experts say
            about software patents stifling innovation, but when one looks
            closely at the software business, the most striking thing is how
            little patents seem to matter.
      
    
    But that paragraph is about software companies being sued by other software
    companies, and not "patent trolls".
    
    Graham also makes some other claims, in particular some about the role of
    the patent system in business competition generally. Check out what he says
    about Reveal.
    
    
    
    
    Patents
    
    Baase 4e §4.5 / 5e §4.6
    Pharmaceutical Patents
      Sofware-patent issues
      Obvious in Context
      The Benson decision
      The Flook decision
      The Diehr decision
       Some software-patent examples
      Heckel paper
      Eolas
      i4i
      NTP
      E-data
      Patent Trolls
      Bessen & Meurer
      Business-method patents
      Apple
      Stallman essay
      FRAND
      Graham essay
      KSR v Teleflex
      The Bilski Case
      Mayo Labs v Prometheus
      Abstract patents and CLS v Alice  
      Lawsuit Venue  
    
    Do patents help advance progress? or hinder it?
    
    Patents are pretty clearly a market
        regulation with the sole goal of improving innovation in
      technology. Inventors don't "deserve" to profit from their ideas; we
      simply want to make sure they are motivated to continue. In other words,
      this is purely utilitarian.
    
     Patents are intended to cover INVENTIONS rather than IDEAS. If you have
      an idea to sell hamburgers with salsa, or newspapers & beer together,
      or to create a website where people can post their own stuff, that's an
      IDEA. It can't be protected: everyone else is entitled to copy it freely.
    
    If you decide that a certain vertical market can use an XML-based word
      processor, is that an invention
      or is that a business idea?
    
    
      - patents cover the idea, not the expression 
 
- the time period is more limited
What do these have to do with computers? There are several issues about
    whether the patent system for software
    in fact helps anyone, and whether software patents fulfill their
    constitutional mandate to benefit society as a whole. These relate to the
    situation where patents are dealt with only by serious developers.
    
    Currently in the US, patents last 20 years, and generally cannot be renewed
    or extended (but see below regarding pharmaceutical patents). During that
    period, the patent owner can enforce their patent, but patent litigation is
    relatively expensive. Formerly US patents lasted 17 years from the date of granting, but to comply with the WTO
    treaty on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) the
    term was changed to 20 years from application.
    
    
    There is also an analogue to the copyright
      situation, where individuals can download software that may violate
    patents in some countries. This creates a situation somewhat related to
    file-sharing: end-users make the decision. Unlike file-sharing, there is no
    group analogous to the RIAA that is going after infringers.
    
    Look at ubuntu software installation? What about MP3 players?
    
     
    
    
     35 U.S.C. §101 (patent-eligibility law): 
     Whoever invents or discovers any new and
      useful process, machine,
      manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
      thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
      requirements of this title.
    
    The meaning of "process" is critical here: does it mean any
      procedure or method? Or does it mean "industrial process"? Historically,
      it pretty clearly was intended to mean the latter.
    
    
    
     Pharmaceutical patents
    Pharmaceutical patents are sort of the poster child for Why Patents Are
      Good For Us (though Boldrin and Levine have argued against even
      pharmaceutical patents in their book).
      Here the patent system IS generally seen as effective at encouraging
      investment: 
    
      -  Development costs are HUGE (~200 million) (maybe 100 million for a
        small, straightforward trial, but some trials need LOTS of patients,
        and/or expensive tests).
 
- Copying is not much harder than for software 
You might not at first really believe the second point above. But take a
      look at the Open Insulin Foundation, openinsulin.org.
      They are literally trying to create an open insulin-production process
      that can be implemented by individuals (though more likely by small
      groups). 
    Note that, despite these two points, pharmaceutical patents don't exactly
      encourage research on potential new drugs. New-drug research
      mostly comes from NIH-funded university research. Pharma patents primarily
      encourage investment in the FDA approval process (which is really the
      expensive part).
    
    One weirdness involving pharmaceutical patents is that a patent can be
      "for the use of"; someone can, if drug X is in the public domain, patent
      the use of X to treat disease Y (this must be in some legal sense a "new"
      use of X). In practice this is
      not much of a problem, because generic manufacturers can still make and
      market X for its old purpose, and doctors can prescribe it for its new
      purpose. Such prescriptions are sometimes said to be "off-label"; they are
      an important way for drugs to get to people who will probably be helped by
      them, but for which no company has yet done clinical trials, and never
      will.
    
    Some specific drugs:
    Cancer monoclonal-antibody drugs
    
    Cancers are caused by runaway cell replication, due to mutation.
      Traditional approaches to fighting cancer involved finding ways to kill
      cells that were dividing rapidly. Such treatment also affects cells that
      normally divide rapidly: hair roots and bone marrow, to name two groups. 
    However, mutations are ubiquitous; only some mutations lead to runaway
      replication. When this does happen, there is usually a specific genetic
      reason: the mutation unleashed some existing cellular mechanism to
      multiply. This has led to the idea that if we can identify a
      multiplicative mechanism, and find ways to shut it down, then we can
      attack cancers that utilize that mechanism. There is at least some
      evidence that many cancers share a relatively small common set of
      replication mechanisms. 
    These protein compounds that affect cellular replication are antibodies
      that are highly specific to a certain substrate; they have very narrow
      targets. The From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_cancer_chemotherapy:
      
    
    Another branch in targeted therapy is the
      increasing use of monoclonal antibodies
      in cancer therapy. Although monoclonal antibodies (immune proteins which
      can be selected to precisely bind to almost any target) have been around
      for decades, they were derived from mice and did not function particularly
      well when administered to humans, causing allergic reactions and being
      rapidly removed from circulation. "Humanization"
      of these antibodies (genetically transforming them to be as similar to a
      human antibody as possible) has allowed the creation of a new family of
      highly effective humanized monoclonal antibodies. Rituximab, a drug used to treat lymphomas, is a
      prime example. -- Wikipedia
    The point is that some cancers can be specifically targeted by certain
      antibodies, because they have specific antibody receptors not present or
      not relevant in non-cancerous cells. The receptors involved tend to be
      very idiosyncratic. Antibodies are produced by specific immune-system
      cells; an antibody is monoclonal if it is (or was at one time) produced by
      one specific cell that was repeatedly cloned. Generally speaking,
      "monoclonal" means that the antibody has only a single receptor; that is,
      its activity is very focused.
    
    None of
        these drugs would exist in the US marketplace if it were not for
        pharmaceutical patents. 
    
    On the other hand, the US Food and Drug Administration, which regulates
      new drugs, is arguably a massive government intrusion into the free
      market. Why shouldn't patent law intrude as well?
    
    
      imatinib/gleevec: leukemias, stomach cancers. It is used to treat
    cancers where the cells involved have a specific receptor. Time magazine
    hailed it as the "magic bullet against cancer" in 2001, when it was
    approved, though that was an overbroad assessment. 
    
    It is the first member of a new class of
      agents that act by inhibiting particular 
tyrosine kinase enzymes,
      instead of non-specifically inhibiting rapidly 
dividing cells. --
      Wikipedia
    The idea is that only cancer cells make these particular enzymes (in
    particular the enzyme BCR-Abl), in a way closely related to the way the
    cells become cancerous.
    
    Imatinib was the subject of a patent lawsuit in India, below.
    
    rituximab/rituxan: binds to the
      white-blood-cell surface protein CD20. This makes those cells more visible
      to existing immune-system defenses. Used to treat leukemias/lymphomas,
      also some autoimmune diseases such as lupus
    ibritumomab tiuxetan/Zevalin also
      binds to CD20; it is often tagged with a radioactive compound to deliver
      radiation therapy (that is, death) directly to the cancerous white blood
      cells.
    cetuximab/Erbitux: metastatic
      colorectal cancer, head&neck cancers. Binds to EGFR receptor; it is an
      EGFR-inhibitor.
    trastuzumab/Herceptin: breast
      cancer. Monoclonal antibody that interferes with HER2/neu receptor. In
      some breast cancers, the HER2 receptor is, as wikipedia put it, "stuck in
      the 'on' position".
    crizotinib/Xalcori: attacks lung cancers triggered by a
      mutation in the ALK gene. The ALK gene encodes a protein that triggers the
      unlimited-cell-division process of the cancer.
    vemurafenib/Zelboraf: blocks a protein that causes skin
      cells to replicate leading to melanoma.
    ipilimumab/Yervoy: T-lymphocytes (a kind of white blood
      cell) attack certain cancer cells, but there are biological mechanisms in
      place that limit this action. Ipilimumab disables these limiting
      mechanisms, allowing the T-lymphocytes to work more effectively.
    
    There are other drugs, too, of course. For some the patent-needed argument
    is just as strong; for others the situation is less clear.
    Antibiotics
    
    There are very few new antibiotics, actually. The FDA used to require not
      just proof of effectiveness, but proof that the infection that was cured
      was in fact resistant to existing antibiotics. A more serious problem is
      economics: a new antibiotic will be approved for use only in the most dire
      cases, to postpone the development of resistance. This means that, during
      the patent period, sales will be at best modest. 
    One promising new antibiotic is Teixobactin,
      discovered with a new technique for culturing soil bacteria in situ.
    
    Protein pump inhibitors (PPIs):
      used for various stomach-acid problems, including ulcers
    
      -  omeprazole/prilosec
-  lansoprazole/prevacid
-  esomeprazol/nexium
HIV: protease inhibitors moved HIV from a short-term
      acute illness to a long-term chronic illness. This made drug development
      profitable again. When AZT
      (one of the first effective anti-HIV drugs) was first applied in the early
      1990's to HIV patients, though, it was an off-label use.
    
    red/white-blood cell drugs:
          filGRAStim/neupogen      
      makes more neutrophils/other WBCs. Used for cancer/chemo/BMT patients
          erythropoietin      
         makes more RBCs: kidney disease, cancer, cancer treatment
    
    diabetes
          exENatide/byetta: this often means the patient can
      avoid taking insulin. It is offcially for type-2 (non-insulin-dependent)
      diabetes. From byetta.com: Byetta may
        also be used for other purposes not listed in this medication guide.
    
    ledipasvir
      and sofosbuvir:
      These were approved in 2014 and 2013 respectively. A combination of these
      two agents is used in the treatment of Hepatitis C; the cure rate for a
      common strain of the virus is around 95%, and serious side effects are
      rare. (Gilead Pharmaceuticals decision to price a course of treatment with
      their Harvoni brand of ledipasvir/sofosbuvir at close to $100,000 has been
      controversial; see http://www.alternet.org/personal-health/84000-hep-c-drug-only-1500.)
      
    IpiLImumab and pembroLIzumab are
      "immune-checkpoint" agents used to treat a variety of cancers by
      reinvigorating the body's own immune-system defenses. It turns out that
      the body's immune system is quite capable of attacking cancer cells, but
      it is turned off by things the cancer cells produce. For ipilimumab,
      T lymphocytes have a receptor, CTLA-4, that turns off their effectiveness;
      many cancer cells can activate this receptor. Ipilimumab binds to the
      CTLA-4 receptor and thus blocks the ability of the receptor to turn off
      the cell, thus in effect re-enabling it. For pembrolizumab,
      lymphocytes have a "programmed death" receptor PD-1 that cancer cells can
      activate to kill the lymphocyte. Pembrolizumab blocks the receptor.
    In 2015, Jimmy Carter announced he had metastatic melanoma that had
      spread to his brain. A few years earlier, his life expectancy would have
      been around six months. He was started on pembrolizumab, approved the
      previous year, and took it for six months, In October 2024, Carter
      celebrated his 100th birthday, although he was at that point in hospice
      care.
    
    In 1984, Congress passed the Drug
        Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, also known as the
      Hatch-Waxman Act. This allowed generic drug makers to use a patented drug
      in their own FDA application, so that approval would be in place as soon
      as the original patent expired (normally after 20 years). However, it also
      gave pharmaceutical developers a chance at a patent extension
      for up to five extra years, subject to the following:
    
    
      - The extension application must follow the date of FDA approval (which
        of course is after all the clinical trials are complete).
 
- The maximum length of extension is five years additional from the time
        of patent filing, or fourteen years from the date of FDA approval
        (whichever is less).
The idea here is that if it took a company fifteen years to bring a drug
    from discovery (and patent) to market, they will get ten years of
    patent-protected sales to recoup their investment rather than five.
    New Drug Rates
    Generally, only two to three dozen new pharmaceuticals receive FDA approval
    each year. In 2012 the number was 39; in 2013 it was 27. 
     
    Third-world issues with pharmaceutical patents 
    Basically, if a country is too poor to afford to treat all its citizens
      with a new drug, many may die. This has definitely been the case with some
      HIV drugs. As a result, the Third World has long argued that it should be
      exempt from pharmaceutical patents.
    
    In the mid-1990's, the WTO basically agreed, and allowed (I'm not sure of
      the exact terms) third-world countries to manufacture generic equivalents
      of first-world drugs for use within their own borders only. The
      manufacturing must be for the government's own use (eg in distributing to
      its people; the manufacturing can't be a for-profit initiative of a
      private company in that country). Also, a good-faith attempt must have
      been made first to negotiate for a reduced-rate license to manufacture the
      drug, and such profits as are made must be given to the patent holder. In
      practice, large US pharmaceutical companies often enter into
      vastly-reduced-price licensing arrangements with third-world companies.
    
    In 2005, the WTO relaxed this rule to allow poorer nations to import
      generics that would otherwise be covered by a patent. This is sometimes
      described as a "compulsory license". The manufacturer would not be
      prosecuted.
    This is perhaps the foremost third-world patent issue.
    
    On April 1, 2013, India's Supreme Court rejected an attempt by Novartis to
    patent Gleevec, known everywhere but in the US as Glivec. 
    
    Gleevec exists in two forms: the "alpha" principal form and the "beta" form.
    The issue before the Indian court was that Novartis was trying to patent the
    beta form, a small change to the existing alpha form. India added
    pharmaceutical patents to its law in 2005, but with the proviso that patents
    for new drugs had to prove significant clinical advantages over alternative
    formulations. Apparently (this is not 100% clear to me) the alpha form had been
    patented in India (perhaps the US patent had been recognized?), but that
    patent had expired.
    
      - List price of a month's worth of GleevecTM brand
        𝛽-imatinib in India: US$ 1,900
- Price of a month's worth of generic 𝛽-imatinib in India: US$ 175
- Discounted price of a month's worth of GleevecTM brand
        𝛽-imatinib in India for 95% of patients: US$ 0.
In Mumbai there is (or was) a large sign reading "Novartis: Making a killing
    in profits". The slogan remains part of a poster.
    
    See also the above-mentioned article http://www.alternet.org/personal-health/84000-hep-c-drug-only-1500.
    
    For a look at the downside of pharmaceutical donations and special pricing,
    see There
      is no such thing as "free" vaccines.
    
    
    Pharmaceutical pricing remains controversial. It was a major sticking point
    in the 2016 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations (the TPP now seems
    dead). The US (and to a lesser extent Europe) subsidizes pharmaceutical
    development for the rest of the world. Should it? There are plenty of people
    in the US who cannot afford their prescriptions.
    
    In an editorial in The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21592619-patents-drugs-are-interests-sick-well-industry-protection-should-not,
    it is claimed
     
     
      Patents on drugs are in the interests of the sick as well as the industry.
      Protection should not be weakened.
    
    Patent rights, in other words, are the only reason many new drugs are ever
    developed.
    
    Writing in The Atlantic (http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-america/259725/),
    judge Richard Posner (are judges even allowed to write for The
    Atlantic?) wrote
    
    So pharmaceuticals are the poster child for
      the patent system.
     But Posner's title was Why There Are Too Many Patents in America.
    The US patent on imatinib expired in 2015. Novartis is believed to have
      paid Sun Pharmaceuticals to delay the introduction of their generic
      formulation. When the generic was introduced, it was priced at
      around $140,000/year, versus $146,000 for brand-name Gleevec (see here).
      The price has since fallen, but not precipitously. 
    
    
    Pharmaceutical companies routinely try to patent minor chemical
    modifications of existing agents. This sometimes leads to significant
    clinical differences, but is derisively known as "evergreening". Here are a
    few stereoisomer examples, with the prefix signifying the isomeric
    difference in bold:
    
      - racepinephrine
- levocarnitine
- dexibuprofen
- escitalopram
    
    ARM patents
    If you have a smartphone, odds
      are it uses a RISC ARM
      processor.
    
    But ARM does not make processors!
    
    Instead, they design them. Companies license the design and then
    arrange with a chip foundry for the actual manufacture. Licensees often make
    minor adjustments to the overall layout, though most (the so-called "hard-core"
      licensees) make no changes to the actual processor cores. A minority
    (the "soft-core"
      licensees) do make such changes.
    
    ARM's designs are protected by copyright. It would be very difficult for
    someone to copy one of ARM's core designs and change it "just enough" so
    that copyright no longer applied; this would be a major redesign effort.
    
    But ARM's designs are also, sort of as a backup, protected by patent. Even
    if someone did re-engineer the core so as to avoid copyright
    infringement, there would still likely be instances of patent infringement.
    By the time someone designed around all ARM's patents, they might as well be
    designing an independent processor.
    
    In 2000, ARM sued picoTurbo basically
      out of existence over processor patents.
    
    In 2012, ARM licensed
    most of the RISC patent portfolio of MIPS Technologies. This protects ARM
    from being sued.
    
    Is ARM's business model appropriate?
    
    
     Patents Generally
    The fundamental justification for patents is to encourage advances in
    technology. Their justification is purely
      utilitarian; it is difficult to give a deontological rationale for
    not using someone else's invention.
    
    Ethically, the scope of the utilitarian argument can be worldwide, but
    national patent laws are generally intended for national benefit. That said,
    treaties have led to fairly uniform patent laws in the industrialized world,
    but there are serious concerns in the Third World about certain aspects of
    patent law.
    
    Also, a part of the patent process is the requirement that the inventor disclose the idea to the world. You
    cannot protect something with both a patent and trade secrecy. To put it
    another way, the patent grants you a limited monopoly in "exchange" for
    publication.
    
    
    
    Software Patents
    You cannot patent a software application as such; software
    patents are meant to protect software inventions;
    that is, particular ideas used. For example, if I am running an online
    directory service, I might patent hashing as a means of lookup (sadly, I
    might succeed, even though hashing has been well-known for many decades).
    
    Copyright protects source code and executable code; it has been extended to
    user interfaces and the Supreme Court is set to rule on the copyrightability
    of APIs. Copyright protects only the expression and not the underlying idea;
    when user interfaces are copyrighted, someone else must modify the interface
    in some ways. 
    
    Suppose that in developing your application you come up with a new feature,
    or particularly innovative algorithm, or innovative application of an
    existing algorithm, or a novel user-interface gesture (think iPhone), or new
    way of presenting data, or some other novel feature. You may be able to
    patent it, as an "invention".  You may even be able to patent a new
    business method supported by your software. Patents are for certain features
    that you consider especially innovative.
    
    If you have a patent, then nobody else can use your idea
    without your permission, even if they discovered and developed it entirely
    separately, for the lifetime of the patent.
     
