Computer Ethics, Summer 2012
Corboy Law 602; Tuesdays & Thursdays, 6:00-9:00
Week 4, Class 8
Readings
Read Baase Chapter 3 on Speech
Read Baase Chapter 4 section 7 which includes patents
Some patent papers
These are also assigned reading.
1. Simpson
Garfinkel, Patently Absurd, 1993

Garfinkel's article is pretty easy reading, pointing out some problems
with software patents specifically.
2.Richard
Stallman on Patents
, 2002
Stallman is against software patents, of course. However, his case here
is
better than many open-source-related arguments; in fact, it is squarely
aligned with the interests of software-development businesses.
3.Paul Graham, a
computer scientist and one of the partners of the venture-capital firm
Y Combinator, wrote a 2006 essay Are Software
Patents Evil?
Graham makes the following claim early on:
One thing I do
feel pretty certain of is that if you're against
software patents, you're against patents in general. Gradually our
machines consist more and more of software. Things that used to
be done with levers and cams and gears are now done with loops and
trees and closures. There's nothing special about physical embodiments
of control systems that should make them patentable, and the software
equivalent not.
Is this true?
Does it matter that Graham is also a radical proponent of using the
lisp programming language, which everybody else stopped using in the
1990's?
Graham also says,
Frankly, it
surprises me how small a role patents play in the
software business. It's kind of ironic, considering all the dire
things experts say about software patents stifling innovation, but
when one looks closely at the software business, the most striking
thing is how little patents seem to matter.
But that paragraph is about software companies being sued by other
software companies, and not "patent trolls".
Graham also makes some other claims, in particular some about the role
of the patent system in business competition generally. Check out what
he says about Reveal.
PP v ACLA
Note that the Supreme Court cases cited by the full Ninth Circuit
(Brandenburg v Ohio, Watts v US) were cases where a threat of violence
was deemed not to be a "true
threat"; these are generally identified as "liberal" opinions. However,
the Ninth Circuit's decision is, in terms of law and order, a somewhat
"conservative" decision.
Hit Man
this was a book published by Paladin
Press, written by "Rex Feral",
supposedly a pseudonym for a woman who writes true-crime books for a
living.
It is likely a work of fiction.
In 1993, James Perry murdered Mildred Horn, her 8-year-old son Trevor,
and nurse Janice Saunders. He was allegedly hired by Lawrence Horn.
In Rice v Paladin Enterprises (1997), the federal court of appeals (4th
circuit) held that the case could
go to jury trial;
ie freedom-of-press issues did not automatically prevent that.
Many of the specifics of the Perry murders were out of the book.
Many of them are rather compellingly "obvious": pay cash, rent a car
under an assumed name, steal an out-of-state license plate, use an AR-7
rifle (accurate but collapsible), make it look like a robbery
The book also explains how to build a silencer, which is not at all
obvious; Perry allegedly did just this.
The following are from the judge's decision. "Stipulations" are
alleged facts that are not being contested at the present time.
"The parties agree that the sole issue
to be decided by the Court . . . is whether the First Amendment is a complete defense, as a matter of
law, to the civil action set forth in the plaintiffs' Complaint. All
other issues of law and fact are specifically reserved for subsequent
proceedings." (emphasis added)
Paladin has stipulated not only that,
in marketing Hit Man, Paladin "intended to attract and assist criminals
and would-be criminals who desire information and instructions on how
to commit crimes," J.A. at 59, but also that it "intended and had
knowledge" that Hit Man actually "would be used, upon receipt, by
criminals and would-be criminals to plan and execute the crime of
murder for hire." J.A. at 59 (emphasis added). Indeed, the publisher
has even stipulated that, through publishing and selling Hit Man, it
assisted Perry in particular in the perpetration of the very murders
for which the victims' families now attempt to hold Paladin civilly
liable. J.A. at 61. [note 2] [242]
Notwithstanding Paladin's extraordinary
stipulations that it not only knew that its instructions might be used
by murderers, but that it actually intended to provide assistance to
murderers and would-be murderers which would be used by them "upon
receipt," and that it in fact assisted Perry in particular in the
commission of the murders of Mildred and Trevor Horn and Janice
Saunders, the district court granted Paladin's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' claims that Paladin aided and
abetted Perry, holding that these claims were barred by the First
Amendment as a matter of law.
What's going on here? Why did Paladin stipulate all that?
It looks to me like Paladin was acknowledging the
hypotheticals as part of its claim that they didn't matter, that the
First Amendment protected them.
The court ruled it did not:
long-established caselaw provides that
speech--even speech by the press--that constitutes criminal aiding and
abetting does not enjoy the
protection of the First Amendment
Past cases that lost:
- publishing advice on how to make illegal drugs
- publishing advice on how to cheat on your taxes
Brandenberg v Ohio [discussed above under PP v ACLA] was cited as a
case of protected speech advocating
lawlessness. But this case, due to Paladin's stipulations [!!], was
much more specific.
A popular theory was that after Paladin Press settled the case
(which they did, under pressure from their insurer),
the rights to the book ended up in the public domain.
Paladin claims otherwise; however, the Utopian Anarchist Party
promptly posted the entire book at overthrow.com and that was that.