    Issues with Software Patents
    
     Why are software patents even controversial? Maybe the
      basic theory is that, in computer science, almost all ideas are
        straightforward to implement. This is completely unlike every
      other field of endeavor, where, after someone comes up with an idea,
      extensive and uncertain development work is the norm. If you have an idea
      for a new pharmaceutical, you have to test it in patients. If you have an
      idea for a new brake rotor, you have to ensure that it doesn't corrode too
      fast, or get too hot, or have hidden weaknesses. But if you have a new
      software idea, developing it is pretty much only a matter of time and
      budget.
    Some people argue that patents are fundamentally flawed. That approach,
      however, leaves us without pharmaceutical patents. Here are some issues
      that are a little more specific to software:
    
      - Implementation problems with the patent office as applied to software
        (patent search is hard, trivial patents are granted). Examples: Diehr,
        Perpetual Motion.
- Software implementation is almost always obvious, and many software ideas
        are obvious. Examples: obvious-in-context, KSR
          v Teleflex, natural-order recalculation, XOR drawing, Eolas, I4I,
        NTP, Data Treasury,
      
- Problems with business-method patents, which until 2005 required
        involvement of "technological arts". Examples: State
          Street Bank, Bilski, 
 
- Fundamental problems with software patents: algorithms are
        mathematical facts. Examples: Benson, 
- Most physical systems infringe at most one or two patents. Software
        can easily infringe hundreds.
- Many software patents are very vague, potentially leading to very
        broad coverage. Examples: BT, E-data,
        , 
- Some software patents represent abstract ideas rather than a concrete
        invention. Examples: Bilski, Ultramercial,
        Alice, 
- So-called patent "trolls" exact a high cost for society. Examples: Trolls, Trolls Again. 
- Even companies that appear to have invested heavily in technology
        sometimes have only weak patent claims. Example: Apple
Complaints about the patent system as a purveyor of undeserved monopolies
      go back a long time; usually these come from the same sources as attacks
      on copyright. An implementation issue might be the (rather more
      mainstream) claim that the patent office is too free in granting patents
      for weak software ideas. We will get to business-method patents below, but
      it is not unreasonable to suppose that monopolies on a specific business
      idea are incompatible with free enterprise.
    
    One example of a fundamental software-patent problem might
    be that algorithms are can be seen as mathematical facts, not inventions.
    While novel applications of
    existing algorithms can be patented, "novel" is very subjective: one
    developer's breakthrough idea might be a standard software-engineering
    exercise to another. 
    
    Another issue is patents for the application of general, abstract principles
    to specific problems. This makes a certain amount of sense for physical
    inventions, because it is not entirely obvious what general engineering idea
    will work in a given physical context. However, in the world of software
    this kind of general-principle application is often trivial.
    There is seldom any question that the method will work, for example; it is
    as if the developer simply opened a copy of Knuth
    or CLR
    and looked up a suitable algorithm in the index. Sometimes it might have
    taken someone some effort to figure out just which algorithm is
    most suitable, but should that make the invention patentable?
    
    A related part of the problem, with aspects unique to computing, is that any
    invention has two parts:
    
      - realizing you need the invention
- actually getting it to work
In the physical world, the second often tends to be the much harder
    component. But in the software world, once you realize you have a need to do
    something, working out an implementation (at least at the "invention" stage)
    is often (not always, but often)
    very straightforward. The developers do standard design work, and look up
    algorithms in the above-mentioned Knuth and CLR. Sometimes there's an
    important optimization to be made, because the first draft wasn't fast
    enough. But that, too, is straightforward, once the limitations of the
    original approach are clear.
     What often seems to happen is that a patent is granted for an invention
      at a time when the inventor had no clear concept of how to use the idea.
      Much later, someone needed to
      get something done, and found a quick obvious solution that turned out to
      be the earlier patented one; this is the middle issue above. The Eolas
      case (below), on running applets within a browser, is a possible instance
      of this. Should early inventors be able to lock out later developers
      simply because they managed to patent a technique to solve a problem that
      was completely obvious later to anyone else faced with that same problem?
      Haven't they really patented the problem?
    To put this another way, some inventions are the result of a genuine
      inventive spark, and some are very obvious. Both kinds of inventions do
      get patents, although patent examiners try to weed out most of
      the latter. Most inventions, and probably most patents, arise because
      someone needed to be able to do something. A plausible test for
      obviousness of an invention is that, if other "people of ordinary skill in
      the art" faced the same problem, they would quickly solve it with the
      given invention. So a nonobvious invention would be one
      for which other people who worked on it would not
      immediately arrive at the solution. 
    Physical-world patents usually take quite a number of real-world
      "building" steps before they can be realized, and so the total amount of
      effort tends to make the end result reasonably "non-obvious".
      However, large numbers of computing patents appear to describe inventions
      that any competent software engineer would have come up with
      independently; that is, there is not any real inventive spark. Therefore,
      when these ideas are patented, they are not generating any social utility.
      Large numbers of computing patents often seem to
      represent an approach that any average software engineer would have come
      up with very quickly.
    Obvious in Context
    
     At the risk of being misleading about the term "obvious" as used in
      patent law, I will call this the "obvious-in-context"
      problem. Much of what passes for "invention", at least in terms of
      application of known algorithms, is really just competent software
      engineering. We might define when an invention is obvious in context as
      follows:
    If a software engineer of ordinary skill,
      familiar with the general area of programming, and familiar with common
      algorithms, and who was presented with the problem in a reasonably
        concrete setting, would readily come up with the solution in
      question.
    This is quite different from readily being able to come up with an implementation,
      given the solution. That might take significant coding, but might involve
      little if any inventive leap. The idea here is that the patented idea
      would be obvious to anyone presented with the problem it solves.
    This not, however, quite the same as the patent standard of "obviousness"
      under current law, in which discovering the applicability of an idea to a
      particular domain can be part of the novelty of an invention. For example,
      consider the use of XOR for drawing easily erasable objects on a video
      screen. We can take either of the following two approaches:
    
      - This is obvious-in-context because anyone trying to figure out how
        update the mouse position using memory-mapped video would likely think
        of XOR
- This is novel because it represents the application of a purely
        mathematical operation to the management of bitmapped video, in a
        concrete and useful way
Perhaps a more serious issue is that the problem to be solved may have
      arisen long after the patent. That is, an engineer, when faced with a
      certain problem in 2015, may find an "obvious" solution that infringes on
      a patent filed in 2010. The engineer may feel the solution would have been
      equally obvious in 2010. But perhaps the problem in question couldn't have
      been formulated in quite the same way in 2010, or perhaps the problem
      itself suggests some element of the 2010 patent invention. The usual
      patent-office standard for obviousness means that the entire
      solution would have been obvious as of 2010.
    An example here might be the Eolas applet patent.
      Web applets with embedded controls became obvious after browsers became
      ubiquitous, but Eolas was granted its patent in the early days of
      browsers, when embedded controls might have seemed much more novel. (That
      said, Eolas eventually lost its patent case because of evidence of prior
      art.)
    A hypothetical solution to a problem of physical engineering is not the
      end of the story; it remains to be seen whether the solution works in
      practice. But for software engineering, that is not a concern:
      unless the engineer has missed something, the solution will
      work.
    There are several specific facets here:
    
      - Some software "inventions" are straightforward applications
          of general algorithms to specific cases. The XOR cursor and
        spreadsheet recalculation order are examples. (Though the application of
        topological sort to spreadsheet recalculation has arguably become more
        straightforward as time has gone on.)
- Some software "inventions" are obvious in a new technological
          context, such as embedding applets in browser windows. The
        Eolas patent is an example; it teaches the embedding of active controls
        in web pages. When the patent was filed in 1994, web browsers were not
        yet "universal viewers", but as soon as they became universal
        viewers, the embedding of active controls was obvious. Similarly, some
        of the screen-manipulation gestures used by smartphones are obvious once
        the concept of a multi-touch screen is available. But perhaps part of
        the original patents here is that browsers or multi-touch screens are a
        universal building block.
- Some software "inventions" are obvious ideas that were not implemented
        earlier due to concerns that the idea would not lead to a profitable
          business. The NTP wireless-email patent might be an example.
 Another way to describe this situation is to say that many patented
      software solutions are ordinary,
      obvious applications of basic
      principles of software engineering. 
    Patent-law obviousness
     When a patent case comes to trial, the judge will often take the
      position that if the patented idea really were "obvious", then someone
      else would have patented it first! Or at least published it first. This
      (codified into the original set of rules for interpreting "obviousness")
      can be an enormous hurdle for the patent defendant. Nonetheless, for software
      anyway the obvious-in-context rule suggests that an "invention" can be
      obvious, but only of interest when other infrastructure had
      reached a certain level. 
    Another judicial hurdle is that, when faced with a claim that a patented
      invention is obvious, the judge will argue that it is only obvious in
      retrospect, and the defendants must prove it was obvious at the time of invention.
      This is impossibly hard, unless there is actual published work prior to
      the time of the invention that describes the invention. Such a publication
      would then be considered prior art.
    If prior art is published, it
      can invalidate a patent. However, if it was used privately, those users
      can continue to use their idea without paying royalties to the owner of
      the patent, but the patent may still stand. The patent can
      be challenged on the grounds of not being novel, but this is harder.
    As we consider patents below, it will often be claimed that the innovation
    is "obvious". In fact, there is sometimes (maybe even often!) evidence that
    the idea was so obvious that prior publication (required to invalidate a
    patent based on "prior art") would have been rejected by any reputable
    publisher.
     In the first facet in the list above, the obvious-in-context problem
      boils down to a general algorithm being applied to solve a specific
      problem. The Flook case (below)
      supposedly made many such inventions non-patentable. However, this isn't
      always what happens in practice, where the decision comes down to the
      question of just how much innovation was needed in applying the algorithm.
    While one can argue that a good patent system can have a very positive
    effect on business and on investment in innovation, it seems clear that a
    bad patent system can have a very negative effect. Good patents reward
    innovation but bad patents actually punish
    it.
    
    This brings us to a second patent issue that is at least somewhat
    software-specific: as a practical matter, you cannot tell what are the boundaries
    of a patent claim. This is slightly due to obfuscatory language, but the
    larger problem is the flexibility plaintiffs have in "claims construction",
    that is, in deciding what the patent covers. The E-data system, below, is an
    example of this.
    
    A third issue with software patents is functional claims:
    patents for a certain transformation, regardless of how it is
      implemented. One example is the Ultramercial patent on displaying ads
    within a video stream, as is done by Hulu. Another might be the Amazon
    "one-click" patent. No pharmaceutical manufacturer, on the other hand, would
    even dream of filing a patent for "any chemical that cures the common cold".
    
    The smartphone wars may or may not be an example of a positive use of the patent system. If
    Apple invented some breakthrough phone features for the iPhone, and patented
    them, then Google should perhaps not be allowed simply to copy them in
    Android-based smartphones. But exactly what happened here is less than
    clear; we will revisit it below. Apple did not, as it turns out, invent the
    "smart phone". Nor did they invent the multi-touch interface. They did not
    even invent the graphical interface; see www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/16/creation-myth.
     One of the central problems in the history of "patent wars" in any field
      is the exceptional expense of patent litigation; another is that the law
      puts the burden of proof on the defendant to prove a patent is invalid;
      patents are presumed valid until proven otherwise. Proving a patent's
      invalidity is not easy; realistically, this involves presenting "prior
      art". Direct challenge on the grounds of obviousness is particularly
      difficult. An added issue is that the party suing may be a patent-holding
      corporation that cannot be effectively countersued. Judges are often
      sympathetic to the "lonely inventor" whose idea is being "stolen" by a
      "big corporation". Finally, court costs are rarely awarded to those who
      win patent-infringement cases, which sometimes seems to have the effect of
      encouraging frivolous suits.
    KSR and Obviousness
     As stated earlier, the "obvious-in-context" standard is something like
      this:
    If a software engineer of ordinary skill,
      familiar with the general area of programming, and familiar with common
      algorithms, and who was presented with the problem in a reasonably
        concrete setting, would readily come up with the solution in
      question.
    The KSR v Teleflex case from 2007 does present one
      practical way of establishing obviousness: an invention is obvious if it
      is a straightforward combination of two (or sometimes more) prior-art
      ideas. This is related to the "obvious-in-context" idea because if a
      solution is obvious given the problem, then the solution is probably
      a combination of prior-art ideas (that is, well-known ideas), and
      therefore a KSR-type argument can often be made. Still, just because an
      invention is a combination of prior-art ideas does not always mean it is
      an obvious combination; there has to be some "motivation to
      combine". Sometimes there are inventions that are quite simple
      to implement, but which are not obvious.
    Here's an example that might go either way: patentpandas.org/stories/company-patented-my-idea.
      On the one hand, "interactive pop-up books" is a combination of
      traditional pop-up books with standard ways of making content interactive
      by adding LEDs and buttons and chips and absolutely-standard stuff like
      that. On the other hand, bringing computer interactivity to children's pop-up
        books might be considered to be an innovative step.
    In principle, the KSR decision rules out patents that are simple
      combinations of prior-art ideas, but doesn't apply to single-concept
      inventions. What about the XOR-mouse patent? Is this a single concept? Or
      a combination, of the XOR algorithm and the bitmapped video system? 
    
    List of software-patent issues
    Abstraction: Often patents cover the application of general
    known algorithms to special cases. This seems intrinsically obvious.
    
    Abstraction: Often patents cover "abstract ideas", which
    are not supposed to be patentable.
    
    Obvious-in-context: Many software innovations are obvious,
    but it takes a specific context to make it worth the trouble to implement
    them. 
    
    Functionality: Some software patents appear to cover a
    specific function, not a way of implementing that function.
    
    Using a Computer: it is inappropriate to patent an existing
    process that is now being implemented on a computer.
    
    Claims Inflation: patent "trolls" often rely on the broad
    interpretation of a patent, so as to cover an idea that arose years later.
    At the time the patent was filed, the later idea was nowhere in evidence.
    See E-data.
    
    Ambiguity: Claims are often written in very obfuscatory
    language. Even clearly worded software claims often have very poorly defined
    "boundaries"; ie they admit many possible different
    interpretations.
    
    
    Aeroplane Control
    A classic "broad" patent is the Wright brothers patent on "wing-warping"
      to control flight (to the Wrights, the wings were the "aero-planes",
      planing the air, the rest of it was the "flying machine"). The Wright
      brothers actually twisted the whole biplane structure -- using cables --
      to bank in a turn. This later led to the development by others of
      ailerons, which achieve the same effect but which mechanically are
      entirely different. A court ruled the Wright patent still applied: what
      mattered was the concept of
      adjusting wing angles to tilt the craft.
    This is a classic "broad patent" for a major new innovation. The courts
      have traditionally recognized "broad" patents, but somehow in software
      this distinction is often lost.
    Some have argued that the Wright brothers tried to claim a functional
      patent here: a patent on any method for turning an aircraft. This is not
      entirely correct: the Wright claim was really for a specific set of
      movements of the wing and of the rudder.
    There has also been major patent litigation about sewing machines,
      agricultural machinery, 19th-century telephones, and electric power. See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-08/apple-phone-patent-war-like-sewing-machine-minus-violence.html.
    
    
    
     Supreme Court cases limit the word "process" in USC Title 35, Chapter
      10, §101:
    
    Inventions
        Patentable: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
      composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
      obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
      this title. 
    
    
    
     Gottschalk v
        Benson, 1972 
    This case continues to be debated, although the Supreme Court has recently
    reaffirmed it. (Gottschalk is the name of the patent commissioner; the
    one-word name for the case is Benson.)
    The court stated that "the patent would
      wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be
      a patent on the algorithm itself". But that is not entirely clear.
    The algorithm was for converting so-called binary-coded decimal (in which
    decimal digits are represented in sequence each by four binary digits, so
    157 = 0001 0101 0111) to true binary. The patent was for the use of this
    algorithm on a computer, not
    universally (though the algorithm makes no sense except on a computer). 
    
    In the decision, the court cited an earlier decision: "[w]hile a scientific
    truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention,
    a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific
    truth may be", and "an idea of itself is
      not patentable." The court also said,
     Here the "process" claim is so abstract and
      sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary
      conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to
      verification of drivers' licenses to researching the law books for
      precedents and (2) be performed through any existing machinery or
      future-devised machinery or without any apparatus. 
    Applications of computer algorithms may indeed be general. In retrospect,
    should this be an issue? The end-uses above are all for software
      using the algorithm; and anyone could always use a different
    algorithm.
    
    One interpretation of the decision quote above is that the Supreme Court is
    willing to allow patents on algorithms that are an integral part of an
    invention, but not on algorithms
    that are in effect simply library routines. The Benson algorithm was clearly
    in the latter category; if it had been closely tied to a particular
    invention -- that is, if there had been a claim
      limitation -- perhaps it would have been patentable. Does that make
    any sense?
    
    One school of thought is that a "process" is not patentable unless there is
    a physical transformation involved, or unless the new invention is necessary
    in carrying out the process; this is sometimes referred to as the "Machine
    or Transformation" rule. The Supreme Court's Benson
    ruling was narrower than that, however. Nonetheless, the court did say 
    
    transformation and reduction of an article
      'to a different state or thing' is the clue
      to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
      machines. [emphasis by pld]
    
    
    At one time, I might have put the emphasis differently: the
    clue. However, the Supreme court backed away from that position in the
    Bilsky case (below).
    
    The Benson decision closes
    with an observation that lack of patentability doesn't seem to have hurt the
    1972 software industry any, and a call to Congress to figure it out (which
    may have had its origins in an amicus
      curiae brief filed by IBM, which was at the time against software
    patents):
    
      "It is noted that the creation of programs has undergone substantial and
      satisfactory growth in the absence of patent protection and that copyright
      protection for programs is presently available." 
      
       
    
 If these programs are to be
      patentable,  considerable problems are raised which only committees
      of Congress can manage, for broad powers of investigation are needed,
      including hearings which canvass the wide variety of views which those
      operating in this field entertain. The technological problems tendered in
      the many briefs before us indicate to us that considered action by the
      Congress is needed. 
    
    
    One possible way to understand Benson
    is that the patent claim limitation
    -- the application of the invention for which the patent was claimed -- was
    overly broad. Benson claimed a
    patent on any use of the algorithm on a computer.
    
    In the 1980 Supreme Court decision Diamond v Chakrabarty, about the
    patentability of genetically modified organisms, the following line from a
    1952 Congress report on patent law is cited
    
        anything under the sun
      that is made by man [is patentable]
    
    How does this square with Benson? 
    
    The Benson decision is frequently cited as evidence that the Supreme Court
    did not intend to allow software patents; the language of the decision --
    that the algorithm was a fundamental mathematical fact -- can be read as
    supporting this. Others use Benson as an example of a case that, with the
    benefit of hindsight, seems more and more strongly to have been wrongly
    decided; that in patenting an algorithm on a computer, one is not patenting
    a mathematical idea. Or, at the very least, Congress should simply heed the
    Court's call to address this issue directly. It doesn't help any that the
    court seems to have misunderstood the concept of widely varying
    applications.
    
    In the Diehr case, below, the Supreme Court seems to have allowed the
    patenting of a much simpler algorithm (really not an algorithm at all) in
    the context of a specific application to a method of manufacturing
    rubber. Is the only issue with the Benson patent the fact that it was so
    general? Aren't most software ideas very general? 
    
    
    Parker v Flook, 1978
    
    In this case, the Supreme Court dealt with an invention that used a computer
    to analyze temperature fluctuations within a catalytic converter, apply a
    smoothing algorithm to discount transient fluctuations, and raise an alarm
    when the averaged temperature was outside of preset limits (the algorithm
    apparently also had something to do with updating those limits). 
    
    The only novel feature of the method is a
      mathematical formula. In Gottschalk v. Benson, we held that the discovery
      of a novel and useful mathematical formula may not be patented. The
      question in this case is whether the identification of a limited category
      of useful, though conventional, post-solution applications of such a
      formula makes respondent's method eligible for patent protection. 
    
    The court ruled that the patent had to be judged as if the algorithm at
    stake were prior art; that is, the algorithm cannot be counted as part of
    the innovation.
    
    Respondent's process is unpatentable under
      101, not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component,
      but because once that algorithm is
        assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered
      as a whole, contains no patentable invention. Even though a phenomenon of
      nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application
      of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a
      phenomenon cannot support a patent
        unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.
      [emphasis added -- pld]
    
    
    One difference between Flook and Benson was that in the Benson
    case there was essentially no claim limitation, while in Flook
    the claim was limited to a specific application of temperature control. 
    
    There has been some criticism of Flook
    because the Supreme Court was vague as to the distinction between §101, on
    patent eligibility itself, and §103, on restrictions due to prior art and
    obviousness.Such a low rate would have caused potential patent plaintiffs to
    think twice about filing a lawsuit using a weak patent. 
    
    Flook is arguably an important case, but alas often seems overlooked in the
    real world. Consider, for example, a patent for the application of a
    standard algorithm to a particular problem:
    
      - Steir patent for overlaying a hairstyle on the image of a person
- Pardo & Landau patent for using "topological sort" to establish an
        evaluation order for formulas
Both of these patents were granted. Arguably, however, both are trivial applications of standard algorithms. In
    fact, more often than not patents that use general, well-known algorithms
    don't seem to be rejected on Flook
    grounds, even when there is essentially no inventiveness in the application
    of the algorithm.
    
    
    Diamond v Diehr, 1981
    
    On the face of it, the Supreme Court ruled here that just because an
    invention incorporates a software component, this does not make the
    invention ineligible for patent. The Diehr invention used a thermocouple to
    monitor the temperature in a mold of curing rubber, connected to a computer
    that read the raw temperature values and did some computation to determine
    when the rubber was finished. While the majority held that the invention was
    just patentable, Justice Stevens (of Sony v Universal) wrote in dissent of
    three problems he had with the Diehr patent [division into paragraphs
    added]:
    
    First, there is not a word in the patent
      application that suggests that there is anything unusual about the
      temperature-reading devices used in this process -- or indeed that any
      particular species of temperature-reading device should be used in it. 
      
      Second, since devices for constantly measuring actual temperatures-on a
      back porch, for example-have been familiar articles for quite some time, I
      find it difficult to believe that a patent application filed in 1975 was
      premised on the notion that a process of constantly measuring the actual
      temperature had just been discovered. 
      
      Finally, the [PTO] expressly found that the only difference between the
      conventional methods of operating a molding press and that claimed in
      [the] application rests in those steps of the claims which relate to the
      calculation incident to the solution of the mathematical problem or
      formula used to control the mold heater and the automatic opening of the
      press.
    
    
    In other words, Stevens felt that the Diehr invention should not be
    patentable, because the only novel
    feature was the use of the computer, and algorithms should not be
    patentable.
    
    
    The Federal Circuit
    Diehr was decided in 1981. In 1982, Congress created a special
    appeals court for patent cases, the Federal Circuit; all patent cases
    appealed from the federal district courts then went to the Federal circuit.
    Patent cases are technically complex, and pose a problem for judges. The
    theory was that the Federal Circuit would thus gain expertise in patent
    cases, and would be better able to rule consistently.
    
    The Supreme Court then got out of the patent-case business for a long while,
    presumably in order for the Federal Circuit to develop its own legal
    theories.
    
    There are still arguments in favor of this single-patent-circuit idea:
    patent decisions in different circuits were often significantly different,
    and "general-purpose" district-court judges typically did not have the
    technical background to understand some patent issues. However, there is
    also a theory that the Federal Circuit plan backfired massively. See http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/how-a-rogue-appeals-court-wrecked-the-patent-system/,
    especially the article's title.
    
    Overall, the Federal Circuit appears to have been from the beginning very
      friendly to patent claims, and unwilling to address the broader
    interests of the rest of society in having patents invalidated.
    Perhaps we all benefit from Apple's investment in innovation that
    might not have been made without the patent system to protect it. But for
    every Apple (and there is really only one), there are thousands of petty
    patent cases that in effect reduce
    the incentive to innovate. If an innovative solution will cost you tens of
    millions in unforeseen patent litigation, it's best not to bother.
    
    Here is a quote from the rogue-appeals-court article above:
    
      In the two decades before the creation of the Federal Circuit, appeals
        courts sided with patent holders in only 20 to 40 percent of cases. ...
        In contrast, the Federal Circuit sided with patent holders more than 80
        percent of the time during its first year on the bench.
     
    It was the Federal Circuit that developed the original patent test for
    "obviousness": there had to be documented evidence in the prior art that
    suggested that someone was aware that the combination of new features in the
    new invention might be desirable. This was known as the
    "teaching-suggestion-motivation" test. It led to the patenting of many
    software ideas that might be so obvious that nobody would have bothered to
    write them down.
    
    The Supreme Court's Benson, Flook and Diehr patents might have been read as
    banning software patents. It was largely the Federal Circuit (with the
    complicity of the Patent Office) that undermined these precedents. And it
    was the Federal Circuit that ruled, in the State Street Bank case (below),
    that business methods were patentable.
    
    By making the Federal Circuit hear only patent cases, the judges focused
    solely on patent issues. The interests of the public were nowhere
    represented.
    
    
    
    Reading original patent descriptions
     You can look them up online. To use the patent office files, go to the
      search-by-patent-number page: 
          http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm
    
    Google can also be used to search for patents at http://google.com/patents;
    their format is often better.
    
    The legal basis of a patent lies not in the description, or the abstract, or
    the illustrations, but in the claims. See 
        http://www.danshapiro.com/blog/2010/09/how-to-read-a-patent-in-60-second
    
    and
        http://www.bpmlegal.com/howtopat5.html
    
    for more information.
    
    
     PTO (Patent & Trademark Office) problems: 
    
    
      - researching "prior art" to determine whether ideas are "novel"
 
- secrecy of the process 
- granting of patents to ideas that are "obvious"
 ignorance is no defense: "submarine" patents 
      The entire process is secret: you can be making good-faith effort to be
      noninfringing and get hit with a huge verdict. 
    Infringement is considered willful
      if you had advance notice of infringing. Your belief that the patent was
      invalid is NOT generally a defense (although some judges have recently
      been allowing this). Damages automatically triple. 
    Maybe the central problem is that at the time of patent application,
      there is nobody representing the interests of the public. (Later on there
      is now a period when the new patent application is public, and
      there is now a large community devoted to objecting to such patents at
      that stage.)
    A good example of the failure of the PTO is the
      issue of granting a patent (11047359)
      to a perpetual motion machine. Such a machine cannot
      exist, and so cannot be "useful". Yet this patent was granted. See unmakeme.com/2022/05/09/patenting-your-perpetual-motion-machine
      for the history, including the patent examiner's initial denial and a
      discussion of how the inventor wore down the examiner's resistance. 
    For another tale, this time about a perpetual-motion patent that was
      rejected, but maybe not for the right reasons, see www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/10/11/the-patent-law-of-perpetual-motion/id=19828.
      
    
    
     Three Groups of Stakeholders:
    
    
      - small inventors 
 
- large corporations 
 
- patent-holding companies 
Where do we fit in? 
    
    Patent-holding companies are sometimes known as
      "trolls", as in "the troll under the bridge, demanding tolls". They are
      often seen as parasitic: they do not, for example, actually produce
      anything. Is this a fair characterization? They do, after all, create a
      market for small inventors.
    How large corporations manage: 
    
    
      - patent banks 
 
- legal departments 
 
- cross-licensing 
 Small inventors: 
    
    
      - market your invention yourself?? 
 
- sell to a holding company? (These are tricky places. They produce
        nothing, they interfere with progress, but they do
        produce a market for new patents.) 
Many times, when patent reform is proposed it is the small-inventors
      community that is most up in arms. Should we care?
    
    
    
    
    Legal advantages of small inventor: somewhat diminished with rise in legal
    fees & increased ambiguity of patent claims
     But small inventors can still
      sell to patent-holding companies. 
     Legal situation of large corporations: 
    
    
      - hard for small inventors to sue them 
 
- can cross-license 
    
    Examples of
          software patents
     
    Here's an interesting list of some software patents, supposedly "random"
      though some particularly famous ones are sprinkled in:
          http://bat8.inria.fr/~lang/hotlist/free/licence/patents.html
    
    Another list can be found at: http://www.textfiles.com/law/softpat.txt
    
     
    In the examples here, try to keep separate the idea of the invention from
    how you might implement it.
    
    CPU Stack Pointer register
    
    Patent 3794980,
      to George Cogar,
      1971. Supposedly, though I can't find the source, this was purchased by
      DEC [?] and eventually placed in the public domain. Or not enforced. Or,
      possibly, it was in fact licensed by Intel/Motorola/everyone_else.
    
    ATT setuid-bit patent 
    Patent 4135240,
      invented by Dennis Ritchie, applied for in 1972 and later placed by
      AT&T in the public domain. The Supreme Court had just ruled in Benson
      that software couldn't be patented; ATT apparently got the patent because
      they claimed it was hardware. This patent was dedicated to the
      public domain in 1979. This patent is certainly a deep idea: if a certain
      bit is set in the filesystem information node for a file (not in the file
      itself), then when the file is executed,
      it runs with the privileges of its owner and not the user. Before then
      (and after; look up why Windows has all those svchost
      processes), there were complex ad-hoc methods for running selected
      programs with elevated (or alternative) privileges.
     
     British Telecom Hyperlink patent
     Patent 4873662.
      BT filed in 1976; the patent was granted in 1989. In 2000 they attempted
      to sue a large number of websites. The patent itself apparently refers to
      a system in which multiple remote users can access "blocks" of data on a
      central computer.
    
    Here, the arguable problem is that BT's claims are much too broad and
      vague.
    Altavista patents on web search
    
    Altavista did have several such patents on basic web "crawling". Most
      were predated by the "archie" archive-searcher for ftp sites, developed by
      Alan Emtage in 1989. Altavista was purchased by CMGI, which then tried to
      demand licensing fees for its patents.
    
    RSA encryption
    Patent 4405829:
      Here is a short description 
    
    Choose primes p and q. 
      Reveal n=pq publicly.
      Find e and d so xed = x mod n (this is not hard) Common values
      for e: 3, 5, 17, 257, 65537. Note (xe)d = xed.
      (n,e) is the public key, d is the private key. A plaintext p is encrypted
      as c = pe mod n; it is decrypted as cd mod n = ped
      mod n = p. The plaintext p is most likely a key for a conventional cipher.
    RSA uses standard high-precision arithmetic in its calculations; the
      underlying number theory has been well-known for centuries. The patent was
      for the APPLICATION of these standard methods to encryption. That
      application was certainly novel. 
     The RSA patents finally expired, after much controversy. Part of that
      controversy was self-induced; the patent owner at one point appeared
      to grant a general license for noncommercial use, but then backed away
      from that.
    
    The RSA idea is not "obvious-in-context". In fact, RSA is, for many
      people, the classic Good Example for why software patents are needed.
     Multimedia
    
     Compton filed a patent in 1989 on multimedia, despite Apple Hypercard in
      ~1987. 
     Steir patent
    Patent 5,060,171
      on artificially adding hair to a person's image [Garfinkel article;
      obvious-in-context; Flook standard?]
    G.729
    This is a voice-compression patent for telephony use. The normal data
      rate for voice is 64 Kbps; G.729 reduces this to 8 Kbps. Given the idea
      of such compression, figuring out an implementation is
      definitely nontrivial, and figuring out an implementation usable in
      real-time for simple CPUs is harder still.
    But eventually open-source alternatives to G.729 appeared. The problem
      was that G.729 was the standard; alternatives were usually not recognized
      by at least one step along the path.
    
    Patents on G.729 are now expired (as of 2017)
     
    E-data
    This is the canonical example of how a vague patent description can lead
      to "claims expansion". The original patent was for an in-store kiosk at
      which a customer could select a number of music tracks to be written on
      the spot to a cassette tape. But E-Data argued that it also applied to
      home music sales, like iTunes.
     
     Eolas applet patent
    About a way for running "applets" in a browser window, with embedded
        controls. See below. A good candidate example for "obvious in
      context"; the idea is obvious to anyone thinking of the browser
      as a universal interface. (That the implementation is also
      obvious is just a given.)
    
    NTP v RIM: the blackberry patent. See below.
    Spreadsheet natural-order recalculation
    Early spreadsheets restricted cells to referring to cells in earlier
      rows, or in earlier columns. Natural-order recalculation means that any
      cell dependencies are allowed, as long as the dependencies are not
      circular. The patent was filed in 1970; the topological-sort algorithm for
      implementing it was published in 1963. The spreadsheet was not invented
      until 1979. Once the spreadsheet was invented, natural-order
      recalculation becomes obvious.
    Using XOR to write to video memory
    You use XOR once to display the content, and a second time to erase it.
      Was this well-known enough in 1976 to be obvious? Again this is a
      candidate for "obvious in context"; anyone needing to write to and then
      restore a memory buffer (eg a video buffer) would naturally think of using
      XOR. But also note that XOR is the implementation, not the
      "idea".
    
    Lempel-Ziv / LZW compression,
    patents 4464650 [?], 4558302
     Lempel and Ziv published their compression scheme in 1978; Terry Welch
      published an improvement in 1984. CompuServe used this compression
      mechanism for the GIF file format, introduced in 1987. A year later, they
      noticed that the algorithm was patented, and that the patent was currently
      held by Unisys. Allegedly, Unisys told Compuserve at that time that they
      would not need to pay royalties.
    
    In 1999, Unisys demanded that some noncommercial websites pay a $5000 fee
      for hosting files in the gif format (an interesting strategy, given that
      the sites were not themselves rendering the images). Some commercial sites
      were asked for even more. It's not clear whether anyone paid it; most
      affected sites rapidly switched to .jpeg or .png. Some observers were
      especially offended by the fact that Unisys allowed the use of the GIF
      format as a free standard until it became well-established, and then
      demanded fees.
    
    There's some question as to whether this was the only or even the
      dominant reason for the shift to PNG format; the latter does offer more
      features (especially alpha and gamma) than GIF, and is a lossless format
      unlike JPEG.
    
    Note that LZW compression is not
      "obvious-in-context"; you can realize you need compression and still work
      very hard to develop LZW.
    
    Newer compression techniques are even less obvious. These would include
      the patents on the MP3 sound-compression strategy, and the G.729
      voice-compression algorithm. 
    Bandwidth-sharing patents
    There are a number of patents for deciding how to share bandwidth among a
      set of customers (eg of an ISP, or guests at a hotel). They all depend on
      the deficit-round-robin
        implementation of Weighted Fair Queuing. Typically these take the
      form of a strategy for sharing unreserved bandwidth in support of a
      specific business goal. 
    Canadian patent 2750345
      discloses a method for assigning users to various "zones" (or traffic
      "classes"), and ensuring that excess bandwidth is assigned to each zone in
      proportion to the current activity in that zone. This is the
      basic idea of so-called Fair Queuing, extended to having multiple zones.
    Generally, queuing systems adjust bandwidth of a user by adjusting the
      amount of data dequeued for that user during each dequeuing cycle. If, on
      each dequeuing round, Alice gets 2000 bytes and Bob gets 3000 bytes, then
      Bob will get 50% more bandwidth. This amount of data dequeued is known as
      the quantum for that user.
    The patent claim 1 states that there is
    a quantum manager for dynamically adjusting
      the values of a plurality of quantums, each of the queues having a
      respective quantum associated therewith
    a dequeuing module for selectively dequeuing
      data from the queues and passing the data to one or more outgoing network
      interfaces;
    wherein, when a selected queue has no
      guaranteed bandwidth rate or has already reached its guaranteed bandwidth
      rate, the dequeuing module dequeues at most an amount of data from the
      selected queue up to the quantum of the selected queue before dequeuing
      data from another of the queues; and 
    the quantum manager dynamically adjust
        the quantums in proportion to tracked user load under each of the zones
      such that the quantum of the selected queue is higher than the other
      quantums while the zone to which the selected queue corresponds has higher
      user load than the other zones....
    The idea here is that the quantum is adjusted dynamically to reflect the
      bandwidth.
    The defendant's system did this dequeuing on an average
      basis, but the amount dequeued in each round was not a
      fixed quantum chosen "in proportion to tracked user load". That is,
      instead of giving Alice and Bob fixed quantums of 2000 and 3000, maybe the
      quantums over three successive rounds would be (2000, 1000), (3000, 7000),
      (1000, 1000). These add up to 6000 and 9000, respectively, so Bob is still
      getting 50% more bandwidth than Alice on average. 
    Does that matter?
    MP3 patents and lawsuits
    The MP3 idea was not obvious,
      and remains fairly complex. Alcatel-Lucent v Microsoft: Alcatel-Lucent won
      $1.5 billion in an infringement
      suit about mp3 decoders Feb 22, 2007 
     MS countersued for other patents 
    The judge eventually set aside the damages, and the appellate court
      agreed. 
    Aug 6, 2007: MS won new trial
     MS then sued A-L for other patents. 
     check out mp3licensing.com
      (Thompson) Royalty Rates: basic mp3 decoder: $0.75/unit 
     MP3 was published in 1991. Did all US mp3 patents expire in 2011?
      Original holder: Thompson Consumer Electronics & Fraunhofer Institute.
      These still hold the "core" mp3 patents. 
     MP3 Patent claimants: 
    
      -  Thompson 
-  Fraunhofer 
-  Sisvel / Audio MPEG 
-  Texas MP3 Technologies 
-  Alcatel-Lucent 
To date, (some) patent holders have announced that no action will be taken
    against open-source decoders. The mp3 compression algorithm is
      admittedly a deep idea. Part of it involves the use of wave decomposition
      to store the information more efficiently; part of it involves
      "psychoacoustics" to identify parts of a sound file that are "unhearable"
      and so can be deleted. 
    
     
     
    
    
    MS has patented the FAT disk format. Here is a summary of the events from
      the Public Patent Foundation, which had challenged that patent:
    
    In April 2004, the Public Patent Foundation
      filed a formal request with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
      to revoke Microsoft Corporation's patent on the FAT File System, touted by
      Microsoft as being "the ubiquitous format used for interchange of media
      between computers, and, since the advent of inexpensive, removable flash
      memory, also between digital devices." In its filing, PUBPAT submitted previously unseen prior art showing
      the patent, which issued in November 1996 and is not otherwise due to
      expire until 2013, was obvious and, as such, should have never been
      granted. The PTO granted PUBPAT's request in June 2004 and provisionally
      rejected the patent in September 2004. In response to the rejection,
      Microsoft made amendments to the patent's claims. The
        PTO proceeded to allow the amended form of the patent. PUBPAT had no
        right to appeal that decision. 
    
    The fact that PubPat can't appeal or even respond to the decision is a
      serious procedural issue. If you are sued by Microsoft for using the FAT
      format, you will be allowed to
      respond to Microsoft's post-2004 amendments to the patent claims. But you
      will probably not.
    
    Microsoft is now actively licensing the format to flash-card
      manufacturers. Why not switch to the free ext2 filesystem? Because that is
      impossible if the device in question has embedded software to read the FAT
      format.
    
    It is unclear which patents Microsoft is most interested in pushing.
      While there are legitimate reasons for thinking that FAT itself might not
      be patentable, Microsoft later introduced a strategy for supporting both
      long filenames and also "8.3" filenames (8 char name, 3 char extension).
      The patent that covers the dual-name strategy is less vulnerable to
      "obviousness" or "prior art" challenges. 
    