[Other parties may also have posted the book independently]
(The bootleg copies don't have the diagrams, though)
It has been claimed that Hit Man
was sold almost entirely
to non-criminals who simply like antiestablishment stuff. However, this
is (a) speculative (though likely), and (b) irrelevant to the question
of whether some criminals
bought it.
Look at the current Paladin
website. Does it look like their primary focus is encouraging
criminals? Secondary focus?
To find Hitman, google "hit
man" "rex feral", or search Amazon.com. Most
references as of 2009 are to those selling used copies of the physical
book; check out amazon.com for current prices of used editions.
The site http://mirror.die.net/hitman
still has the online text.
Other bad materials:
- Encyclopedia of [Afghan] Jihad
- Bomb-making instructions generally
Note the Encyclopedia of Jihad has a significant political/religious
component!
4th-circuit opinion:
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/comm/free_speech/rice.html
Should the law generally make sense? See http://xkcd.com/651
Threats
As we've seen above, threats must be
"true threats" to be unprotected speech, but the standard for that is
pretty much the eye of the recipient.
Harassing speech
Harassment of another individual is generally not protected by
free-speech laws. Computer-mediated forms of such harassment can
include emails, open and closed discussion forums, texts, or even
blogs. Harassment must be
- persistent
- must inflict emotional harm
Generally, harassment must
also be directed at an individual.
Incitement to Imminent Violence
The Brandenburg
standard is still good law here: inflammatory speech is permitted
unless it is intended to, and likely to, incite imminent lawless
action. But specific threats are separate.
Group Libel
This remains a long shot. The idea is that if someone says hateful
things about a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group, any member of that group can
file a lawsuit.
Criminal Libel
An even longer shot, except in Colorado.
ISPs and Hate Speech
ISPs are not obligated to do anything about hate speech on their
customers' web sites. They are not obligated to remove anything
objectionable or defamatory.
However, many ISPs do have Terms of Service forbidding hate speech.
Universities and Hate Speech
Arthur Butz, a faculty member at Northwestern University, has a
sideline of writing essays denying the Holocaust. For a long time, his
faculty web page at Northwestern contained links to all his other
writings. As of now, it appears that his other writings have been moved
to another site.
Northwestern has always had a policy allowing faculty to use the
internet for a wide variety of purposes. In their Rights
and Responsibilities policy, Rights
comes at the beginning and the first item under it is Intellectual Freedom, where it is
stated that,
The University is a free and open forum
for the expression of ideas,
including viewpoints that are strange, unorthodox, or unpopular. The
University network is the same.
Note that the immediately following item on the list is Safety from Threats. That is,
despite the above, Northwestern does not tolerate harassment.
Other universities have disallowed student/faculty use of the internet
except for narrow academic purposes, perhaps with cases like Butz's in
mind.
German regulation of hate speech
Germany's constitution states that
everybody has the right freely to
express and disseminate their opinions orally, in writing or visually
and to obtain information from generally accessible sources without
hindrance.
However, German criminal law forbids
- defamation of the deceased
- incitement to violence and hatred
- public display of the Nazi swastika
- claiming as fact things that are demonstrably false
The last one has been used successfully to prosecute Holocaust deniers.
In other words, despite the wording of the German constitution, speech
is much more regulated than in the United States. That is, the German
courts have interpreted their free-speech clause less broadly than has
the US Supreme Court.
German law has generally tolerated the existence of off-shore
hate-speech websites accessible in Germany. However, there have been
attempts to prosecute when (a) there were relatively stronger grounds
for claiming jurisdiction, and (b) there were things that might have
been done to restrict access within Germany.
In 1995, Nebraskan neo-Nazi Gary Lauck was arrested on a trip to
Denmark, extradited to Germany, and convicted for neo-Nazi materials he
published in
the United States, some of which were shipped to Germany. He served
four years in prison. After his release he switched to mostly online
activities; he has apparently not been arrested since.
In 1998, Felix Somm -- at the time the German manager of CompuServe --
was convicted in Germany because CompuServe made certain pornography
available in Germany. Somm's conviction was later overturned,
apparently because Somm had absolutely no control over the material in question and in fact had asked
CompuServe to block the material within Germany.
What if Somm, instead of asking CompuServe to block the material, had
instead thrown up his hands and said it was beyond his control?
In 1999, the Australian Fred Tobin was arrested while on a trip to
Germany, for Holocaust-denial activity; at least some of this appears
to have been carried out via a website Tobin maintained in Australia;
he was
later convicted and served seven months in prison.
In 2008 Germany attempted to extradite Tobin from Australia. This
failed. He was later arrested at Heathrow Airport in England, while
traveling; again, the German extradition claim failed as Holocaust
denial is not a crime in the UK.
He was convicted in Australia in April 2009 for violating a court order
not to include anti-Semitic materials on his website, and served three
months.
Canada also criminalizes hate speech: it is a criminal act to "advocate
or promote genocide” or to willfully promote "hatred against any
identifiable group".
Ultimately, the problem of jurisdiction
for speech regulation is a difficult one. We'll come to that
jurisdiction issue later, as a topic in and of itself.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD)
From the Anti-Defamation League site above:
... nations ratifying the [ICERD]
convention are required to “declare an offence punishable by law” the
dissemination of ideas “based on racial superiority or hatred.”