    Microsoft sued the TomTom people (http://arstechnica.com/microsoft/news/2009/02/microsoft-sues-tomtom-over-fat-patents-in-linux-based-device.ars),
      because TomToms, although they are based on Linux, use the FAT filesystem
      internally. The suit was settled
      two months later, after TomTom agreed to switch to the ext2 filesystem.
    
    FAT is a good example of an idea that is obvious to anyone presented with
      the problem of how to create a
      simple filesystem suitable for small devices. However, there is the added
      problem of it's being standard
      (although an unofficial one); you can't just implement a workaround.
    
    
    
    
     Photoshop and patents
    It might seem reasonable that such a complex program as Adobe Photoshop has
    been effectively protected by patents. However, I can find no evidence that
    this is the case. I did find the
    following:
    
    Macromedia has sued Adobe for patent infringement over some Photoshop
    options (http://www.managingip.com/Article/1327272/Macromedia-claims-Photoshop-patent.html)
    
    The leading open-source alternative to Photoshop, gimp,
    may have had more trouble with Microsoft patents than Adobe's. In general,
    there are lots of notes out there from gimp developers discussing their
    patent woes. (I lost my specific reference, though.) Gimp has had to
    struggle with the LZW patent on the gif format (US expiration 2003, Europe
    2004), and the possible jpeg patent.
     
     
    
     
     
     
    
     
     Patent infringement suits
    Note that we do not generally have
    much access to the judge's reasoning in these cases. There may be a written
    opinion, but often not, and in any event we generally don't have ready
    access to many of the documents offered in evidence. 
    
    (Some of the documents, though not
    all, are available from the Law Library.)
    
    
    
    
    (In the link above, correct the spelling of "pdf")
    
    Paul Heckel wrote Debunking the Software
      Patent Myths for the June 1992 Communications of the ACM. Heckel
    approaches software patents as a small inventor who has sued Apple over
    Hypercard and is in general very strongly pro-patent. He was actually faced
    with huge software-development debts and no future market because Apple had
    reproduced his idea. He makes several claims about some well-known early
    software patents.
    
    4197590,
    January 1976
     Method for dynamically
        viewing image elements stored in a random access memory array
    
    The use of XOR here (using XOR to draw and also to erase) was mathematically
    well-known. Is this an innovative application, or a straightforward one?
    
    Heckel calls the patent "largely the invention of the frame buffer".
    However, the concept of a framebuffer, or memory-mapped display (in which
    the video screen is memory-mapped into a location in RAM, so that writing to
    the screen is as simple as writing to memory) was definitely prior art; the
    patent dates from 1976 but there was an article on the idea by Michael
      Noll in the Communications of the ACM (not a research
    journal) in 1971. Evans
      and Sutherland began selling framebuffer hardware in 1974 (for
    ~$50,000!). The problem with frame buffers was that, in the 1970's, RAM was
    extremely expensive! Framebuffers were an idea that wasn't so much as
    invented as waited for the price to come down.
    
    The patent application claims that they invent a way for a small (eg
    416x312) graphics window to allow viewing of a larger 2048x2048 virtual
    display, and panning across. That is
    a significant invention. However, Cadtrak attempted to enforce the
    XOR-cursor portion of the patent alone.
    
    From the patent abstract:
    
    A computer graphics display system including
      random access raster memory for storing data to be displayed, a raster
      memory control unit for writing data into the raster memory, a video
      control unit for causing such information to be displayed on a CRT display
      screen....An XOR feature allows a selective erase that restores lines
      crossing or concurrent with erased lines. The XOR feature permits part of
      the drawing to be moved or "dragged" into place without erasing other
      parts of the drawing. 
    
    
    It seems to me that a major claim of this patent, and the only relevant
    claim past the 1984 introduction of the Macintosh, is the XOR feature.
    
    It is legitimate to try to enforce just a single claim; if the Patent Office
    thinks any of your claims are too obvious, they are supposed to say so.
    However, claiming that the XOR is nonobvious makes at least some sense in the context of the original patent;
    the idea is much more obvious as a standalone operation.
    
    For the XOR patent, the context was the development of memory-mapped video.
    At that point, XOR became the "obvious" way to update the screen so as to
    allow a very fast and easy undo. But without practical experience with
    memory-mapped video, the idea simply seems obscure.
    
    
    4398249,
    August 1970
    This is the natural-order-recalculation
      patent, 4398249; commonly used in spreadsheets. This was an
    invention of Rene K. Pardo and Remy Landau in 1970. 
    
    It is a classic example of applying a well-known algorithm to a specific
    case.
    The idea is to take a set of formulas (spreadsheet cells, for example)
      that have dependencies: some cells depend on other cells in that they use
      the value of the other cell when computing their own value. We want to
      find a way to evaluate all the cells correctly, unless there is an actual
      circularity. 
    
    Cell A depends
        on B if A needs B's value in its formula 
      Rule: Before calculating A, calculate all cells A depends
        on. 
      Normally this is done iteratively: first evaluate all cells that depend on
      nothing, then those cells that depend on the ones just done, etc etc.
      
      More formally:
      Let Known_Cells be the set of all cells we can calculate initially, ie
      that do not depend on any other cells.
      repeat
           search the spreadsheet for cells which depend
      only on Known_Cells.
           Calculate their value, and add them to
      Known_Cells
      until there are no new Known_Cells
    
    The algorithm is called "topological sort"; published in the CS literature
    in 1963.
     
    Heckel claims that what Pardo and Landau really invented was the
    spreadsheet, although (apparently) in primordial form not recognizable by
    later spreadsheet pioneers such as Dan Bricklin (VisiCalc, first released in
    1979); Bricklin is generally recognized as the inventor of the spreadsheet.
    Heckel does not name any software product Pardo and Landau produced. There
    was indeed an important legal case regarding the patentability
    of the idea; initially their request was denied by the PTO as an "algorithm.
    It is now considered to be an "early" software patent. 
     Spreadsheets were a brilliant idea (Dan Bricklin, VisiCalc?). How
      significant, as an invention, is natural-order recalculation? Was it a
      major insight? Or did someone finally pick up their copy of Knuth and look
      for an appropriate algorithm?
    Bricklin, by the way, did try to patent VisiCalc, but was unable to,
      because in 1979 (two years before Diehr) he was unable to.
      VisiCalc was a software application. See www.bricklin.com/patenting.htm.
      There might have been some patentable general principle -- after all,
      Pardo and Landau managed to get their patent in 1970 -- but officially
      algorithms could not be patented since Benson in 1972. Pardo and
      Landau just managed to get lucky.
    Pardo and Landau sold the patent to the company Refac,
    which Heckel characterizes as "a white knight in the fight against the
    patent pirates". However, note the following line from the appellate court
    in Refac v Lotus, at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/Federal/judicial/fed/opinions/95opinions/95-1350.html:
    
    The district court did not abuse its
      discretion in holding that the '249 patent is unenforceable
        on the ground of inequitable conduct. [emphasis added]
    
    
    Apparently Pardo and Landau were told by the USPTO that their patent was not
    fully disclosed; specifically
    
    [T]he disclosure is not deemed of the level
      which would enable one with ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
      invention. The flow diagram which applicants represent in figure 2 is not
      of the detailed level which a programmer would need in order to write a
      program from.
    
    
    They presented three supposedly disinterested witnesses who each submitted
    an affidavit that, yes, they could implement the desired program from the
    patent description. However, one of the three, Robert F Bullen, had a
    previous business relationship with Landau, that neither of them disclosed.
    
    So much for "white knights".
    
    There remains the broader concern that Pardo and Landau did not in fact
    appear recognize that they had a "spreadsheet", and that Dan Bricklin was
    the first to grasp that concept, and that what Pardo and Landau did
    have was just the idea of using topological sort when evaluating a large
    number of expressions with dependencies. 
    
    Here's the abstract of Pardo & Landau's patent, slightly edited, for
    compiling a set of formulas when some formulas may depend on the values of
    other formulas:
    
    A process and apparatus (compiler program)
      carried out on a digital computer for converting a source program into an
      object program. The source program [consisting of a set of formulas] is
      entered into a first storage area of a computer. ... The compiler program
      then examines each formula to determine whether it has been defined [that
      is, whether it has no dependencies on as-yet-undefined
      formulas]. If the first formula has been defined, it is removed from the
      first storage area; placed in a second storage area; and marked as being
      defined. if the first formula examined has not been defined, it is
      retained in the first storage area. The compiler program repeats this
      process for each formula in the first storage area. After the formulas in
      the first storage area have been examined, the compiler program determines
      whether any formulas have been added to the second storage area. If so,
      the compiler program repeats the examination of the individual formulas
      still retained in the first storage area. The compiler program repeats the
      process until all formulas have been defined; added to the second storage
      area; and marked as being defined. The content of the second storage area
      is an object program which is executable by the computer. 
    
    
    
    Heckel's own patent was 4736308.
    It was described as covering the display of two or more strings together on
    the screen (apparently scrolling with two or more subwindows). The argument
    was made that if scrolling was prior art, and subwindows were prior art, how
    could a trivial combination of them be patentable? Heckel's claim is that
    his patent actually covers a Hypercard-like product (hypertext plus
    button-activated scripts), though this is not clear from the patent
    abstract. 
    
    As in other software patent disputes, Heckel's idea to some extent fits the
    model of the application of general software engineering principles to solve
    a particular problem. However, Heckel's patent also has an element of how to
    frame the programming environment for the user; this would appear to be a
    genuine user-interface innovation. (Though note that much of the innovation
    was done by Xerox in the development of the Smalltalk environment.)
    
    
    
    
     Eolas
        v Microsoft
    
    Patent 5838906:
      Distributed hypermedia method for
        automatically invoking external application providing interaction and
        display of embedded objects within a hypermedia document, filed
      in October 1994.
    
    The alleged invention is about a way for running "applets" in a browser
      window. Is this really an "invention" at all?
    
    Back in 1992, browsers just displayed images and static text. However, it
      was clear by then that applications could display content in windows
      created and "owned" by other applications; for example, MS Word could at
      that time display an Excel subwindow.
    
    What was not foreseen was that browsers would become universal viewers of
      just about everything. Once they did, though, the Eolas "invention" --
      displaying a certain kind of content in a browser -- does become obvious.
      Should this make the idea not patentable? Eolas finally did lose their
      patent, but not for this reason.
    
     Microsoft v Eolas (+ Univ of California, as part of UCSF): 
      MS lost this case in 2004; was ordered to pay $521 million.  They
      then won the right to a new trial, but settled in 2007 before the
      beginning of the new trial. There are suggestions on the web that the
      settlement amount was in the range of $100 million. These may be pure
      speculation, but the odds are they settled for less than the original
      verdict. 
    Between the end of the first trial and the settlement, a PTO
      re-examination upheld the patent. However, the examiners discovered that a
      crucial feature of the Eolas patent that was not prior art was that the
      applet began running immediately, with no user input (like YouTube videos
      do today). Microsoft modified Active-X for a while so that it did not
      start automatically; users had to press "run". This "workaround" possibly
      gave Microsoft an edge in the negotiations.
    The patent covers 
    
    a system allowing a user of a browser
      program ... to access and execute an embedded program object [or small
      computer program, often referred to as "applets" or "plug-ins"]
     Patent filed 1994, granted 1998, USPTO review 2004, upheld 2005
    
    See http://cse.stanford.edu/class/cs201/projects-99-00/software-patents/hypermedia.html
    
     "Viola" prior art: may or may not be relevant: see http://www.viola.org
     The Viola browser project was found by the district court to have been
      "abandoned", but the circuit court found that Viola version 1.0 was
      "abandoned" only in the sense that it was replaced with version 2.0. 
     Part of the technical issue was about the meaning of the term
      "executable application". The court allegedly gave this broad meaning.
      Microsoft claimed it only meant "standalone applications". 
     Eolas was started by Michael Doyle, faculty member of UCSF. UC Berkeley
      is apparently the owner of the patent.
    
    Doyle certainly had some early ideas, that came before Java applets.
    
    Had the Eolas patent been more aggressively enforced (and been more
      enforceable), it would have been a huge impediment to the world-wide web.
    
    October 2009: Eolas has launched a major lawsuit against just about
      everyone: press
        release. The list of defendants includes lots of sites that use
      web-embedded objects: amazon, apple, eBay, and youtube.
    
    View 1: Eolas developed some early web-embedding technology, and got
      really lucky
      View 2: Eolas patented Microsoft's 1990 Object Linking and Embedding idea,
      and got a 20-year license to fleece us
      View 3: Eolas might control a "critical" piece of the web standards.
    
    
    Consider the actual Eolas patent claim again. They have allegedly patented
    the idea that an applet could be displayed automatically within a browser
    window. In a sense, they have patented the idea that browsers can display
    certain kinds of content.
    
    (Actually, their claim oscillates between the idea of displaying an applet,
    and the idea of displaying it automatically.
    This is a tricky issue.)
    
    Who had the idea that browsers could display any
    content, and thus that that was all you really needed? One version of VMware
    used a browser plugin to view your virtual machine's console! 
    
    Maybe the deepest problem with the Eolas patent is that the whole idea of
    embedding one window in another is trivial.
    The implementation might take some effort, but the conceptual idea does not
    require any research or trial and error. Embedding an application window in
    a browser window might not have been obvious back in 1994, but
      only because browsers weren't well understood. Normally, if you
    patent a technique or machine, it will almost always become at least
    somewhat obvious in retrospect, but here the issue is stronger. It's that
    the idea here was inevitable, once
    browsers grew to the point that they were used to view all sorts of things.
    It's as if someone tried to patent a handful of general browser strategies,
    without developing them, in the hopes that one of them would pan out and
    they could collect licensing fees. (Eolas did generate a working version of
    their embedding idea, but they
    didn't do anything to popularize it as part of the web.)
    
    To try to put it another way, advances in software often lead to radical
    changes in how we use the software. Consider browsers, or wireless, for
    example. Radical change in use patterns often leads to demands for obvious
    new features, that previously were either impractical or simply irrelevant.
    
    PTO review
    Here's the PTO
      review upholding the Eolas '906 patent in 2005.
    
    One of the things to get out of this document is the sense in which the PTO
    process favors the inventor; they are legally bound to interpret the
    inventor's claims in the most favorable light. This is because the
    assumption is (required to be) made that the PTO got the patent right in the
    first place; thus, the appeal is not neutral.
    
    See Page 3 (p 7 of the pdf) for a discussion of "obviousness".
    
    See also Page 11 (15) for a discussion of the Toye reference, in particular
    the discussion on Page 13 of an early X-windows version of Object Linking
    and Embedding. The NoteMail viewer could display active content: "any
    application that displays through an X-server can insert its output ...
    dynamically onto a notebook page through an embedded 'virtual window'". The
    patent re-examiner then asks whether NoteMail is "equivalent to" a browser.
    
    
    Further on (Page 17/21) it is stated that 
    
    MediaMosaic does enable interactive control
      and manipulation of objects embedded in what arguably may be construed to
      be a "browser-controlled window," BUT ONLY AFTER USER INTERVENTION, such
      as by making a selection with a mouse. [capitals in original -- pld]
    
    
    In other words, Eolas apparently has a patent on having something happen without having to click the mouse;
    their patent is for "zero-click" operation (one better than Amazon!). This
    was an important issue in 2003 as well. It is not a triviality. However, it
    is difficult to see how the invention of not
    having to click the mouse can be seen as deep. We're no longer talking about
    the idea of embedding applets; we're talking about automatically launching
    them.
    
    Is not clicking the mouse worth half a billion dollars? That's more than the
    cost of every mouse in the US!
    
    
    And finally, Eolas was derailed. In February 2012, Eolas lost a major
    District Court jury trial in Texas against Google, Yahoo, Amazon, JC Penney,
    CDW, Staples, and maybe one or two others. The jury held that all of Eolas'
    claims were invalid. Tim Berners-Lee testified, as did Pei-Yuan Wei
    (developer of Viola) and Dave Raggett (inventor of the <embed>
    tag). The defense took pains to argue that Doyle's idea was (a) obvious even
    in 1993 and (b) was not new; a 1991 Berners-Lee email (two years before the
    Eolas patent) was presented, in which he wrote "One thing I’d like to do
    soon, if I have time, is to teach the parser about Viola object descriptions
    and basically embed Viola objects into HTML files".
    
    More at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/02/interactive-web-patent.
    
    Those who previously entered into agreements with Eolas to pay royalties
    must still do so.
    
    In July 2012 the Texas court issued a ruling that the patents were invalid.
    
    In July 2013, the Federal Circuit upheld the District Court ruling.
    
    At this point the Eolas claims appear to be dead.
    
    Why Texas? See http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-small-town-judge-who-sees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases.
    
    
     E-Data
    An earlier example of claims inflation is the E-Data
    patent, number 4,528,643.
    The original patent was granted in 1985 to Charles Freeny, for a kiosk-type
    vending machine for point-of-sale creation of audio cassettes or CDs. Such a
    device would be set up in music stores and would free the store from having
    to carry physical inventory. It is not clear, however, if any major music
    publishers agreed to allow their content to be sold that way; in any event,
    Freeny sold his patent in 1989 for $100,000. 
    
    E-Data bought the patent in 1994 and interpreted it as a device to sell
    merchandise using computers, thus raising the claim that it covered much of
    e-commerce. Specifically, E-Data tried to argue that the patent covered all
    online sales where the finished
    product was delivered via computer
    (examples might include e-books, digital music and other digital content).
    
    Note that this is predated by the abstract idea of using computers to
    perform whatever business functions they can.
    
    Multiple lawsuits were launched in 1995. In 1998, District Court judge
    Barbara Jones decided that the patent applied only to in-store sales, not
    online sales from off-site locations. This was a common-sense interpretation
    of the patent claims. The patent abstract is as follows (bullets added):
    
    The present invention contemplates a system
      for reproducing information in 
material
        objects at a 
point of sale
        location wherein 
      
        - the information to be reproduced is provided at the point of sale
          location from a location remote
          with respect to the point of sale location, 
- an owner authorization code
          is provided to the point of sale location in reponse to receiving a
          request code from the point of sale location requesting to reproducing
          predetermined information in a material object, 
- and the predetermined information is reproduced
            in a material object at the point of sale location in
          response to receiving the owner authorization code. 
    The Federal Circuit then reversed this decision in 2000 (Interactive Gift
    Express v Compuserve, 99-1324),
    ruling that "point of sale locations" could
    include ones own living room, and that a home computer could
    be considered an "information manufacturing machine" as defined in the first
    formal claim of the patent (as the place where the reproduction occurred),
    and, for that matter, that a digital download could be considered a
    "material object". The Federal Circuit also ruled that the "authorization
    code" could be anything authorizing the sale, including an ordinary
    acknowledgment.
    
    In 2003, Apple settled and entered into a licensing agreement. However, the
    terms of the agreement were not disclosed, meaning that Apple may in fact
    have paid a token fee (or perhaps even no fee at all); the existence of the
    settlement then gives ammunition for extracting settlements from other
    companies. The US patent expired in 2003, but judgments for past
    infringement were still a risk after that date.
    
    Note that claim expansion is not an automatic win for the patent holder.
    Once E-Data got the claim-expansion ruling, defendants could introduce as
    Prior Art any evidence of selling ebooks or music downloads online, not just
    selling through in-store kiosks.
    
    
    
    Two more specific patent cases
     
    
      - i4i v Microsoft: i4i patented a particular,
        straightforward method of storing files with markup tags. Microsoft used
        a method of storing markup tags in Word documents. i4i claimed that MS
        violated its patent; this appears to be a very expansive interpretation
        of their original patent.
 
 
- NTP v RIM: RIM developed the Blackberry system
        of wireless email devices. NTP claimed to have a patent on the idea. 
    
    
    
    Patent cases we looked at:
    
      - NTP v RIM: NTP did "invent" something, but the actual invention seems
        rather straightforward. Before RIM, neither NTP nor anyone else was
        willing to give the idea of building a wireless system for forwarding
        email the investment needed to get the system running
- Eolas: a very "obvious in context" patent, and one for which
        (fortunately!) documented evidence of that existed at the time it was
        granted.
 
 
- i4i v Microsoft: a good example of "claims inflation": i4i invented
        something much more rudimentary
    
    
    Patent Trolls
    Other names are Patent Holding Companies and Non-Practicing Entities, or
    NPEs. What to do about them? They do create a market for the sale
    of inventions. While many NPE patents come from bankruptcy sales and other
    sales, some still come from small inventors with no other way to capitalize
    on their patent.
    
    Because NPE companies do not make anything, they cannot be countersued or
    convinced to enter into a reciprocal patent-sharing agreement.
    
    If a company buys a "good" patent, like the RSA patent, licensing it is a
    socially reasonable business model. The problem, however, is with companies
    who purchase rather weak patents, and go after companies using the
    invention. This is, in part, a problem because of the issuance of a weak
    patent. But another part of the problem is that it is (or used to be) much
    cheaper to sue for an infringement claim than to defend against it, meaning
    that even if the patent was clearly inapplicable a company might still agree
    to settle.
    
    The Obama administration issued legislative proposals and interim executive
    orders on June 4, 2013, intended to curb patent trolls. This is difficult
    because there is so much money on the table. Here is an abridged version of
    the executive order outline, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues:
    
    EXECUTIVE ACTIONS
    Today the Administration is also announcing a number of steps
          it is taking to help bring about greater transparency to the patent
          system and level the playing field for innovators.  Those steps
          include:
    
      - 
        Making “Real Party-in-Interest” the New Default.  Patent
          trolls often set up shell companies to hide their activities and
          enable their abusive litigation and extraction of settlements. 
          This tactic prevents those facing litigation from knowing the full
          extent of the patents that their adversaries hold when negotiating
          settlements, or even knowing connections between multiple trolls.... 
- 
        Tightening Functional Claiming.  The AIA made
          important improvements to the examination process and overall patent
          quality, but stakeholders remain concerned about patents with overly
          broad claims — particularly in the context of software.  The
            PTO will provide new targeted training to its examiners on scrutiny
            of functional claims and will, over the next six months
          develop strategies to improve claim clarity, such as by use of
          glossaries in patent specifications to assist examiners in the
          software field. [pld: about time!] 
- 
        Empowering Downstream Users.  Patent trolls
          are increasingly targeting Main Street retailers, consumers and other
          end-users of products containing patented technology — for instance,
          for using point-of-sale software or a particular business
          method.  End-users should not be subject to lawsuits for simply
          using a product as intended, and need an easier way to know their
          rights before entering into costly litigation or settlement. [pld:
            may not help much] 
- 
        Expanding Dedicated Outreach and Study.  Challenges
          to U.S. innovation using tools available in the patent space are
          particularly dynamic, and require both dedicated attention and
          meaningful data.  [pld: chatter] 
- 
        Strengthen Enforcement Process of Exclusion Orders. Once
          the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) finds a violation of
          Section 337 and issues an exclusion order barring the importation of
          infringing goods.... [pld: irrelevant to troll suits] 
At least it is a start.
    
    Some of the legislative proposals are more interesting:
    
      - 
        Require patentees and applicants to disclose the “Real
            Party-in-Interest,” by requiring that any party sending
          demand letters, filing an infringement suit or seeking PTO review of a
          patent to file updated ownership information, and enabling the PTO or
          district courts to impose sanctions for non-compliance. 
- 
        Permit more discretion in awarding fees to prevailing parties
            in patent cases, providing district courts with more
          discretion to award attorney’s fees under 35 USC 285 as a sanction for
          abusive court filings. 
- 
        Expand the PTO’s transitional program for covered
          business method patents to include a broader category of
          computer-enabled patents and permit a wider range of challengers to
          petition for review of issued patents before the Patent Trial and
          Appeals Board (PTAB). 
- 
        Protect off-the-shelf use by consumers and businesses by
          providing them with better legal protection against liability for a
          product being used off-the-shelf and solely for its intended use.  
- 
        Use demand letter transparency to help curb abusive suits, incentivizing
          public filing of demand letters in a way that makes them accessible
          and searchable to the public. 
The best way to end abusive patent lawsuits, however, is to
    disallow such patents in the first place.
    
    See also trolls2.
    
    
    End-User Patent Lawsuits
    A recent legal strategy has been for patent-holding companies to sue end
    users rather than manufacturers.
    
    For one approach, see Austin Meyer's thepatentscam.com
    (warning: video autoplay with sound). Meyer is being sued for selling his
    app on the Google Play Store. 
    
    Apple lost a case to VirnetX based on specious patents, and now Apple
    network services may be in trouble: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/05/patent-troll-that-beat-apple-now-wants-judge-to-block-facetime-imessages.
    
    Innovatio IP
    Innovatio IP bought several Wi-Fi patents from Broadcom, and in 2011 began a
    large series of patent lawsuits against a large number of hotels and
    coffeeshops that provide Wi-Fi access for customers, and who are using
    routers from Cisco, Netgear and Motorola.
    
    Innovatio was founded by Noel Whitley, a former Broadcom IP attorney. That
    more or less explains how the company was able to buy the patents.
    
    The patents are not for the use of Wi-Fi by customers, or something silly
    like that. They appear to be genuine patents on Wi-Fi technology. The
    problem is that the manufacturers claim that the patents were legitimately
    licensed, but Innovatio is not suing them, and therefore they have
    no standing to defend the cases. The end-users who are being sued
    are not, generally, in a position to fight the lawsuits.
    
    Cisco, Netgear and Motorola filed up to file a RICO lawsuit against
    Innovatio, but the judge did not allow that case to proceed. 
    
    When the IEEE set the Wi-Fi standard, all patent-holders who wanted their
    technology incorporated had to agree to license on RAND (Reasonable And
    Non-Discriminatory) bases (sometimes FRAND: Fair, RAND). But the RAND terms
    covered only what were considered to be "essential" patent claims (though
    this is a very broad category). Innovatio is arguing -- possibly speciously
    -- that the claims they are litigating are non-essential claims.
    
    See more at http://essentialpatentblog.com/2013/04/innovatio-wifi-suppliers-clash-over-over-essentiality-of-innovatio-802-11-patents/.
    
    Project Paperless
    Another set of companies sometimes collectively known as "Project Paperless"
    (but using a large number of shell-corporation names) has been sending out
    large numbers of letters to businesses claiming their use of office scanners
    to email pdf attachments is infringing. A sample letter is at http://pld.cs.luc.edu/ethics/scanner_infringement_letter.pdf.
    
    Some of the patent numbers are 6,185,590,
    6,771,381,
    7,477,410 and 7,986,426.
    
    
    Quite aside from the question of going after end users is the question of
    licensing fees. The Innovatio and PP patents should probably involve fees on
    the order of $0.10, rather than $10,000. 
    
    
    Bessen and Meurer, Patent
        Failure
    In 2008, James Bessen and Michael Meurer wrote a book Patent
      Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats and Lawyers put Innovators at Risk,
    outlining their research on the hidden costs of the patent system. Somewhere
    in the last century Bessen was CEO of one of the first desktop-publishing
    companies.
    
    One statistic that the book presents is the profit-to-litigation
    costs ratio, where both categories of costs are due to the existence of the
    patent. For pharmaceuticals, the ratio is typically 15:1. For other
    industries,  this ratio until the early 1990s hovered around 1:1, but
    in recent years has fallen to 1:4 (that is, litigation costs have outweighed
    profits fourfold!). For the specific industry of software, the issue is
    likely even worse. Be aware, though, that counting up profits associated
    with patents is difficult, and that arguably the goal of patents is to
    create incentive, not profits per
    se, and that unraveling the connection between incentive and profits is
    difficult. There are also many other social costs
    to patents besides litigation: suppressed invention is one. 
    
    Bessen and Meurer are particularly concerned with the intertwined issues of
    patent boundaries and notice.
    The patent boundary is the scope of the patent; that is, exactly what is
    covered. Patent notice is the act of making the boundaries apparent to
    others. Bessen and Meurer give examples (such as Eolas and E-Data)
    demonstrating that patent boundaries are highly
    subjective; they argue in fact that the lack of clear boundaries means
    nothing less than that patents are fundamentally not
    analogous to property: Without
      Boundaries, It Ain't Property is the title of their third chapter.
    
    
    Furthermore, they argue that in most other examples of things considered to
    be property, boundaries and notice are crystal clear. Land
    is titled, and can be fenced and posted (with No Trespassing signs); in
    fact, if the land is not posted, you cannot prosecute someone for
    trespassing. Ownership of personal property is almost always very clear,
    also. Sometimes ownership of water rights
    is ambiguous, as are some forms of mineral rights. Patent boundaries are
    ambiguous because of:
    
      - unpublished claims
- difficult-to-interpret claims (due to obfuscatory language)
- changes in claim interpretation (by the plaintiff or by the courts;
        E-data and i4i are good examples)
- very high search costs
Claim inflation is sometimes allowed because a judge feels an "impulse to
    award pioneer inventors". Even if that inventor didn't actually invent what
    they claimed!
    
    Bessen and Meurer attribute the software-patent problem
    largely to the fact that software patents are so often patents on abstraction.
    Abstract claims are fundamentally broad; for example, the Supreme Court
    rejected in 1840 a patent for "the art of cutting ice by means of any power,
    other than human power". It is in the nature of an abstract claim to include
    things not actually invented. An abstract claim covers how things may
    be done in the future. Samuel FB Morse, in his patent for the
    electromagnetic telegraph, tried to make the following eighth claim:
    
    I do not propose to limit myself to the
      specific machinery, or parts of machinery, described in the foregoing
      specifications and claims; the essence of my invention being the use of
      the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call
      electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or printing
        intelligible characters, letters, or signs,
        at any distances, being a new application of that power, of
      which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.
    
    This would cover the internet and the fax machine. Should it?
    
    In the 1854 case O'Reilly v Morse, the Supreme Court threw out Morse's above
    eighth claim, and ruled that abstract ideas were not patentable. Alas, the
    Federal Circuit has tolerated some abstract claims.
    
    One form of abstract claim is the functional claim: to
    claim any mechanism that achieves the same desired result. 
    
    The abstraction issue is not the same as the obvious-in-context issue. But
    the combination of abstract patents on obvious ideas (such as the E-Data
    patent on selling with the help of a computer) does have the effect of
    further expanding patent-holders' rights.
    
    Bessen and Meurer suggest several possible reforms:
    
      - "Make patent claims transparent", and available to interested parties
        from the time of filing
- "Make claims clear and unambiguous by enforcing strong limits against
        vague or overly abstract claims". The idea here would be that, if a
        patent were vague and subject to multiple interpretations (eg i4i and
        E-data), then the most restrictive
        interpretation, or at leaset the interpretation most concretely
        described by the patent, should be the one used by the courts.
- "Make patent search feasible by restricting the flood of patents." In
        other words, there is a hidden social cost from too many patents: it
        becomes too hard for other inventors to examine them all.
- Create "an exemption from penalties when the infringing technology was
        independently invented"
 
The first is widely recognized as an important strategy, and to a limited
    extent was incorporated into the Patent Reform Act of 2011. The second,
    however, would likely be much more important.
    
    More recent proposals:
    
      - Immediate publication of all patent applications (versus after 18
        months, currently)
- Limit changes to claim language in pending patents (to prevent a
        pending patent from morphing into something else entirely). These
        changes, though, are actual changes to the claim text, made by amending
        the patent; this does not refer to changes in interpretation.
- Availability of greater information about prosecution history, that
        is, other infringement lawsuits filed for the same patent.
- Mandatory disclosure of changes in patent ownership
This last one may actually win approval, but it is very narrow.
    
    
    Reading original patent descriptions
    You can look them up online. Follow uspto.gov -> patents -> patft
    (uspto.gov/patft). Or go directly to the search-by-patent-number page: 
          http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm
    
    Google can also be used to search for patents at http://google.com/patents.
    
    
    
     
    State Street Bank case, and
      Business-Method patents
    Patent 5193056
    
    decided 1998; patent filed 1993
    The patent was filed by Signature Financial Group on a mechanism for
    calculating taxes on certain pooled-fund investments. The basic outcome of
    the case was that financial-services software containing an algorithm became
    patentable. From the 1998 Federal Circuit decision:
    
    (...) the transformation of data,
      representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of
      mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a
      practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or
      calculation, because it produces 'a
        useful, concrete and tangible result' -- a final share price
      momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted
      and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.
    
    
    For many decades, patents for business methods were generally denied (to be
    more precise, this "business-methods exception" to patentability was an
    oft-stated maxim, but the courts had never ruled directly on it). Even after
    the 1981 Diehr case
    allowing some software patents, a claimed software invention that also
    involved a business method might be refused a patent. By a decade after
    Diehr, however, the USPTO had begun granting a fair variety of
    software-related inventions of new business methods or business processes;
    it was too hard to make a distinction between software patents and
    business-method patents. When State Street Bank infringed on Signature
    Financial Group's patent, the latter sued, and SSB then tried to use the
    business-methods exception as a defense. In its ruling, the Federal Circuit
    established that there was no
    "business-methods exemption" as such, and that the USPTO had been within its
    rights to grant such patents.
    
    The State Street Bank case introduced the rule that a business method could
    be patented if "it produces a useful,
      concrete, and tangible result". This "useful, concrete and tangible
    result" test was at the heart of the Bilski case, below, in 2009.
    
    For a while, business-method patents were only granted for software-related
    processes; that is, business methods that involved the "technological arts".
    However, in 2005 the USPTO overturned this,  as there was no
    "technological arts" requirement written into law. The "useful, concrete and
    tangible result" rule was the only one that applied (note that this rule
    does pretty much forbid patenting a business idea).
    There remains a great deal of overlap between business-method patents and
    software patents.
    
    Somewhere during this time the USPTO also reversed its longstanding refusal
    to grant patents purely for software (until then, software patents had to
    list some hardware involvement, although that was mostly a formality in
    practice). Whether this was related to the rise of business-method patents
    is unclear.
    
    This case opened the door to a huge influx of business-method patents,
    including Amazon's "one-click" method (below). 
    Exhibit A: Amazon "one-click"
      patent, # 5960411, granted 1999. Twenty-three days later, Amazon got an
      injunction against Barnes & Noble, and eventually won their case. BN
      had to stop using their "ExpressLane" shopping method.
    
    The essential feature of the 1-click patent appears to be that you don't
      have to go through the usual multi-screen checkout process; you can just
      click "send me this stuff the usual way", and it will remember all your
      previous entries.
    
    Paul Barton-Davis, one of Amazon's founding programmers, called the
      1-Click patent "a cynical and ungrateful use of an extremely
        obvious technology" [emphasis added]. By "ungrateful",
      Barton-Davis apparently meant that Amazon had benefitted enormously from
      public-domain software ideas.
    
    One-click shopping is obvious
      from a software-development perspective. It is not nearly so obvious from
      the perspective of online shopping, however.
     Overall, there are many other more-mundane patents on online shopping
      carts. IBM[?] supposedly has a patent on suggesting new purchases based on
      past ones. 
    See the Bilski case (later) for
    more updates.
    
     
    
    
    Apple Patents
    Just so you know who we're dealing with, here is a memo
        from Steve Jobs in 2010 in which he describes "Holy War with
      Google", presumably in large part because of Android. But he (later on in
      the memo, in item 5) says "Strategy: catch up to Android where we are
      behind (notifications, tethering, speech, ...) ...
    Patent
      ruling in Apple "Cover Flow" feature. Apple purchased the patent from
    the developers in 2006, but another group (Mirror Worlds) also claimed a
    patent. But the judge ruled in Apple's favor.
    
    
    Graph of
      phone-patent lawsuits
    
    Apple seems intent on suing Android out of existence, targeting both Google
    (developer of Android) and all hardware phonemakers using Android,
    apparently believing Android to be a knockoff of the iPhone. However,
    history makes this much less clear. Smartphones were introduced in 2001 and
    2002 by Palm, Microsoft and Blackberry. The iPhone did not appear until
    2007. The iPhone did introduce the
    multi-touch interface, though by 2007 Microsoft Surface develpment was well
    under way. Android was introduced in 2008. 
    
    Similar lawsuits have been filed by Apple against makers of products
    competing with the iPad; the Samsung Galaxy tablet has been banned in
    Australia. But most of what Apple has are design
    patents, not software patents. Ironically, Apple already licenses several
    Samsung patents for phones generally. And many observers have commented that
    HTC seems to be introducing innovative features faster than Apple right now.
    
    Apple filed a large batch of design patents in January 2007, starting a few
    days before the iPhone was introduced. Design patents for the Apple iPhone
    interface do make sense, in general; competitors should not be able to copy
    Apple's "look and feel". On the other hand, design patents are by their
    nature pretty straightforward to work around: all you have to do is make the
    competing product look different.
    
    Apple based the Macintosh interface on work at Xerox PARC, and then failed
    to protect it from Microsoft (actually, the judge ruled that Apple had licensed the technology to MS). At
    least some of what Apple wants to protect in their iPhone cases is the
    physical design, though much of the design basics came from the work of Dieter Rams.
    
    That said, most of Apple's innovations are genuine innovations, not
    involving elaborate claim expansion or subterfuge. Here, for example, is
    their "location" patent: 6122520 / RE42927:
    System and method for obtaining and using location specific information.
    Here is an article about it: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505124_162-57325995/apple-gets-killer-location-services-patent/
    
    Apple has developed many very clever ideas for the iPhone. Many of these
    patents seem rather broad, however, especially the location patent.
    
    Note that the strategy of Samsung/HTC was to file infringement
    counterclaims. This is why it is much harder for a legitimate developer to
    sue for infringement than a troll. However, the Samsung and HTC patents
    appear mostly to be general
    patents on wireless technology that they had previously agreed to license on
    Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. 
    
    Multitouch patent: http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2387401,00.asp
    
    Here's an amazing (though not up-to-date) graph by Florian Müller on Apple
    patent litigation relating to the iPhone:
    http://www.scribd.com/doc/44759893/Apple-vs-Android-10-12-02
    
    Apple v Motorola
    In June 2012, Richard Posner (normally of the Seventh Circuit but sitting
    temporarily as a District Court judge) dismissed an Apple v Motorola suit,
    arguing that Apple had largely failed to demonstrate the need for damages
    beyond a nominal level.
    
    On November 5, 2012, Wisconsin District Court judge Barbara Crabb dismissed
    the Apple v Motorola case filed there, in which Apple accused Motorola of
    asking too much for its patents and was asking Judge Crabb to set a license
    amount. Motorola had asked for 2.25% of all net sales for use of its
    standard cell-phone patents. A problem is that while that may be a
    reasonable percentage for a "stupid" phone that doesn't do anything beyond
    place calls, it applies an unreasonable tax on "smart" phones with many
    non-cellular-related features. But the case dismissal apparently had more to
    do with the fact that the entire situation was more properly part of a
    larger case. Apple was asking Judge Crabb to act more as a mediator, and was
    not willing to be bound by any eventual decision.
    