Additionally, the convention requires these nations to “declare illegal
and prohibit” all organizations and organized activities that “promote
and incite racial discrimination.”
The United States signed the convention in 1966, but the Senate tacked
the following on to the ratification resolution:
The Constitution and laws of the United
States contain extensive protections of individual freedom of speech,
expression and association. Accordingly, the United States does not
accept any obligation under this Convention, in particular under
articles 4 and 7, to restrict those rights, through the adoption of
legislation or any other measures, to the extent that they are
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States
(Note that there is a long history of UN actions that various member
states have declined to accept.)
LICRA v Yahoo
Baase, section 3.3.2; see also Marc Greenberg's article at http://www.btlj.org/data/articles/18_04_05.pdf.
(Quotes below not otherwise cited are from Greenberg's article.)
Yahoo offered Nazi memorabilia for sale on its auction site.
They were sued by LICRA (LIgue Contre
le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme, or now Ligue Internationale Contre le
Racisme et l'Antisémitisme), joined by the UEJF, the Union of French
Jewish Students. In France the sale of Nazi memorabilia is illegal.
This is a JURISDICTIONAL case that probably should
be discussed
elsewhere, except that it addresses a free-speech issue. But this is as
good a time as any to start in on some of the rationales for a given
court's claiming judicial jurisdiction related to an action that
occurred elsewhere. Here are some theories, more or less in increasing
order of "engagement":
- the "affects" test: the court decides that the remote action
affects its own local citizens in some manner. A passive website would
count here.
- the "affects intentionally" test: the court decides that the
source intended to have an
effect on its local citizens
- the "targeting" test: the court feels that the action was directed at its local citizens,
with some level of intent.
- the "primarily affects" test: the court decides that the action's
primary effect is on its
local citizens
- the plaintiff test: the affected party (buyer or the one defamed,
for example) lives in the local jurisdiction
- purposeful availment: by choosing to engage in local commerce,
the remote entity "purposefully avails" itself of the legal system of
the local jurisdiction.
- contract: the remote site has a contract with parties in the
local jurisdiction
In Batzel v Cremers, the California court decided it had jurisdiction
perhaps because of the plaintiff test.
The LICRA v Yahoo case was heard in Paris by Judge Jean-Jacques
Gomez, who explained the French law as follows:
Whereas the exhibition of Nazi objects
for purposes of sale constitutes a violation of French law ..., and
even more an affront to the collective memory of a country profoundly
traumatised by the atrocities committed by and in the name of the
criminal Nazi regime against its citizens and above all against its
citizens of the Jewish faith . . . .
Judge Gomez decided they did have jurisdiction to hear the case.
But Yahoo US has no assets in France! There was a separate company,
Yahoo France, that controlled the yahoo.fr domain.
Judge Gomez based his jurisdictional decision on the so-called effects test: that the actions of
Yahoo US had negative effects
within France. Intent, or targeting, or direction do not enter; the
effects test is perhaps the weakest basis for claiming jurisdiction.
Gomez later explained some of his reasoning in an interview:
For me, the issue was never whether this
was an American site, whether Yahoo had a subsidiary in France, the only issue was whether the image was
accessible in France.
It is true that the Internet creates virtual images, but to the extent
that the images are available in France, a French judge has
jurisdiction for harm caused in France or violations of French law.
But in the case of my decision, it was
extremely simple: the Nazi collectibles were visible in France, this is
a violation of French law, and therefore I had no choice but to decide
on the face of the issue. Whether the site is all in English or not
makes no difference. The issue of
visibility in a given country is the only relevant issue.
Gomez issued his first interim order on May 22, 2000: that Yahoo US
must use geolocation software to block access to its auction materials
within France. It was estimated that 70% of French citizens could be
blocked by the software alone, and that another 20% would be blocked by
adding a page that said
To continue, click here to certify that you are
not in France
What would the purpose of that be? Clearly, French neo-Nazis would
likely simply lie. However, other French citizens would be reminded
that these objects violated French law. What is the purpose of laws?
In November 2000, Gomez issued a second interim order fining Yahoo US
100,000 francs per day for noncompliance, after three months. (The May
order had listed 100,000 euros,
some ten times as much.) He included in his ruling evidence that not
only had Yahoo US done things that had effects
in France, but also that Yahoo US was targeting
France; the latter claim was based on the observation that, for most
French viewers visiting yahoo.com,
the advertisements displayed were in French.
When Yahoo indicated they might not comply, based on First Amendment
grounds, LICRA & UEJF suggested
they might go after the assets of yahoo.fr, though this was perhaps
just overheated hyperbole.
At about the same time, Rabbi Abraham Cooper, of the Simon Wiesenthal
Center, issued his own argument against a First Amendment defense (from
Greenberg):
It’s good to try to wrap yourself
around free speech . . . but in this case it doesn’t wash. Television
stations, newspapers and magazines refuse
to accept some advertisements
in an effort to marginalize viewpoints and products that the vast
majority of Americans think are disrespectful or even potentially
dangerous. Internet companies . . .
should just do what American companies have been doing for half a
century: reserve the right not to peddle bigotry.
The US side
At this point, Yahoo US did two things. The first was to decide,
internally, based on arguments by Rabbi Cooper and others, to ban the
sale of all "hate material"
on its US site, including both Nazi and KKK memorabilia. Books (eg
Hitler's Mein Kampf)
and items issued by governments (eg German coins bearing the swastika).