    Both of these cases are still going on; check in at http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/04/googles-bargaining-chip-argument-has.html.
    Find a comfy chair first.
    Apple v HTC
    Apple v HTC before the International Trade Commission (ITC), filed March
      2, 2010
    5481721   
    Method for providing automatic and dynamic translation of object oriented
    programming language-based message passing into operation system message
    passing using proxy objects
    5566337   
    Method and apparatus for distributing events in an operating system 
    5946647   
    System and method for performing an action on a structure in
    computer-generated data 
    5969705   
    Message protocol for controlling a user interface from an inactive
    application program 
    6275983   
    Object-oriented operating system 
    6343263   
    Real-time signal processing system for serially transmitted data 
    
    The ITC issued a partial ruling against HTC on December 19, 2011: HTC's
    phones could not use the "data-tapping" mechanism, in which phone numbers
    embedded in text (eg in email) are identified and the user can tap them to
    dial. This is described in the 5946647
    patent, claims 1 and 8. Identifying embedded URLs by browsers and email
    clients has been around for a long time, although the mouse was needed to
    "tap" them. 
    
    While removing the data-tapping functionality might be a problem for HTC,
    Google may be able to develop a workaround.
    
    The ITC ruling here suggests that, in the long run, Apple could prevail
    against HTC only on narrow claims, and the Android market is not in any real
    danger.
     Apple v HTC, US District Court, Delaware
    Apple also filed a conventional lawsuit against HTC in Delaware.
    
    5455599   
    Object-oriented graphic system 
    5848105   
    GMSK signal processors for improved communications capacity and quality 
    5920726   
    System and method for managing power conditions within a digital camera
    device 
    6424354   
    Object-oriented event notification system with listener registration of both
    interests and methods 
    7362331   
    Time-based, non-constant translation of user interface objects between
    states 
    7479949   
    Touch screen device, method, and graphical user interface for determining
    commands by applying heuristics 
    7633076   
    Automated response to and sensing of user activity in portable devices 
     HTC counterclaims
    5377354   
    Method and system for sorting and prioritizing electronic mail messages 
    6188578   
    Integrated circuit package with multiple heat dissipation paths 
    7278032   
    Circuit and operating method for integrated interface of PDA and wireless
    communication system 
    
    
    Apple and HTC settled all their
        lawsuits on November 10, 2012. At the moment, however, this
    is seen as an indication of HTC's relative weakness, compared to Samsung and
    Motorola. 
    
    In April 2012 Apple actually lost
    an important patent case in Germany, against Motorola, and so for the time
    being it's harder to buy an iPhone there, or use the iCloud service. But my
    understanding is that Apple is well-positioned to prevail in the long run.
    
    Apple v VirnetX
    In November 2012, Apple lost a patent infringement suit filed by VirnetX,
    for technology relating to FaceTime (and perhaps to some VPN-related
    features).
    Apple v Samsung
    This is Apple's big stand against Android. Samsung here is a stand-in for
    Google, which Apple was initially reluctant to sue because Google doesn't
    actually make any phones. (Apple may now be preparing a suit against
    Google.)
    
    Samsung has also countersued, both in the US and throughout the world.
    Outside the US, Samsung met with a reasonable degree of success.
    
    The first (of two) US Apple-v-Samsung lawsuit was filed in
    April 2011. The case involved both design patents and utility patents. 
    
    The utility patents were
    
      - 7,469,381:
        Bounce-Back Effect
- 7,844,915:
        On-Screen related to '381, above, but also related to pinch-to-zoom. It
        is sometimes even called the "pinch-to-zoom" patent, but that seems a
        very optimistic designation.
- 7,864,163: Tap
        To Zoom: the user taps on something and the display zooms in
Is the last patent a material improvement over having to zoom using the
      "pinch" gesture?
    Apple also won on three design patents:
    
      - D593087,
        covering the overall iPhone shape, with Home button and surrounding
        bezel
- D604305,
        covering on-screen icons
- D618677, covering "the ornamental design of an electronic device"
Design patent 504,889,
      on the rectangular case with rounded corners, was also included in Apple's
      complaint, but the jury did not find for Apple on this. It would be
      difficult to find a workaround for a rectangular case with rounded
      corners, as this layout is largely functional.
    In August 2012, a jury in California returned a verdict against Samsung,
    with a judgment of $1.05 billion. Part of these damages
    were for design patents, including the infamous "rounded corners". But two
    key patents were the "edge-bounce" patent, 7,469,381, and the "tap to zoom"
    patent 7,864,163. 
    
    During the trial, Apple was able to present emails from Samsung indicating
    that they needed to make their phones more like Apple's and less like
    Nokia's. These were probably not internal calls for direct infringement,
    however, but simply awkwardly worded. Samsung at that point had simply
    realized that its main competitor was in fact Apple.
    
    Each side was given a rather limited time to present its arguments.
    
    Two months later, the USPTO issued a preliminary invalidation of the '381
    bounce-back patent. 
    
    Later, questions were raised about some of the jurors. Jury foreman Velvin
    Hogan was a patent-holder himself. In an interview he claimed the jurors
    reached their damages award in order to punish Samsung, but the instructions
    to the jury were to set the award strictly for compensation for Apple's lost
    sales. 
    
    Both the edge-bounce and tap-to-zoom patents deal with very specific
    details. What about broad patents on the touchscreen interface? It seems
    unlikely at this point that Apple has those. What about patents on Apple's
    specific overall "look and feel"? It is not even clear Apple has those,
    although if they did workarounds should be straightforward. The edge-bounce,
    tap-to-zoom and slide-to-unlock (below) patents are realistically all really
    of this kind: patents on how the user interface works. If they are
    interpreted narrowly, there is no problem. If they are interpreted broadly
    (eg interpreting the slide-to-unlock patent as forbidding any
    sliding motion related to unlocking), there is reason for concern. 
    
    Eventually a retrial (at least of the damages) was ordered, and the damages
    were reduced in November 2013 to $290 million. 
    
    In May 2015 the Federal Circuit issued its appeal ruling,
    upholding the design-patent infringement claims (and also some non-patented
    trademark claims). Samsung had argued that (a) mostly they weren't
    violating Apple's design patents (a Samsung S3 cannot be mistaken for an
    iPhone, after all), and that (b) to the extent that they did copy
    Apple's design, it was for functional purposes only (you can't patent
    function). The Federal Circuit didn't buy either argument.
    
    Worse, for Samsung, the 1952 law covering design patents (35
      U.S.C. § 289) states that all profits from the infringing
    design be surrendered: "Whoever during the term of a patent for a design ...
    applies the patented design... shall be liable to the owner to the extent of
    his total profit". There is no "proportionality" rule covering cases where
    most of a device (eg a phone) is not infringing. The law was
    presumably written with situations in mind in which the applicable design
    was the primary selling point (eg the 1950s-era Eames
      chair).
    
    This rule might make sense if the design infringement was narrowly
    construed, eg if the infringing design had to intentionally mimic
    the original. It seems unlikely Samsung was doing that; all phones look
    superficially alike.
    
    In September 2015 the Federal Circuit issued a revised damage award of $548
      million (up from the 2013 $290 million). In December 2015 Samsung
    agreed to pay this, but reserved the right to ask for the money back if a
    later appeal succeeded; see http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/12/samsung-to-finally-pay-apple-548m-as-part-of-endless-patent-case/.
    
    
    On March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court accepted Samsung's appeal (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/03/supreme-court-could-slash-apples-548m-win-against-samsung/).
    The Federal Circuit's interpretation of design patents, and the 1952 law
    above, required forfeiture of all profits for infringement. In
    December 2016 the Supreme Court invalidated that full-forfeiture rule, and
    sent the case back to the Federal Circuit to determine how much money should
    be owed for Samsung's infringement on Apple's design patent.
    
    
    Apple filed a second lawsuit against Samsung in February
    2012. Jury selection began on March 31, 2014. The utility patents at stake
    are
    
      - 5,946,647:
        Quick Links; eg recognizing URLs in text
- 6,847,959:
        Universal Interface for Search (think Siri, but it's hard to see how the
        claimed "unitary interface" innovation is different from Google itself).
- 7,761,414:
        Syncing in the background. Multi-tasking was developed in the 1960's.
- 8,046,721:
        Slide-to-Unlock, v1 (below)
- 8,074,172:
        Predictive Text; having your keyboard suggest word completions. Some
        forms of this go back to the 1970's.
This trial includes the still-more-or-less-current Galaxy SIII (though the
    S7 is now out).
    
    Apple worked hard on integrating all the features above into a consistent
    iPhone interface. But some of the patent claims are decidedly unconvincing,
    especially '414. 
    
    In May 2014 Samsung was ordered to pay Apple $119.6 million in this case, an
    amount widely regarded as much smaller than Apple was hoping for. 
    
    In February 2016 the Federal Circuit overturned even this modest award (www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-1171.Opinion.2-24-2016.1.pdf).
    Apparently the Federal Circuit actually threw out the relevant Apple
    patents, calling them "obvious", but Apple can still appeal.
    Slide-to-unlock
    One famous Apple patent, not used in the Apple v Samsung case
    above, is : slide-to-unlock. In its original form (8,046,721),
    the slider had to appear at a specific point on the screen, and be moved "to
    a predefined location and/or ... along a predefined path". Apple has now
    received a couple more slide-to-unlock patents; the latest is 8,286,103.
    This latest patent does still refer to "unlock images":
    
    The device is unlocked if contact with the
      display corresponds to a predefined gesture for unlocking the device. The
      device displays one or more unlock images with respect to which the
      predefined gesture is to be performed in order to unlock the device.
    
    The ice-cream-sandwich (Android version) slide-to-unlock mechanism involves
    no unlock image whatsoever; one simply drags a finger along the screen. The
    action creates ripples; if the path is long enough, the phone unlocks.
    
    Is this a legitimate workaround?
    
    How is slide-to-unlock different from the very standard GUI action of
    dragging an object?
    
    Slide-to-unlock is a pretty central patent for smartphones; life would be
    much harder if you had to enter an unlock code each time. Slide-to-unlock is
    also a feature with no physical-world analog, unlike many other GUI
    features.
    
    One of Apple's slide-to-unlock patents was invalidated in Germany in April
    2013, largely (if not entirely) because software is not patentable in Europe
    unless it "solves a technical problem with technical means" [www.fosspatents.com].
    
    Very recently, there is new evidence that the slide-to-unlock gesture was
    developed ten years before Apple patented it: http://www.geekwire.com/2014/microsoft-researchers-1991-video-torpedo-one-apples-patents/.
    
    
    Florian Müller's excellent patent blog has a good summary of what he
    considers Apple's top four patents at http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/04/teaching-away-is-why-apples-rubber.html:
    
      - rubber-banding edge bounce
- slide-to-unlock
- pinch-to-zoom (I am not clear which version)
- 7,479,949:
        touchscreen heuristics (the "Steve Jobs" patent)
Müller makes an argument that the first one is the most important,
      because it is revolutionary and not evolutionary. Past practice had been
      to display a document with "hard" margins. Müller writes:
    Rubber-banding solves the problem that an
      abrupt end to a scrolling operation instinctively makes a user press
      harder because it appears that a device is not responding to a gesture.
      ... But from an end user's perspective, rubber-banding is a solution to a
      problem. Having a "glow" at one edge of the screen is better than getting
      no visual feedback at all, but it's too subtle. 
    
    (Personally, I think edge-glow is just fine, but I get his point.)
    
    The '949 patent is interesting:
    
    detecting one or more finger contacts with
      the touch screen display, applying one or more heuristics to the one or
      more finger contacts to determine a command for the device, and processing
      the command.
    
    It is at the heart of what makes the iPhone touch interface so effective.
    And yet the courts have so far not been impressed with it. Apple obtained an
    injunction banning the import of devices violating it, but Android has found
    pretty effective workarounds; see 
    http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/04/apples-patent-dispute-with-samsung-and.html.
    The USPTO has also issued a preliminary invalidation.
    
    The 7,844,915
    version of the pinch-to-zoom patent has received preliminary invalidation in
    July 2013. 
    
    
    
    Google
      and Microsoft sue GeoTag
    GeoTag appears to be a classic troll. But
    the article mentions Skyhook, and suggests that is not
    a troll. Does this matter? What about i4i?
    
    Here's the GeoTag patent: 5,930,474
    
    How this compares with RE42927 I have no idea.
    
    This patent is definitely an example of an idea,
    the implementation of which is obvious,
    given the availability of GPS. Should such things be patentable?
    
    
     
    Stallman article: why software is
      different
    
    1. There's no advance warning (but isn't this true of any patent?)
    
    2. There is no easy way to read them. They are deliberately obscure. And,
    for software, this is directly tied to the fact that the algorithms are very
    general. 
    
    3. Some patents are just plain inappropriate, but fighting them is
    exhorbitant.
    
    4. chicken-and-egg problem with converting from .gif to .png: how can you
    get browsers to support this? (This is partially resolved by browser
    plug-ins.)
    
    5. "prior art" is very hit-or-miss; sometimes (often!) it was considered too obvious to document. More
    specifically, ideas ruled by the PTO to be patentable were often "CS
    folklore" but too obvious to publish.
    
    6. Software tends to use many
    ideas per application, and so one software project might require licensing
    of many diffferent pieces. This
    makes incremental innovation difficult, for anyone.
    (Even microsoft.) This problem exists for software because writing software
    is in some sense much easier than
    traditional engineering, and so you can afford to put more ideas in.
    
    7. Software licensing terms tend not
    to take into account the fact that projects use many ideas, and a given
    patented piece should be only a small part of the total.
    
    8. Open source.
    
    9. Patented standards are a large
    social cost.
    
    10. It is not possible to search the patent database before the patent is
    granted
    
    11. Tremendous software progress is
    often made with negligible investment; we don't need patents to encourage
    development.
    
    12. Computing has a high rate of radical, as opposed to incremental, change.
    
    
    An issue that Stallman doesn't address directly is that 20 years is a very long time in the software
    industry, and that locking an idea up for that long has the practical effect
    of stifling growth, not encouraging it. Software patents have had the effect
    of postponing adoption until patent expires (cf James Gosling's first
    language) (hint: his second language was Java).
    
    And basic ideas are still being patented for a new use
    (eg the Steir hair patent)
    
    Finally, another issue is the obvious-in-context problem I mentioned above,
    that does seem to be a special issue with software:
    often an idea is an immediate, trivial corollary of some later development,
    or of some more abstract way of looking at the situation. However, some
    earlier out-of-context patent may still apply. The XOR-cursor and Eolas
    patents may be of this type. It's not that embedded applets is an innovative
    idea, per se, it just takes a critical mass of web sites to become relevant.
    
    
    Is
      software legitimately a special case?
        
      
    
    A related issue is that weak patents can have significant social costs, by
    blocking core technologies that everyone needs. Examples are not always easy
    to identify.
    
      - XML-structured documents (because of i4i v Microsoft)
- RSA encryption (patent difficulties were the "other" reason RSA made
        little progress in the 1990's
- X-windows XOR cursor (but the workaround worked pretty well)
- natural interfaces for embedded applets [?], because of the eolas
        patent
 
 It is more likely for workarounds to be found, or for a feature to be
      licensed and added to non-open-source software.
    
    FRAND
    Standards organizations often require that patent holders who want their
      technology incorporated into a standard agree to license the technology on
      "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" terms (this is also sometimes
      abbreviated RAND). 
    The theory behind F/RAND licensing is that the patent should be
      reasonably inexpensive, and no company should get a special deal.
      Essentially all the core cellphone technology is licensed under F/RAND
      terms.
    Apple v Qualcomm
    F/RAND makes patented standards a little more reasonable, but does not
      resolve all the problems. In 2017 Apple sued Qualcomm, owner of a large
      number of cellular and mobile-internet patents, over its licensing terms.
      Qualcomm's interpretation of "fair and reasonable" is that it charges a percentage
      of the phone's price, around 5%. For a $400 phone, that's $20. But for a
      high-end $1000 iPhone, it's $50.
    Qualcomm allows chip makers to manufacture chips based on
      Qualcomm's technology for free, more or less. But the company that buys
      the chips and builds a consumer product has to pay the 5% licensing "tax".
    Apple's issue is that most of the costs of an iPhone are not related to
      the communications technology. Apple has a large number of innovations,
      and feels that Qualcomm's licensing fee should be a flat rate. Qualcomm is
      profiting from every non-telecom feature Apple adds to the iPhone.
    Apple has a point. Apple's case is bolstered by a Supreme Court decision
      disallowing royalties if a part is sold outright; the patent-licensing
      costs must be entirely included in the selling price of the part. 
    See www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-10-04/apple-and-qualcomm-s-billion-dollar-war-over-an-18-part.
    
    
    For another tale of F/RAND woe, see alastairs-place.net/blog/2018/02/21/aura.
      Alastair Houghton developed in 2014 a way of connecting speakers to Apple
      laptops so as to get digital surround sound. There was one catch: the
      software made use of the Dolby AC-3 codec, which was patented.
    Dolby licensed the technology under F/RAND terms, though, and initially
      Houghton thought he could work out a deal. But the set patent terms
      assumed a mass-market level of sales, and were much too high for
      Houghton's niche product.
    Dolby considered Houghton's request for special licensing terms, but in
      the end decided they could not do that because that would violate the
        non-discriminatory part of F/RAND. Not everyone would get the same
      deal! The pricing structure built into the F/RAND terms made sense only
      for hardware devices, not for software. 
    The patent for AC-3 finally expired, and Houghton was able to release his
      package in 2018, four years later.
    In 2008, the FTC weighed in to enforce the original F/RAND terms for
      licensing Ethernet speed auto-negotiation from N-Data, which had purchased
      the patents and tried to raise the licensing terms. See http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080123-ftc-defends-ethernet-forces-patent-troll-back-under-bridge.html
    
    
    
     
     
    
    
    Paul Graham
    This would be a good time to take a quick look at the Paul
      Graham paper. Graham is both a venture capitalist and a software
    engineer (and a Lisp programmer!). One of his first points is the following:
    
    One thing I do feel pretty
            certain of is that if you're against software patents, you're
            against patents in general. Gradually our machines consist more and
            more of software. Things that used to be done with levers and cams
            and gears are now done with loops and trees and closures. There's
            nothing special about physical embodiments of control systems that
            should make them patentable, and the software equivalent not.
      
    The contrary position here is that physical systems are different. If you
      are building a complex machine with gears, you have to worry about all
      sorts of things: the strength of the gears, the precise shape of the gear
      teeth, whether the gears are meeting at an angle (as in bevel gears),
      whether there are pinion gears, the force between the gears, lubrication,
      temperature, and bearings for the gear shafts. None of
      that matters for digital systems. Gears, ultimately, are used to transfer
      power and to adjust "impedance"; those issues don't even exist
      for digital systems.
    Suppose one is designing a mechanical valve. There are again all sorts of
      mechanical details to be addressed. Now consider a network router as a
      kind of "packet valve". To open the valve, this is all you need:
        ipforward = True
    To close it:
        ipforward = False
    (The "ipforward" name is used for this purpose in Linux; it is in
      /proc/sys/net/ipv4.)
    The bottom line is that, yes, there are very advanced digital
      analogues of physical machines that are not trivial, but the most common
      problem with implementing software control systems is simply the
      development time. There is no "trial and error" to speak of. 
    Here are a few more Graham points, based largely on his experience as a
      venture capitalist. Patents, he feels, don't matter much to software
      startups, unlike physical-machine
        startups. 
    
      - Third paragraph (above) on being against software patents meaning
        you're against patents generally
- Amazon one-click patent
- Startups do not in fact get sued. They don't attract any attention
        until they're big enough to be acquired or to cross-license.
- Patents do play a role with
        being acquired; the suitor has to feel that it's cheaper to buy you than
        to build on their own.
 
- "So, are you guys hiring?" and the Viaweb project
 
- patents: for an "armed truce" (cross-licensing) with other big guys,
        or as part of being acquired
- patents play a small role the
        software business.
- The Reveal startup in 2002. They made X-ray machines, not software. 
 
- Design counts for more than invention, because design is what delivers
        the product.
- Why Microsoft won't sue
        linux out of business (MS probably won't, but Graham's reasoning here is
        perhaps wishful thinking).
 
Graham has three reasons why patents don't matter:
    
      - Software is complicated; the real issue isn't the software but
        developing -- and designing --
        it. However, this argument also works the other way; if you have an
        idea, then you are better off pursuing patent enforcement than
        development, because development is hard.
        But also note Graham's point that if a big company tries to copy a
        little company's patents, there will be a "thousand little things the
        big company will get wrong". 
 
- Startups seldom compete head-to-head with big companies; they "change
          the paradigm". You don't go into the word-processing business;
        you invent Writely (now part of Google Apps?). And, "big companies are
        extremely good at denial". They will go to great lengths to pretend that
        you don't exist, to "keep you in their blind spot". Suing a startup
        would mean you realized they were dangerous. He cites IBM as an example;
        it would have been demeaning for them to sue microcomputer developers.
        Also, for Microsoft to sue web-app developers (or smartphone developers)
        would be to admit that Windows is fading.
- Hacker opinion is against big patent lawsuits. If you're a big
        high-tech company, you'll lose a lot of your best people if you're seen
        "doing evil". This might be
        true for Google; it's less clear at Microsoft (though the employees
        there do care about principles). It's probably not true at Eolas.
 
What do you think of these? How does the Eolas case fit in?
    
    The argument is sometimes made that patents have real value for startups, so
    that they can cross-license if accused of violating other patents. Is
      this a legitimate argument in favor of patents?
    
    Graham is perhaps close to the heart of the matter on an other issue:
    computing startups do not usually get sued until they are large
    enough to attract attention. Does this mean they don't need patents?
    
    There are anecdotal reports that some startups feel someone else would take
    over their idea if they did not have patent protection. How important is
    such protection, versus the "troll tax"?
    
    
    
     
    
     Note that patents are for the use of an idea in a specific context: 
    
    
      - prime factorization for the purpose
          of encryption
 
- xor for the purpose of redrawing the
          mouse 
 
- digital scanning for the purpose of
          storing bank records (see below)
 
- RF links for the purpose of email
        [NTP v RIM; it's not clear this is the entire issue] 
Alas for computing, the PTO has often accepted patents for the use of a very
    standard, well-known idea in a specific context.
    
    
    Patent problems 
     submarine patents: you don't hear about them until too late! 
    
    prior art: hard to find, hard to
      document, trivial ideas were never written down! This problem, at least,
      will go away with the passage of time. 
     non-obviousness: difficult to
      contest.
    
    Many ideas go into one program! Technology evolves extremely
      rapidly.
    
    Violates settled expectations (important part of law!) What's patented
      seems to be more a matter of chance than anything else. 
     ignorance is no defense: "submarine" patents entire process is secret:
      you can be making good-faith effort to be noninfringing and get hit with a
      huge verdict. 
     willful: you had advance notice of infringing. Your belief that the
      patent was invalid may NOT be a defense, although it has been accepted as
      a defense in some cases. Damages automatically triple. 
    
    Europe
    
    EU Parliament voted in July 2005  648-14 AGAINST the EPO (European
    Patent Office) directive.
    
    March 17, 2009: European Patent Office has asked the EU's "Enlarged Board of
    Appeal" to decide on the exclusion of software from patentability. The EPO
    has long been pushing for software patentability, and this is seen by some
    as an attempt to bypass the European Parliament.
    See http://lwn.net/Articles/324022
    Also http://press.ffii.org/Press_releases/EPO_seeks_to_validate_software_patents_without_the_European_Parliament.
    Also http://www.ffii.org/EPOReferral.
    Note especially Q3, under Questions. Under some earlier rulings (T163/85 and
    T190/94), patentability required "a technical effect on a physical entity in
    the real world". However, other
    rules did not include this requirement.
    
    European patent law is similar to the Diamond v Diehr standard: machines
    that use software are patentable, but not software that stands alone.
    However, in the US the Diehr standard evolved into software patentability;
    in Europe software remains unpatentable as such.
    
    Here's an article from FFII.org entitled, "Why are Software Patents so
    Trivial?", in which they suggest that this is a fundamental
    problem: http://eupat.ffii.org/analysis/frili.
    
    In February 2016 the Indian Patent Office adopted a similar rule, that
    software alone is not patentable. See http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/no-patent-if-invention-lies-only-in-computer-programme-says-indian-patent-office-116022200875_1.html.
    
    
    Stakeholders
    Who are the stakeholders in software patents? Are we stakeholders?
      Compare pharmaceuticals. http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/2005/pulpit_20050818_000863.html:
      "Do you feel helped by patent reform?" 
    
    If the Eolas patent had succeeded earlier in the game, Firefox might
      never have been started, and then Internet Explorer would still likely
      lack tabs, plug-ins, and other core features.
    
    WHY does the situation seem so different
        from pharmaceuticals?
    
    
    Role of "patent trolls", or patent licensing firms
    ("troll" as in "the troll under the bridge, demanding tolls", not "trolling"
    as in fishing for "flames")
    Note that the established-company-versus-established-company defense of a
    "patent bank" is useless against trolls that do not actually make anything.
    
    Microsoft is both patent-troll victim (see the Eolas case, above)
    and patent troll itself. See, for example, http://www.zdnet.com/article/the-one-thing-microsoft-needs-to-do-to-gain-real-open-source-trust/:
    
    
    This latter role is perhaps why Microsoft and other large companies has
    resisted patent reform.
     
    
    Barriers to entry 
     Patent Trolls: companies that have no assets but patent claims, and
      don't attempt to produce anything but simply collect. Is this bad? Or are
      such companies just creating a market for small inventors to sell their
      inventions?
    
    I4i is not such a company; they
      did produce an XML-based product.
    
    
     
    
     Patent and open source 
     The open-source community is a strong
      proponent of eliminating software patents. 
    
     Is the open-source community entitled to: 
    
      - an applet-aware browser? 
- an mp3 player? 
- a gif viewer? 
- other ideas that are patented? 
Is the open-source community entitled to the Asterisk
      phone switch?
    
    Does MS intend to destroy or hobble or marginalize linux through patents?
    
     It is very well documented that the patent process can have a very
      NEGATIVE impact on open-source development, and on generally accepted
      software adoption. 
     So if the purpose of software patents is to aid technological process,
      and it doesn't do that, are software patents a good idea?
    
    What happens if the software in question is made available through a site
      in Europe, which (as of now) doesn't have strong software-patent laws?
      Should the site warn visitors from the US? 
    
    Is this at all like thepiratebay.org?
    
    
     
    Patents: are the right ideas being patented? Or are patents being granted to
    trolls for peripheral ideas?
    
    xor:   trolls?
      rsa:   good
      spreadsheets:   trolls?
      eolas:   trolls?
    
    
    
     
    
     
    
    
    
    They have developed technology for storage of digital images of bank
      checks. They actually did develop the whole system, although again the inevitability issue arises here. They
      did not develop any of the actual root technology: scanners, or data
      security, or digital storage systems with enough capacity to hold images
      for negligible cost.
    
     From their website: 
    
    The Corporation was founded in 1998 and was
      granted its first two Network architectural patents (5,910,988 and
      6,032,137) in 1999 and 2000, respectively. The patents detail the
      important and revolutionary aspects of DataTreasury's systems for remote
      image capture, document imaging, centralized processing and electronic
      storage. Our innovations were particularly noted for enhanced security,
      fault tolerance and high reliability. These key elements form the
      underpinnings of DataTreasury's technology. 
    That said, it is clear that none
      of DataTreasury's ideas are revolutionary. 
    
    From politico.com/news/stories/0308/9202.html:
      The company had benefited from a
        controversial 1998 court ruling that broadened the definition of a
        patent to include business processes. 
    The proposed (but never passed) patent-reform act of 2007 singled out
      this patent for congressional revocation. 
     It appears that DataTreasury is claiming a business-method patent on the
      use of electronic image scanning for check processing. They are looking
      for very significant licensing fees. Again, every
      piece of the technology has been around from well before the patent
      (scanning, secure storage, ???)
    
    Should a new (but straightforward) application of existing technology be
      patentable?
    
     The DataTreasury patent has been singled out by Congress for action, but
      it is not clear what will happen. 
    
     
    
     Patent reform: 
    
      -  PTO trying to learn more prior art 
-  Watchdog groups doing same 
-  Trivial prior art is harder and harder to patent, simply due to the
        passage of time and better documentation of trivial techniques 
-  Still problems with patented protocols (and business methods) 
Someone tried patenting a movie storyline a few years ago. This patent WAS
    rejected.
     
    
     Patent Reform Act of 2007: H.R. 1908 and S. 1145 (this
        did not pass). This was the first [?] patent-reform act proposed.
    
     Those in bold are the most significant. 
    This did not pass.  Here are some of the proposed changes in U.S.
      patent law 
    
      - 1.1 Switch from first-to-invent to first-to-file
 
- 1.2 Expand prior user rights, to compensate 
- 1.3 Publish patent applications 
- 1.3.5 Allow corporate filers (ie inventor's employer) 
- 1.4 Allow pre-issuance protests by third parties 
- 1.5 Expand use of post-issuance reexamination and opposition
        proceedings 
- 1.6 Eliminate the "best mode" requirement (obscure) 
-  1.7 Modify the patent law doctrine of willful infringement.
        "willful" is a serious problem, because it vastly increases the damages
        and is applied rather inconsistently. 
- 1.8 Modify the patent law doctrine of inequitable conduct
          
- 1.9 Allow patent applications to be submitted by an assignee 
- 1.10 Limit access to injunctions 
- Damages: must be in proportion to incremental improvement over
            prior art 
- Bars "tax planning" patents [!] See US Pat 5206803
 
- Bars DataTreasury from bank extortion 
 Discuss: first-to-file: who benefits? how are small inventors affected?
      How are prior-art rules affected? 
    This has again been introduced in 2009; apparently the issues are the
      damages calculation, post-issuance reexamination proceedings, and defining
      inequitable conduct. At least the last provision has been removed from the
      2009 bill. A good-faith defense for believing a patent was invalid is also
      included. Also included is a definition of prior art to include anything
      "available to the public"; publication no longer would have to occur.
    
    [Note that NTP argued that RIM's conduct was held to be inequitable simply because NTP had sent them a letter
        outlining its patent claims, and RIM had disagreed.]
    
    In 2011, Congress passed the America
        Invents Act. This included the following features:
    
    
      - switch from first-to-invent to first-to-file (though the first-to-file
        inventor must be an original inventor, not someone who got the idea from
        the real inventor and rushed to patent).
 
- prior art expanded to include any public use, or foreign offers for
        sale. The "publication" rule is thus relaxed.
- allows pre-patent-issuance filings by third parties, and also
        post-issuance review
- bars tax-planning patents
- small inventor ("micro-entity") fee reduction
 
- deny patent holders the right to appeal post-grant re-examination
        reversals to the District Courts.
The full impact of the law is not yet clear. There were no changes to rules
    for willful infringement, inequitable conduct, access to injunctions, or
    proportionate damages.
    
    
     
    
     
    
     KSR v Teleflex, Supreme
      Court, April 30, 2007 
     This Supreme Court case altered the legal standard for disproving
      "non-obviousness" in favor of defendants. It is now quite a bit easier to
      challenge patents on this basis. In particular, KSR v Teleflex makes it
      much easier to argue that software patents are simply a
      combination of pre-existing ideas; all the defendant has to come up with
      are the prior art for the pre-existing inventions and some rationale for
      why it would have been obvious to combine them. The defendant does not
      have to prove that it would have been obvious which pre-existing
      inventions to combine. 
     Teleflex had a patent on a pedal coupled to an electronic throttle
      control (basically cruise control). The question was whether that was
      "obvious". 
     The proper question to have asked was whether
      a pedal designer of ordinary skill, facing the wide range of needs created
      by developments in the field of endeavor, would have seen a benefit to
      upgrading [a prior art patent] with a [throttle-control] sensor 
     not thought of it by
      themselves, and not motivated to
      implement the change, but simply saw the benefit.
      Furthermore, the conclusion of obviousness needed only to be supported by
      ordinary evidence, not written documentation. The old "nonobviousness"
      standard often in effect required proving that a patent was "prior art".
      This test was known as the "teaching-suggestion-motivation" test. All
      three pieces had to be there. Another sentence from the KSR decision:
    
    [t]he combination of familiar
        elements according to known
        methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield
      predictable results.
    
     
    By comparison, my obvious-in-context approach means that the idea (or
      combination) is obvious to anyone facing a later  Does that suggest
      that not clicking the mouse is obvious?
    The KSR decision has made it straightforward to establish the obviousness
      of an invention that consists of two parts if
    
      - There exists prior art for each part
- Combining the parts would have been obvious, because it would
        have been obvious that the two parts together would have been useful.
Would this have helped RIM? Perhaps. The Supreme Court did have an older
    obviousness test from the Graham
    case of 1966. In it they advocated considering the general scope of prior
    art, the extent to which the invention departed from prior art, the
    prevailing degree of ordinary skill in the field (eg, if software engineers
    were generally able to fit data structures to a given problem then a new
    application of a data structure might be "obvious"), and what the court
    called "objective" evidence. Unfortunately, the objective-evidence examples
    for non-obviousness included such things as "commercial success" and
    "long-felt but unserved needs": if the new product had great commercial
    success, and satisfied long-felt but unserved customer needs, it might be
    presumed non-obvious. That is exactly the test the RIM court applied to rule
    in NTP's favor. Alas, there are good reasons to suppose that RIM's
    commercial success had nothing to do with innovation, and everything to do
    with lining up investment in what was, at the time, a rather speculative
    need. (The third SCOTUS example of non-obviousness was the "failure of
    others" to solve the problem at hand; if that test were applied to most
    software patents, few would survive.)
    
    The KSR case is apparently one of the most-cited Supreme Court patent cases.
    
    
     Bilski case
      
    Federal Circuit decision released
        October 30, 2008
        Supreme Court decision released June 28, 2010 (decision
          here)
       
     This was a very significant case. It was decided at the appellate level
      by an en banc sitting of the
      Federal Circuit. They proposed a "machine or transformation" test for
      patentability of abstract processes. The Supreme Court then heard the
      case, and while they did not
      uphold the "machine or transformation" test, they ruled that Bilski's
      invention was not patentable because it was too
        abstract. There had been widespread speculation that the Supreme
      Court would use the Bilski case to rein in business-method patents, or at
      least make the patentability rules a little clearer. They apparently did
      not do either. 
     
     Bilski patent: Claimed method of managing the risk of bad weather in
      commodities trading. 
     He submitted a patent application seeking exclusive rights to a method
      of using hedge contracts to reduce the risk that a commodity's wholesale
      price might change. 
     Again, the technique fails under both prior-art and obviousness
      standards. But those don't apply in the same way to business-method
      patents. 
     The patent was rejected by the Patent Board of Appeals. The Board, in
      rejecting the claim, asked the Federal Circuit court for assistance in
      determining patentability of non-technological method claims. 
     The federal circuit court did the following: 
     The court by its own action grants a hearing en banc. The parties are
      requested to file supplemental briefs that should address the following
      questions: 
     
    
      -  (1) Whether claim 1 of the 08/833,892 patent application claims
        patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101? (the
        patent-eligibility rules) 
-  (2) What standard should govern in determining whether a process is
        patent-eligible subject matter under section 101? 
-  (3) Whether the claimed subject matter is not patent-eligible because
        it constitutes an abstract idea or mental process; when does a claim
        that contains both mental and physical steps create patent-eligible
        subject matter? 
-  (4) Whether a method or process must result in a physical
        transformation of an article or be tied to a machine to be
        patent-eligible subject matter under section 101? 
-  (5) Whether it is appropriate to reconsider State Street Bank &
        Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
        1998), and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352
        (Fed. Cir. 1999), in this case and, if so, whether those cases should be
        overruled in any respect? 
 The appellate court did affirm
      the need for a physical transformation. Their central doctrine is "Machine
      or Transformation". This would have been a problem for business patents,
      and perhaps software patents. 
     Note that their reasoning was taken straight from the few SCOTUS cases
      on record. 
     The following question arises whenever a patent is applied for on an
      abstract process: 
    [Is the patent] tailored narrowly enough to
      encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle rather
      than to pre-empt the principle itself?
    
     Benson: NO 
      Diehr: YES (one of the prior SCOTUS cases) 
      Bilski: NO
    
    This part of the Federal Circuit's reasoning may still stand.
    
     Part of the Benson ruling: 
    
    Transformation and reduction of an article 'to
      a different state or thing' is THE clue to the patentability of a process
      claim that does not include particular machines. 
     The Diehr patent was for making rubber, using a computer to control the
      process. It wins the "different state or thing" standard hands down. 
    The federal circuit dismissed the "useful, concrete, or tangible result"
      test: that is NOT enough to establish patentability. 
     They also reject the "technological arts" test (see above) that was
      once-upon-a-time part of the method-patent rules. They agree that it is
      too hard to tell whether something involves the technological arts;
      however, unlike the USPTO, they end up ruling the OTHER WAY; that is, to
      reject MORE broadly than the TA test. 
     machine-or-transformation test: emphasize the OR. 
     We will, however, consider some of our past
      cases to gain insight into the transformation part of the test. A claimed
      process is patent-eligible if it transforms
        an article into a different state or thing. This transformation
      must be central to the purpose of the claimed process. But the main aspect
      of the transformation test that requires clarification here is what sorts
      of things constitute "articles" such that their transformation is
      sufficient to impart patent-eligibility under §101. 
     Tanning leather curing rubber (Diehr case) 
     The raw materials of many information-age
      processes, however, are electronic signals and electronically-manipulated
      data. And some so-called business methods, such as that claimed in the
      present case, involve the manipulation of even more abstract constructs
      such as legal obligations, organizational relationships, and business
      risks. Which, if any, of these processes qualify as a transformation or
      reduction of an article into a different state or thing constituting
      patent-eligible subject matter? 
    Note that while the Bilski decision does not claim to reverse State
        Street (the case that led to business-method patents), most
      commentators seem to feel that it has that effect. It is less clear that
      Bilski would have had a significant effect on software patents.
    
    Applying the Machine-or-Tranformation
        test to famous cases
     RSA? material transformation in "real" terms The transformation is to a
      file. While it is electronic, it is decidedly material. 
     MP3? material transformation in "real" terms? An mp3 file isn't a
      physical thing, but it does have a certain "thingness". People think of
      them as things, and buy them as things. An mp3 file is material. 
     NTP? maybe no? The argument can be made that there is no "material
      thing" on the table here. Email messages are NOT it; the patent only
      addresses the delivery of email. 
    DataTreasury? It seems unlikely that DataTreasury's patents would stand up
    to this new test.
    
     Supreme Court
    Pamela Samuelson, writing in the March 2010 CACM, noted that the Supreme
    Court appeared during oral arguments to believe that some
    way was needed to disallow patenting of nontechnological processes. Justice
    Scalia asked whether horse-training techniques should be patentable, and
    techniques to "win friends and influence people". Justice Sotomayor asked
    whether speed-dating methods could be patentable, and Justice Breyer asked
    if a professor could patent an improved teaching method.
    