Allegedly this decision was made "independently" of the decision of the
Paris court, though the review was pretty clearly prompted by that decision. The
continued sale of books and coins would not bring yahoo US into full
compliance with Judge Gomez' order. Here's a recent quote from http://help.yahoo.com/l/us/yahoo/shopping/merchant/pricegrabber-04.html;_ylt=AqCUIEnwDUz2L4y3cFY9q3fuqCN4
spelling out the rule:
Any item that promotes, glorifies, or
is directly associated with groups or individuals known principally for
hateful or violent positions or acts, such as Nazis or the Ku Klux
Klan. Official government-issue stamps and coins are not prohibited
under this policy. Expressive media, such as books and films, may be
subject to more permissive standards as determined by Yahoo! in its
sole discretion.
The second action Yahoo US took was to sue in US court for a Declaratory Judgement that the French court did not have jurisdiction within the
US, and that no French order or claim could be enforced in the US. This
case was Yahoo v LICRA
(the reverse order of the French case LICRA v Yahoo). Such declaratory
judgement orders are common in contract and IP cases (especially patent
cases); if party A threatens party B with a contract or
patent-infringement claim, and B believes that the suit is meritless,
they can bring an action for declaratory judgement that forces A's hand
(and which also may put the case into a more B-friendly forum). In
order to ask for a declaratory judgement, there must be an actual
controversy at hand; the question may not be moot or speculative.
The case was heard by US District Court Judge Fogel, of California.
There were two legal issues to be addressed:
- whether the US court had jurisdiction at all over LICRA and UEJF
- whether there was sufficient actual
controversy that a declaratory judgement could be issued.
Note that in the first item here, the question of whether the French
court had jurisdiction over Yahoo US is turned around. The second question
hinges on whether the controversy is "ripe" for settlement.
For a finding of jurisdiction, there is a three-part test:
- LICRA & UEJF must have "purposefully availed" themselves of
the right to conduct some US-based transaction, in some sense
acknowledging their protection under US laws (specifically
The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate
some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some
act by which he purposefully avails
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;)
- The claim must arise out of LICRA & UEJF's activities within
the US
- The claim of jurisdiction must be "reasonable"
The second two parts are straightforward; the purposeful-availment test
is trickier. LICRA and UEJF had (1) sent a cease-and-desist letter to
Yahoo, (2) had requested that the French court put restrictions on
Yahoo's actions within the US, and (3) had used the US marshal's office
to serve papers on Yahoo US. Judge Fogel argued that the defendants
here engaged in actions that not only had effects on Yahoo US, but which were
also targeted against Yahoo
US; the act of targeting is strong evidence that the
purposeful-availment standard is met.
(Yahoo had tried to claim that, because LICRA used a yahoo.com email
address, they had thus agreed to Yahoo's terms of service requiring US
jurisdiction; apparently judge Fogel didn't seriously consider that.)
The second part of the issue is the "ripeness" standard, that there is
in fact an actual controversy. LICRA and UEJF insisted that they were
satisfied with Yahoo US's compliance, and that they had no intention of
asking for enforcement of the 100,000-franc-per-day judgement. Yahoo,
for its part, insisted that (a) they were not in full compliance with
the French court's order, as they still allowed the sale of Nazi books
and coinage, and (b) that their free-speech rights were being chilled
by the threat of the judgement, even if further legal steps never
materialized. This is a core issue with free-speech cases: it is often
the case that party A treads on party B's free-speech rights simply by
making a threat; B might
comply for the time being, but might still want a definitive ruling.
Judge Fogel agreed, and issued his ruling in Yahoo's favor.
The Appellate decision
The 9th Circuit Appellate court, ruling en banc, held that the US likely
did
have jurisdiction in the case against LICRA and UEJF, specifically
because of LICRA and UEJF's actions against Yahoo US in French court.
BUT the case was directed to be "dismissed without prejudice",
as it was not yet ready to be decided. It was not in fact "ripe"; there was no
active controversy.
(same thing happened to US v Warshak, when the 6th circuit en banc
ruled the question was not "ripe")
The appellate decision was based squarely on the idea that Yahoo US insisted that its change of policy
regarding the sale of "hate" artifacts was not related to the French
case. As a result of that, Yahoo
could not show that their speech was in any way chilled.
Therefore, there was no actual controversy. The Appellate court also
took into account the lack of interest on the part of LICRA and UEJF of
pursuing the penalties.
Finally, paradoxically, the Appellate court hinted that Yahoo could not
really have believed that, if LICRA or UEJF did ask for penalties, that any US
court would have gone along; any US court would reject such a judgement (perhaps on
First Amendment grounds despite the 9th circuit's wording here):
[E]nforcement of that penalty is
extremely unlikely in the United States. Enforcement is unlikely not
because of the First Amendment, but rather because of the general
principle of comity under which American courts do not enforce monetary
fines or penalties awarded by foreign courts.
(Note that the US court is equating the French award with a fine or penalty, rather than a civil judgement. I am still not sure
exactly which category actually applied.)
Ironically, because Yahoo took the ethical
approach of banning the sale of hate materials, their legal case became moot.