    However, this did not quite happen. Here are a few quotes from the decision,
    written by Justice Kennedy [emphasis by pld]:
    
    Section 101 specifies four independent
      categories of inventions or discoveries that are patent eligible:
      “process[es],” “machin[es],” “manufactur[es],” and “composition[s] of
      matter.” “In choosing such expansive terms, . . . Congress plainly
      contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope”
    
    
    This Court’s precedents provide three
      specific exceptions to §101’s broad principles: “laws of nature, physical
      phenomena, and abstract ideas.”
    
    
    The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for patent
      eligibility under §101. The Court’s precedents establish that although
      that test may be a useful and important
        clue or investigative tool, it is not the sole test for deciding
      whether an invention is a patent-eligible “process” under §101. In holding
      to the contrary, the Federal Circuit violated two principles of statutory
      interpretation: Courts “ ‘should not read into the patent laws limitations
      and conditions which the legislature has not expressed,’ ” Diamond v.
      Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 182, and, “[u]nless otherwise defined, ‘words will
      be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ ”
    
    
    Section 101 similarly precludes a reading of
      the term “process” that would categorically exclude business methods. The
      term “method” within §100(b)’s “process” definition, at least as a textual
      matter and before other consulting other Patent Act limitations and this
      Court’s precedents, may include at least some methods of doing business.
    
    
    Because petitioners’ patent application can
      be rejected under the Court’s precedents on the unpatentability of
      abstract ideas, the Court need not define further what constitutes a
      patentable “process,” beyond pointing to the definition of that term
      provided in §100(b) and looking to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and
      Diehr. Nothing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing the Federal
      Circuit’s past interpretations of
      §101. [that is, the Supreme Court is not endorsing the State Street Bank
      case -- pld] 
      
      The appeals court may have thought it needed to make the
      machine-or-transformation test exclusive precisely because its case law
      had not adequately identified less extreme means of restricting business
      method patents. In disapproving an exclusive machine-or-transformation
      test, this Court by no means desires to preclude the Federal Circuit’s
      development of other limiting criteria that further the Patent Act’s
      purposes and are not inconsistent with its text.
    
    
    In other words, 
    
    We can kick this patent out without
      resorting to a Machine or Transformation test, and while we probably think
      the MoT test is too restrictive, we're not going to say anything further.
    
    
    Return to Gottschalk v Benson
    (which Bilski v Kappos did apparently firmly uphold)
    
    It is easy to interpret Bilski as reinforcing the Benson
    decision. It is up to the Supreme Court, however, to decide if Benson
    was in fact the right approach. The idea expressed in Benson
    that the algorithm was "too general" and might be used for anything
    seems in hindsight rather quaint; it is clear a few decades later that this
    is going to be the case with perhaps the majority of software patents. For
    example RSA patented a method of encryption that could be used for anything:
    banking, personal matters, commerce, digital signatures, etc. 
    
    Also, Section VI of a separate opinion by Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and
    Sotomayor is a strong argument against business-method patents, period. 
    
    The constitutionally mandated purpose and
      function of the patent laws bolster the conclusion that methods of doing
      business are not “processes” under §101 [of the Patent Law].
    
    However, we will have to wait for a future case to see if this position
    makes it into an actual decision.
    
    
    Mayo Labs v Prometheus Labs, Supreme Court, March 20,
      2012
    Prometheus Labs patented a way of measuring levels of thiopurine drugs to
    maintain a consistent dosage. The set of metabolites is measured, and from
    these varying levels an inference can be made as to the level of the
    original drug. 
    
    Mayo Labs used the patented idea without a license. Prometheus sued. The
    District Court found in favor of Mayo (more or less), but the Federal
    Circuit held that Prometheus's strategy was patentable, and, furthermore,
    even met the stronger "machine or transformation" test of patentability. The
    Federal Circuit's argument was that administration of the drug "transformed"
    the body, and that administering the blood test "transformed" the blood
    sample (my first reaction here is that it seems that similar logic could
    make anything fit the "machine or
    transformation" logic, thus undermining the whole purpose of the MoT test as
    a limitation on
    patentability).  Following Bilski
    back in 2008, the Supreme Court remanded the Mayo v Prometheus case back to
    the Federal Circuit for reconsideration; while the Bilski
    decision was often seen as expanding
    the rule of patentability beyond the MoT test, what the Supreme Court
    apparently had in mind was that sometimes things could be patentable while
    not meeting the MoT test but other times perhaps things could meet the MoT
    test and yet not be patentable. The Federal Circuit ruled again that
    Prometheus's  invention was patentable under the MoT test. 
    
    The Supreme Court ruled in March 2012
    
    Because the laws
        of nature recited by Prometheus’ patent claims—the relationships
      between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the
      likelihood that a thiopurine drug dosage will prove ineffective or cause
      harm—are not themselves patentable, the claimed processes are not patentable
        unless they have additional features that provide practical
      assurance that the processes are genuine applications of those laws rather
      than drafting efforts designed to monopolize the correlations.
    
    
    What other patents that we've looked at might be construed as patenting
    general scientific principles? The eolas patent? Any patent where as
    standard data structure is applied to a specific context?
    
    The Prometheus patent was denied on the grounds that there was nothing
    substantial to the invention beyond a fundamental scientific principle
    (relating to a blood test for the effective levels of a drug). The patent is
    for the idea that by measuring two metabolites of the drug the effective
    level can be determined.
    
    For software patents, in many cases the anti-patent argument is that a
    claimed invention is nothing more than a fundamental principle, applied in a
    specific context.
    
    Myriad Genetics
    The Supreme Court also in 2012 sent back to the Federal Circuit court for
    reconsideration, in light of the above case, the Association for Molecular
    Pathology v. Myriad Genetics case. Here, Myriad Genetics had been issued a
    patent on two human genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2. Patenting of human genes is
    controversial because, well, perhaps if you had one of those genes you would
    have to pay a royalty? (The answer is no, of course; the patent would be for
    the use of the gene in a particular in
      vitro manner.) 
    
    The Federal Circuit upheld the patent in August 2012, and the Supreme Court
    heard the case. They ruled on June 13, 2013 that human genes can not
    be patented; that isolating a human gene is an act of scientific discovery
    rather than invention. This invalidated a large number of existing gene
    patents.
    
    It does not affect patents for genetically modified organisms, though.
    
    Myriad had not allowed others to test for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, even
    with more sophisticated tests than their own. 
    
    Myriad's patent on synthetically created DNA still stands.
    
    
    Abstract Patents
    This is an important distinction that merits greater emphasis. In theory,
    "abstract ideas" are not patentable. In practice, the Federal Circuit has
    undermined this with a number of decisions, notably the State Street Bank
    case. 
    
    There is some uncertainty as to what, exactly, constitutes an "abstract
    patent", and when an idea is too general to patent. Bilski's process was one
    such abstract idea, but note that in the State Street Bank case the Federal
    Circuit had agreed that similar abstract ideas were patentable (to
    its credit, the Federal Circuit reversed course on that in their original
    Bilski decision). 
    
    In Ultramercial v Hulu the
    Federal Circuit has allowed patentability of the idea of requiring a
    subscriber to view online ads before viewing copyrighted content. The patent
    in question is 7346545.
    The abstract states
    
    The present invention is directed to a
      method and system for distributing or obtaining products covered by
      intellectual property over a telecommunications network whereby a consumer
      may, rather paying for the products, choose to receive such products after
      viewing and/or interacting with an interposed sponsor's or advertiser's
      message, wherein the interposed sponsor or advertiser may pay the owner or
      assignee of the underlying intellectual property associated with the
      product through an intermediary such as a facilitator.
    
    There are no techniques described in the patent. That is, the
    patent is on the abstract idea of showing ads on the internet.
    
    This patent is also troubling on prior-art and obviousness grounds;
    advertising has been present on commercial broadcast TV from the beginning.
    
    Such patents are also sometimes called functional patents:
    the patent describes only the "function" of the invention (showing ads,
    sending characters, cutting ice) rather than a specific method.
    Functional patents can also be considered a more specific category; some
    patents considered "abstract" do at least attempt to outline a method.
    
    There is a theory that the most egregious problems with software patents
    would be fixed if abstract/functional patents were disallowed. Of the
    patents we have considered, the XOR patent, the spreadsheet-recalculation
    patent, the MP3 patents and the RSA patent are not
    functional/abstract; each involves a specific way of doing things. The Eolas
    patent may be considered to be functional, in that it covers any mechanism
    for embedding a window in a browser. The i4i patent seemed concrete in its
    initial formulation, but the interpretation of it in the i4i v Microsoft
    case (covering any way of separating structure and content) certainly seems
    as abstract as patents can get. For the NTP v RIM case, the idea of
    forwarding email via wireless certainly has some strong elements of
    abstractness. On the other hand, RIM's precise invention did bear a certain
    similarity to NTP's idea.
    
    After the Mayo v Prometheus decision, the Supreme Court also sent the
    Ultramercial decision back to the Federal Circuit. In summer 2013 a
    three-judge panel of the the Federal Circuit (Rader, Lourie, O'Malley) affirmed
    their previous decision, though with a new argument. Judge Rader apparently
    felt that the abstract idea of inserting commercials into TV became
    non-abstract because the Internet was involved. Judge Rader
    referred to the following diagram outlining the interactions:
    
    
    
    In theory, if the patent is really that specific, then workarounds should be
    available. In my limited reading of the patent, however, the crucial claims
    do indeed seem extremely broad.
    
    Judge Lourie, while concurring, argued that the computer issue was
    incidental, and that overall the particular methods of the patent
    were concrete enough that it was not invalid due to abstractness. 
    
    That said, a month earlier the entire Federal Circuit, en banc,
    had created in CLS Banc International v Alice Corp a larger class of
    inventions that were non-patentable by reason of abstractness. In that
    decision, Judges Rader and Lourie were in opposition.
    
    CLS Banc International v Alice Corp
    In a decision handed down May 10, 2013, the Federal Circuit, en banc
    (but with only ten judges) ruled that certain computer-related
    business-method patents of Alice Corporation were in fact ineligible for
    patent protection. The patents involve the presence of a third party in a
    transaction, who makes guarantees so as to reduce the settlement risk for
    the primary parties. Having a third party mediate disputes between
    adversaries, and having that third party act as an escrow agent, is an
    ancient tradition. But the big difference, according to Alice, is that their
    patent is for doing this on a computer.
    
    CLS bank was created essentially for the specific purpose of being exactly
    this type of escrow agent; their name is an acronym for Continuous Linked
    Settlement". 
    
    Alice's main patent is 7,725,375.
    Claim 26 is a major one. Charles Duan of Public Knowledge has claimed that
    the claim can be implemented via the following seven lines of code. Accounts
    1 and 2 are held by Institution 1; account 3 is held by Institution 2.
        account1 = 200;
    account3 = 300;
    read(exchange_value);
    if (account1 < exchange) {print("insufficient funds"); exit(1);}
    account1 -= exchange; 
    account3 += exchange;
    print("Institution 1 should debit account 2 by " + exchange_value);
    No less than seven different opinions were written. The main opinion was per
      curiam, or authorless; it stated that the court was split five to
    five and therefore the District Court's decision that Alice's patents were
    invalid would stand.
    
    A major written opinion, joined by five judges total, was by Judge Lourie.
    Technically, it does not establish a precedent.  Lourie writes that
    abstract principles are not patentable; to be patentable, an abstract idea
    has to be applied to a concrete case.
    
    What matters is whether a claim threatens to
      subsume the full scope of a fundamental concept, and when those concerns
      arise, we must look for meaningful limitations that prevent the claim as a
      whole from covering the concept's every practical application.
    
    Lourie also took a dim view of the idea that taking a common operation and
    computerizing it was patentable:
    
    [A computer is] just a calculator capable of
      performing mental steps faster than a human could.... Unless the claims
      require a computer to perform operations that are not merely accelerated
      calculations, a computer does not itself confer patent eligibility.
    
    Judge Lourie tried to tie this theory back to Diehr,
    stating that, in that case, the use of a computer did indeed offer more than
    just "accelerated calculations".
    
    It does appear, though, that Lourie implicitly expanded the scope of the
    "abstract ideas" exception. Recall that the Supreme Court settled the Bilski and Prometheus
      Labs cases based on the abstract-ideas and natural-law exceptions,
    respectively, but did not give a great deal of guidance in either case as to
    just how far these exceptions could be applied.
    
    Judges Rader and Moore wrote in dissent:
    
    [T]he current interpretation of § 101, and
      in particular the abstract idea exception, is causing a freefall in the
      patent system. Holding that all [claims at issue] are directed to no more
      than an abstract idea gives staggering breadth to what is meant to be a
      narrow judicial exception. And, let's be clear: if all of these claims,
      including the system claims, are not patent-eligible, this case
        is the death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including all
      business method, financial system, and software patents
      as well as many computer implemented and telecommunications patents....
      This would render ineligible nearly 20 percent of all the patents that
      actually issued in 2011.
    
    
    
    On June 19, 2014 the Supreme Court released their decision in Alice v
      CLS, and they state firmly that adding a computer to an otherwise
    unpatentable abstract idea can not make it patentable. Furthermore, the
    decision was unanimous!
    
    Stating an abstract idea "while adding the
      words 'apply it'" is not enough for patent eligibility. [Mayo v
      Prometheus]. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea "to a particular
      technological environment." [Bilski]. Stating an abstract idea while
      adding the words "apply it with a computer" simply combines those two
      steps, with the same deficient result.
    
    This is a clear statement that software is not eligible for patent just
    because it describes doing something on the computer that was formerly done
    another way. While this might seem obvious, note that the Federal Circuit, en
      banc, couldn't get a majority to agree to this.
    
    On the other hand, the decision was not terribly deep, either. The Supreme
    Court still insists that algorithms are not patentable, but applications of
    algorithms may be. There were those who hoped that the Supreme Court would
    use Alice to overturn all or most software patents (though that
    was never realistic). Similarly, the Alice decision reinforced the
    position that abstract ideas are not patentable, but applications may be,
    all without really specifying what an "abstract idea" was.
    
    So we still don't really know what the Supreme Court considers "abstract".
    The defendant did argue that an abstract idea must be a "preexisting,
    fundamental truth that 'exists in principle apart from any human action'",
    but the Court firmly and explicitly disagreed.
    
    The decision does suggest that, in some cases, an idea may be "abstract" by
    virtue of being well-known, that is, obvious. This gives a new way to attack
    patents for obviousness, without going through the difficult rigamarole of
    challenging the USPTO ruling that a patent was "nonobvious". Strictly
    speaking, this confuses the issue of whether an invention is eligible
    for a patent with whether it is sufficiently non-obvious to be worthy
    of a patent; the two issues are addressed separately in the patent law.
    
    Here are a few other interpretations of "abstract"
    
      - So general as to have no specific implementation, as in Ultramercial's
        patent
- Representing a method for how people are to act
- Not tied to any specific physical invention (some people argue all
        software is in this category)
    A more serious problem with the Supreme Court's doctrine that "algorithms
    are not patentable, but applications may be" is that it runs afoul of
    reality. In some deep sense, all software is an algorithm. In a
    practical sense, there are a lot of innovative ideas that are just a
    straightforward application of a particular algorithm. Compression is
    usually of this form; one comes up with an algorithm to describe the
    compression, at which point the application of the algorithm is absolutely
    straightforward. This would include mp3! And yet in the Bilski
    decision, Justice Kennedy states
    
    the machine-or-transformation test would
      create uncertainty as to the patentability of software, ... and inventions
      based on linear programming, data compression, and the
      manipulation of digital signals.
    
    Actually, all three kinds of inventions listed are fundamentally algorithms.
    So, according to Kennedy, the Supreme Court is not necessarily
    against the patenting of algorithms.
    
    David Kappos, patent commissioner at the time of Bilski v Kappos,
    wrote that the Supreme Court had fundamentally upheld
    software patents in its Alice decision. This is not quite clear.
    However, reading Kappos' essay at http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-supreme-court-leaves-patent-protection-for-software-innovation-intact/
    makes it a little more clear why the USPTO continues to award such weak
    patents. Bilski is clearly very enthusiastic about software patents. He
    wrote
    
    patentability is awarded based on the merits
      of the invention at hand, whether the medium in which it is built is a
      concrete structure, ceramic shape, metallic apparatus, molecular
      composition or computer language
    
    He also wrote
    
    U.S. software innovation is among our most
      important economic drivers
    
    Alas, it now often seems to be the case that software innovation is actively
    threatened by the patent system.
    
    After the Alice decision in June 2014, the Federal Circuit again revisited
    Ultramercial v Hulu, and on November 14, 2014 ruled that the Ultramercial
    "patent does not claim patent eligible subject matter" and ruled the patent
    invalid.
    
    
    Trolls Again
    The Alice decision has created problems for patent trolls; a large number
      of weak patents have been thrown out based on this ruling.
    The Supreme Court addressed in the 2014 season two cases on when a losing
    plaintiff in a patent case could be required to pay court costs to the
    plaintiff: Octane Fitness v Icon Fitness and Highmark v
      Allcare Health Management System (in the latter case, Allcare held a
    software patent and Highmark was suing for a declaratory judgment to have it
    invalidated). The relevant law states this can only occur in "exceptional"
    cases; the Federal Circuit had earlier interpreted "exceptional" to mean if
    there was "material inappropriate conduct related to the matter in
    litigation", and not just a frivolous suit. The Supreme Court did not think
    much of the Federal Circuit's standard:
    
    The framework established by the Federal
      Circuit in Brooks Furniture is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly
      encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts. 
    
    And also:
    
    The district court “is better positioned” to
      decide whether a case is exceptional..., because it lives with the case
      over a prolonged period of time. 
    
    The specter of having to pay the other side's legal fees potentially puts a
    huge damper on "patent-troll" litigation: it means the troll takes a much
    greater risk in filing a frivolous lawsuit.
    
    See arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/03/biggest-patent-troll-of-2014-gives-up-drops-appeal/.
    
    
    Some Patent-Troll Examples
    This is a touchy subject; I do not believe all patent-holding companies
      are "trolls". RSA, for example. Something all the trolls below have in
      common is that the patent claim is very weak.
    Lodsys has claimed a patent
      on in-app purchasing (for iOS and Android apps).
    
    MPHJ, the "scanner troll", claims to have a patent on scanning
      documents and emailing them to the user.
    
    VirnetX has won a judgment against Apple; one judgment was for $625 million
    though the judge later ordered a new trial, which is pending. But let's look
    at some of the patents:
    
      - 7418504:
        secure DNS (not distributed!)
- 7921211:
        more on secure DNS
- 6502135:
        This is the VPN patent. But VPNs were prior art; PPTP was invented in
        1996, two years before this patent filing.
- 7490151:
        more on secure DNS (read the claims, not the abstract)
Also consider Eolas and E-Data (but possibly not I4I or NPT).
    
    
     Lawsuit Venue
    In recent years, plaintiffs were free to file patent-infringement lawsuits
    anywhere. They often chose the Eastern District of Texas.
    
    But in 2017 the Supreme Court ruled in Heartland v Kraft
    that patent defendents must be sued in the state where they are
    incorporated. Heartland was incorporated in Indiana; Kraft had sued them in
    Delaware. 
    
    Many companies are incorporated in Delaware, because of its
    business-friendly legal environment, but patent cases are not affected by
    state laws.
    
    The most popular venue for filing patent lawsuits is the Eastern District of
    Texas, presumably due to its plaintiff-friendly judges and juries. This is
    now done with forever.