Judge William Fletcher:
1. Here is a summary of Yahoo's position:
For its part, while Yahoo! does not
independently wish to take steps to comply more fully with the French
court’s orders, it states that it fears
that it may be subject to a substantial (and increasing) fine if it
does not.
Yahoo! maintains that in these circumstances it has a legally
cognizable interest in knowing whether the French court’s orders are
enforceable in this country.
2. The French court did not ask for restrictions on US citizens. If
geolocation filtering works, in other words, the issue is moot:
The legal question presented by this
case is whether the two interim orders of the French court are
enforceable in this country. These orders, by their explicit terms, require only that Yahoo! restrict access
by Internet users located in France. The orders say nothing whatsoever about
restricting access by Internet users in the United States.
The underlying theory here is that the worldwide scope of a website is not a given.
3. Maybe Yahoo is ok in
France. (Note, however, that the uncertainty still hangs over Yahoo.)
A second, more important, difficulty is
that we do not know whether the
French court would hold that Yahoo! is now violating its two interim
orders.
After the French court entered the orders, Yahoo! voluntarily changed
its policy to comply with them, at least to some extent. There is some
reason to believe that the French court will not insist on full and
literal compliance with its interim orders, and that Yahoo!’s changed
policy may amount to sufficient compliance.
At other points, Judge Fletcher uses the fact that neither LICRA nor
UEJF have taken further steps as additional evidence that there is no
"active controversy". Another sentence along this line is
Until it knows what further compliance
(if any) the French court will require, Yahoo! simply cannot know what
effect (if any) further compliance might have on access by American
users.
And here's the kicker, dismissing the "chilled speech" issue:
Without a finding that further
compliance with the French court’s orders would necessarily result in
restrictions on access by users in the United States, the only question
in this case is whether California public policy and the First
Amendment require unrestricted access by Internet users in France. [italics in original -
pld]
The First Amendment applies in the US, not in France. Not that Judge
Fletcher doesn't get this:
We are acutely aware that this case
implicates the First Amendment, and we are particularly sensitive to
the harm that may result from
chilling effects on protected speech or expressive conduct.
In this case, however, the harm to First Amendment interests — if such
harm exists at all — may be nowhere near as great as Yahoo! would have
us believe.
But:
Yahoo! refuses to point to anything
that it is now not doing but would do if permitted by the orders.
That, of course, was due to Yahoo's ethical decision not to allow the
sale of hate materials.
Judge Fletcher then states
In other words, as to the French users, Yahoo! is
necessarily arguing that it has a First Amendment right to violate
French criminal law and to facilitate the violation of French criminal
law by others. As we indicated above, the extent -- indeed the very
existence -- of such an extraterritorial right under the First
Amendment is uncertain.
The first phrase here, about French
users, was omitted by some sites that reported on the decision
[including me -- pld]; that omission decidedly changes Fletcher's
meaning, which is that the First Amendment does not necesarily protect French users.
Fletcher concludes with the following, implicitly addressing Yahoo's
issue that they were still allowing the sale of Mein Kampf in violation of the
French orders:
There is some possibility that in
further restricting access to these French users, Yahoo! might have to
restrict access by American users. But this possibility is, at this
point, highly speculative. This level of harm is not sufficient to overcome the factual
uncertainty bearing on the legal question presented and thereby
to render this suit ripe.
These issues led to the declaration of non-ripeness.
This is a JURISDICTIONAL
case that was left undecided, officially, though the Ninth Circuit
certainly hinted that France did not have authority to demand
restrictions on US speech.
At about the same time, there was growing improvement in
advertising-based
geolocation software (IP addr -> location); the earlier blocking
estimates rose from 70% to well over 90%.
Illinois Eavesdropping Law
Should you be able to record the police in Illinois in public? Illinois
law says this is illegal (actually, that it is a felony):
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when
he:
(1) Knowingly and intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the
purpose of hearing or recording all or any part of any conversation or
intercepts, retains, or transcribes electronic communication unless he
does so
(A) with the consent of all of the
parties to such conversation or electronic communication or
(B) in accordance with Article 108A or Article 108B of the "Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963", approved August 14, 1963, as amended;
However, in a similar case in Massachussetts,
which has a similar law, the First Circuit Appellate Court upheld not
only overturning the law, but that the person doing the recording had a
right to sue the officers for false arrest (meaning, in effect, that
the officers should have known the law was unconstitutional).
See http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/8819-court-denies-police-immunity-in-video-arrest.
From the decision at http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/10-1764P-01A.pdf:
We conclude, based on the facts alleged, that Glik was exercising
clearly-established First Amendment rights in filming the officers in a
public space
On the other hand, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit has
spoken in favor of the law [http://www.suntimes.com/news/7639298-418/judge-casts-doubt-on-aclu-challenge-to-law-forbidding-audio-recording-of-cops.html]:
“If you permit the audio recordings, they’ll be a lot more
eavesdropping. … There’s going to be a lot of this snooping around by
reporters and bloggers,” U.S. 7th Circuit Judge Richard Posner said.
“Yes, it’s a bad thing. There is such a thing as privacy.”
On May 10, 2012, the Seventh Circuit issued an order banning
prosecution under the law in Cook County, and sent the case itself back
to the District Court. Judge Posner dissented. One of the points of his
dissent was that the Seventh Circuit's objections to the law were so
broad that nothing would forbid a third party from making an audio recording of an arrest or other police interation.
In September 2011, Crawford County judge David Frankland found the
Illinois law
unconstitutional, for violating due process and criminalizing ordinary
behavior; the state is appealing. On March 2, Cook County Circuit Court
judge Stanley Sacks also ruled that the law was unconstitutional,
though again apparently not because of the First Amendment. A later
attempt to repeal the law failed in the Illinois house.
Imagine whether or not an anti-recording law should apply to the press.
Would that be consistent with the First Amendment [Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press]? Then the question
becomes whether the press is distinguishable from everyone else.
As another example of the "who is the press" question, many states have
"shield laws" for the press regarding subpoenas of sources: the
government cannot subpoena reporters notes or the identity of sources
except in very unusual conditions. What constitutes the "press" here?
Should an established blogger qualify? What about a beginning blogger?
The Illinois shield law has the following definitions:
Sec. 8‑902. Definitions.
(a) "Reporter" means any person regularly engaged in the business
of collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a news
medium on a full‑time or part‑time basis . . . .
(b) "News medium" means any newspaper or other periodical issued at
regular intervals whether in print or electronic format and having a
general circulation; a news service whether in print or electronic
format; a radio station; a television station; a television network; a
community antenna television service; and any person or corporation
engaged in the making of news reels or other motion picture news for
public showing.
This definition of a reporter would appear
to cover a "regular"
blogger; there is no mention of employment or a news-publishing
business.
The Supreme Court's 2010 ruling in Citizens
United v Federal Election Commission was widely reported as
deciding "corporations are people too". Actually, the ruling merely
extends free-speech rights to groupsof
people (that is, corporations). The ruling also, however, made it
clear that there was no basis for singling out "media
corporations" for first-amendment protection (versus other
corporations). In the present circumstance, that would suggest that
there is no way to distinguish between public recording (or shielding
of sources) by "the press" and public recording or shielding by
individuals; given that the
former is incontrovertably protected, perhaps the latter is as well.
Finally, should newspapers be able to apply their journalism-shield
laws to anonymous online comments left regarding articles? See http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=7086.
Corporate Cybersmear
Here is the essential problem:
- an employee posts something critical at a site, "anonymously"
- the employer sues the site, claiming libel
- the site caves, and provides real identity of poster
- the suit is dropped, and the poster is FIRED.
This is a significant issue in the "free speech" of employees. Note
how giving providers an easy way to get libel cases dismissed via
summary judgement makes this strategy for corporations much more
difficult.
Supposedly Apple employees are fired if they write about Apple
online anywhere.
In 2004, some bloggers announced new Apple rumors. In this case,
apparently the rumors were accurate, and involved inside information
from Apple employees. Apple sued, in the case Apple v Does,
for the identities of the insiders. Apple argued in court that bloggers
were not covered by the California shield law, and that even if they
were they must still divulge the identities of their contacts. The
trial court ruled in Apple's favor in 2005; the California Court of
Appeals reversed in 2006. From the 2006 decision:
... the discovery process is intended
as a device to facilitate adjudication,
not as an end in itself. To accept
Apple’s position on the present point would empower betrayed employers
to clothe themselves with the subpoena power merely by suing fictitious
defendants, and then to
use that
power solely to identify treacherous employees for purposes of
discipline, all
without any
intent of pursuing the underlying case to judgment.... Our
sympathy for employers in such a position cannot blind us to the gross
impropriety of using the courts and their powers of compulsory process
as a tool and adjunct of an employer’s personnel department.
See http://www.chillingeffects.org/johndoe/faq.cgi
Note that the issue here is the use of the legal system to
find identities of anonymous posters.
Baase has an extensive section on anonymity.
What about employee bloggers?
- They are free to speak
- Their employers are free to fire them
We do have the case of Dawnmarie Souza
who was fired from American
Medical Response of
Connecticut in 2009 after commenting on Facebook about her work
environment. The NLRB, however, weighed in (much later, Feb 11 2011)
with a ruling (non-final as the case was settled, but putting heavy
pressure on employers) that Souza's speech was "concerted protected
activity" under NLRA (National Labor Relations Act) rules for
discussion of work conditions with
other employees.
Souza was discussing conditions on a private Facebook page, and had
friended at least some coworkers, and was not blogging publicly. AMR's
work rules apparently prohibited any
discussion of work conditions on the internet.
http://philadelphiaemploymentlawnews.com/2011/02/amr-settles-dawnmarie-souzas-wrongful-termination-lawsuit.html
http://brodyandassociates.com/nlrb-breathes-new-life-into-federal-labor-law-are-you-ready
Souza was unionized, but the NLRA applies to nonunionized workers as
well. However, the exact scope of the recent NLRB opinion is unclear.
Is source code speech?
Well, is it?
Cases where it's been debated:
- encryption
- DMCA anti-circumvention (eg deCSS)
Encryption was a BIG issue for the US government, 1977 - ~ 2000
For a while, the NSA (National Security Agency) tried very hard to
block even publication of scientific papers. They would issue "secrecy
orders".
But eventually the government's weapon of choice was ITAR:
International Trade in Armaments Regulations
Suppose you make F-16 fighters. You need a munitions export permit
to sell these oversees. What about if you make open-source encryption
software? You need the same kind of permit! Even if you GIVE IT AWAY!!
BOOKS were exempt. The rule applied only to machine-readable forms.
For a while, there was a machine-readable T-shirt with the RSA
encryption algorithm on it.
Discussion: does it make any
sense to ban the online source code, if a book in which the same code
is printed can be freely distributed?
Zimmermann case
Phil Zimmermann released PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy")
as an open-source project in 1991. The government made him promise
not to do it again. Zimmermann's associates outside the US released the
next version. Zimmermann was under indictment for three years,
but charges were eventually dropped.
PGP later became a commercial software company, but not before
aiding in the creation of the OpenPGP standard (and allowing that use
of the PGP name). The open-source version is now GPG (Gnu Privacy
Guard).
Schneier case
In 1994 Bruce Schneier wrote a textbook Applied Cryptography.
All the algorithms were printed, and also included verbatim on a 3.5"
floppy disk in the
back of the book.
Phil Karn (of Karn's Algorithm for estimating packet RTT times) applied
for an export license for the package, also in 1994. It was granted for
the book (actually, the book needed no license), but
denied for the floppy.
Discussion: does this make
sense?
Some of Karn's notes are at http://www.ka9q.net/export.
Bernstein case
Daniel Bernstein created a cipher called "snuffle".
In 1995, while a graduate student at UC Berkeley, he sued to be allowed
to publish his paper on snuffle and to post it to the internet.
In 1997 the district court ruled in his favor.
In 1999 a 3-judge panel of the 9th circuit ruled in his favor, although
more narrowly. Opinion of Judge Betty Fletcher:
http://epic.org/crypto/export_controls/bernstein_decision_9_cir.html
Prior-restraint was one issue
Bernstein's right to speak is the issue, not foreigners' right to hear
But does source code qualify? see p 4232: C for-loop; 4233:
LISP
Snuffle was also intended, in part, as political expression.
Bernstein discovered that the ITAR regulations controlled encryption
exports, but not one-way hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1. Because
he believed that an encryption system could easily be fashioned from
any of a number of publicly-available one-way hash functions, he viewed
the distinction made by the ITAR regulations as absurd. To illustrate
his point, Bernstein developed Snuffle, which is an encryption system
built around a one-way hash function. (Arguably, that would now make
Snuffle political speech,
generally subject to the fewest restrictions!)
Here is Judge Fletcher's main point:
Thus, cryptographers
use source code
to express their scientific ideas in much the same way that
mathematicians use equations or economists use graphs. Of course, both
mathematical equations and graphs are used in other fields for many
purposes, not all of which are expressive. But mathematicians and
economists have adopted these modes of expression in order to
facilitate the precise and rigorous expression of complex scientific
ideas.13 Similarly, the undisputed
record here makes it clear that
cryptographers utilize source code in the same fashion.
Government argument: ok, source code might be expressive, but you
can
also run it and then it does
something: it has "direct functionality"
Fletcher: source code is
meant, in part, for reading.
More importantly, the idea that it can be banned due to its "direct
functionality" is a problem:
what if a computer could be ordered to do something with spoken
commands?
Would that make speech subject to restraint? In some sense absolutely yes; if speech became
action then it would be, well, actionable
(that is, something that could be legally prohibited).
In 1999, the full 9th circuit agreed to hear the case; it was widely
expected to make it to the supreme court.
But it did not. The government dropped the case.
The government also changed the ITAR rules regarding cryptography,
and Bernstein continued to appeal. In 2003 a judge dismissed the case
until such time as the government made a "concrete threat".
Junger v Daley
Peter Junger was prof at Case Western Reserve University. He wanted
to teach a crypto course, with foreign students.
6th circuit:
The issue of whether or not the First
Amendment protects encryption source code is a difficult one because
source code has both an expressive feature and a functional feature.
The district court concluded that the functional characteristics of
source code overshadow its simultaneously expressive nature. The fact
that a medium of expression has a functional capacity should not
preclude constitutional protection.
Because computer source code is an
expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas about
computer programming, we hold that it is protected by the First
Amendment.
BUT: there's still a recognition of the need for balancing:
We recognize that national security interests can outweigh the
interests of protected speech and require the regulation of speech. In
the present case, the record does not resolve whether ... national
security interests should overrule the interests in allowing the free
exchange of encryption source code.
The DCMA also has a speech restriction:
(1) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof, that— (A) is primarily designed or produced
for the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a technological [copy-protection measure]
If you write an online or print article about how to bypass copy-protection, you may be violating this.
DeCSS case
There are several; the best known is Universal
Studios
v Reimerdes, Corley, and Kazan.
Eric Corley, aka Emmanuel Goldstein, is the publisher of 2600 magazine.
Corley:

DeCSS was developed in ~1999, supposedly by Jon Lech Johansen. He wrote
it with others; it was released in 1999 when Johansen was ~16. He was
tried in Norway in 2002, and was acquitted.
Cute story about Jon: In 2005, supposedly Sony stole some of his GPL-covered code for their XCP "rootkit" project. Jon
might have been able to sue for huge damages (though the usual
RIAA-lawsuit standard is based on statutory damages per item copied,
and here only one thing was copied). More at http://news.slashdot.org/story/05/11/17/1350209/dvd-jons-code-in-sony-rootkit

Judge Kaplan memorandum, Feb 2000, in Universal v Reimerdes:
As a preliminary matter, it is far from clear that DeCSS
is speech protected by the First Amendment. In material
respects, it is merely a set of instructions that controls
computers.
He then goes on to consider the "balancing" approach between free speech
and regulation, considering the rationale for the regulation and the
relative weights of each side.
The computer code at issue in this case does little to serve
these goals [of expressiveness]. Although this Court has assumed
that DeCSS has at least some
expressive content, the expressive
aspect appears to be minimal when compared to its functional component.
Computer code primarily is a set of instructions which, when read
by the computer, cause it to function in a particular way, in this
case, to render intelligible a data file on a DVD. It arguably
"is best treated as a virtual machine . . . ."
[the decision cites
Lemley & Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, Duke Law Journal
1998. However, the sentence in Lemley and Volokh's paper explicitly
refers to executable object
code, not source! "The Bernstein court's conclusion, even if upheld,
probably doesn't extend past source code to object code, however. We think most executable software
is best treated as a virtual machine rather than as protected
expression." Judge Kaplan apparently did not grasp the distinction.]
Note that this virtual-machine argument renders irrelevant the Bernstein
precedent! Actually, the virtual-machine argument pretty much presupposes that you have come down
solidly on the side of code-as-function instead of code-as-expression.
Also note the weighing of expression versus functionality, with the
former found wanting.
Do you think that Judge Kaplan was stricter here than in the crypto
cases because crypto was seen as more "legitimate", and deCSS was
clearly intended to bypass anticircumvention measures?
The district court issued a preliminary injunction banning 2600.com
from hosting DeCSS; the site then simply included links to other sites
carrying it. The final injunction also banned linking to such sites, and
included language that equated linking with trafficking.
Universal v Reimerdes, Appellate Court
The Appellate decision was similar to Judge Kaplan's District Court opinion, though with somewhat more on the
constitutional issues, and an additional twist on linking. Also, note
that one of Corley's defenses was that he was a journalist, and
Writing about DeCSS without including
the DeCSS code would have been, to Corley, "analogous to printing a
story about a picture and not printing the picture."
However, in full context, that idea was harder to support. Corley's mistake was in describing DeCSS as a way to get free movies. What if he had
stuck to the just-the-facts approach, and described exactly how easy it
was to copy DVDs without actually urging you to do it? Is this similar
to the "Grokster" workaround?
Both the DC and Appellate courts held that the DMCA targets only the
"functional component" of computer speech.
One argument was that the CSS encryption makes Fair Use impossible,
and that therefore the relevant section of the DMCA should be struck
down. The appellate court, however, ruled instead that "Subsection
1201(c)(1) ensures that the DMCA is not read to prohibit the 'fair use'
of information just because that
information was obtained in a manner made illegal by the DMCA". Subsection 1201(c)(1) reads
(c) Other Rights, Etc.,
Not Affected. — (1)
Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or
defenses
to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.
This is an interesting argument by the court! Literally it is correct, but the practical problems with Fair Use access go unaddressed.
Some notes on the free-speech argument:
Communication does not lose
constitutional protection as "speech" simply because it is expressed in
the language of computer code. Mathematical formulae and musical scores
are written in "code," i.e., symbolic notations not comprehensible to
the uninitiated, and yet both are covered by the First Amendment.
The court also acknowledged Junger v Daley (above).
However:
As the District Court recognized, the
scope of protection for speech generally depends on whether the
restriction is imposed because of the content
of the speech. Content-based restrictions are permissible only if they
serve compelling state interests and do so by the least restrictive
means available.
A content-neutral restriction is
permissible
if it serves a substantial governmental interest, the interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the regulation is
narrowly tailored, which "in this context requires . . . that the means
chosen do not 'burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interests.'"
That is, the DeCSS code may be said to be "expressive speech", but
it's not being banned because of what it expresses.
Unlike a blueprint or a recipe, which
cannot yield any functional result without human comprehension of its
content, human decision-making, and human action, computer code can
instantly cause a computer to accomplish tasks.... These
realities of what code is and what its normal functions are require a
First Amendment analysis that treats code as combining nonspeech and
speech elements, i.e., functional and expressive elements.
As for hyperlinks (in the section "Linking"),
a hyperlink has both a speech and a
nonspeech component. It conveys information, the Internet address of
the linked web page, and has the functional capacity to bring the
content of the linked web page to the user's computer screen.... The
linking prohibition is justified solely by the functional capability of
the hyperlink.
What if one simply printed the site name, without
the link: eg cs.luc.edu? For links, one can argue that the expressive
and functional elements -- what the other site is, and how to get there
-- are inseparable.
The non-linking rule may become more of an issue as time goes on and the US attempts
to remove from the DNS system sites which provide illegal access to
copyrighted material. In the future, identifying a new IP address for,
say, the now-seized megaupload.com may be suspicious.
Gallery of DeCSS: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/Gallery
Check out these in particular:
- haiku page
- page1.gif
- mathematical description
- DVD logo
Does the entire gallery serve to establish an expressive purpose?
If you want to play DVDs under linux, I recommend VLC Media Player at
http://videolan.org/vlc (which
generally needs libdvdcss).