Computer Ethics, Spring 2012

CMUN 009;  Mon 4:15-6:45, Week 6, Feb 27

Week 6 Readings

Chapter 2



Takehome midterm: probably towards the end of the week of March 12. You will have three days (eg March 15-18).


Facebook data reapers

How about this site: Social Intelligence Corp, www.socialintel.com.

What they do is employee background screening. They claim to take some of the risk out of do-it-yourself google searches, because they don't include any information in their report that you are not supposed to ask for. What they do is gather all the public Facebook information about you (and also from other sources, such as LinkedIn), and store it. They look, in particular, for
While they do not offer this upfront, one suspects they also keep track of an unusually large number (more than four?) of drunken party pictures.

Think you have no public Facebook information? Look again: the information does not have to have been posted by you. If a friend posts a picture of you at a party, and makes the album world-viewable, there may have gone your chance for that job at Microsoft.

To be fair, Social Intelligence is still fine-tuning their rules; the latest version appears to be that they keep the information for seven years, but don't release it in a report unless it's still online at the time the report is requested. Unless things change, and they need to go back to the old way to make more money.

In June 2011 the FTC ruled that Social Intelligence's procedure was in compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

See:
Is this a privacy issue?



While we're on the subject of data collection, consider ChoicePoint and Acxiom. (ChoicePoint is now LexisNexis.com/risk (for Risk Solutions)

Look at the websites. Are these sites bad?

What if you are hiring someone to work with children? Do such employees have any expectation of privacy with regard to their past?

ChoicePoint sells to government agencies data that those agencies are often not allowed to collect directly. Is this appropriate?

ChoicePoint might argue that it is similar to a credit bureau, though exempt from the rules of the Fair Credit Act because they don't actually deal with credit information.

Baase p 60: "At least 35 government agencies are or were clients of ChoicePoint". Some of the data collected (again from Baase):
(By the way, if a company offering you for a job pushes you hard to tell them your birthdate, which is illegal for companies with four or more employees, they are probably after it in order to search for criminal-background data.)


Facebook and other sites

Facebook now shows up on unrelated sites. Sites are encouraged to enable the Facebook "like" button, and here's an example of theonion.com displaying my (edited) friends and their likes: http://cs.luc.edu/pld/ethics/theonionplusFB.html. How much of this is an invasion of privacy?

While Facebook does seem interested in data-sharing agreements with non-FB sites, it is often not at all clear when such sharing is going on. The two examples here, for example, do not necessarily involve any sharing. An embedded "like" button, when clicked, sends your information to Facebook, which can retrieve your credentials by using cookies. However, those credentials are hopefully not shared with the original site; the original site may not even know you clicked "like". As for the box at theonion.com listing what my friends like, this is again an example of "leased page space": Facebook leases a box on theonion.com and, when you visit the site, it retrieves your FB credentials via cookie and then fills in the box with your friends' "likes" of Onion articles. The box is like a mini FB page; neither the likes nor your credentials are shared with The Onion.

One concern with such pseudo-sharing sites is that they make it look like sharing is in fact taking place, defusing objections to such sharing. If someone does object, the fact that no sharing was in fact invoved can be trotted out; if there are not many objections, Facebook can pursue "real" sharing agreements with confidence. They also make it harder to tell when objectionable sharing is occurring.

An example of a true data-sharing agreement would be if a restaurant-review site let you log into their site using your Facebook cookies, and then allowed you to post updates about various restaurants.

Facebook "connections": http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/05/things-you-need-know-about-facebook

Your connections are not communications with other users, but are links to your school, employer, and interests. It is these that Facebook decided to make "public" in May 2010; these they did back off from.


Facebook and advertising

Facebook claims that user data is not turned over to advertisers, and this seems true (with a couple slip-ups): advertisers supply criteria specifying to whom their ads will be shown, and Facebook shows the ads to those users. For example, if I see an ad for "Illinois drivers age 54", it doesn't mean that Facebook has turned over my age; it is more likely that the advertiser has created an ad for each age 30-65, perhaps, and asks Facebook to display to a user the one that matches his or her age.

Once you click on the ad, however, the advertiser does know what ad you are responding to, and thus knows your age if you choose to give them your name. There was a slip-up a couple years ago where game sites (often thinly veiled advertising) were able to obtain the Facebook ID of each user. Here's what they say:

In order to advertise on Facebook, advertisers give us an ad they want us to display and tell us the kinds of people they want to reach. We deliver the ad to people who fit those criteria without revealing any personal information to the advertiser.

For more information on how to do this, see http://www.facebook.com/adsmarketing/index.php?sk=targeting_filters. Facebook supports targeting based on:
Note that you don't get to choose what attributes advertisers can use, because advertisers do not see them! And Facebook itself has access to everything (duh).


Facebook and privacy more fine-grained than the Friend level

What if you've Friended your family, and your school friends, and want to put something on your wall that is visible to only one set? The original Facebook privacy model made all friends equal, which was sometimes a bad idea. Facebook has now introduced the idea of groups: see http://www.facebook.com/groups. Groups have been around quite a while, but have been repositioned by some (with Facebook encouragement) as subsets of Friend pools:

Have things you only want to share with a small group of people? Just create a group, add friends, and start sharing. Once you have your group, you can post updates, poll the group, chat with everyone at once, and more.

For better or worse, groups are still tricky to manage, partly because they were not initially designed as Friend subsets. When posting to a group, you have to go to the group wall; you can't put a message on your own wall and mark it for a particular group. News feeds for group posts are sometimes problematic, and Facebook does not make clear what happens if a group posting is newsfed to your profile and then you Comment on it. You may or may not have to update your privacy settings to allow group posts to go into your newsfeed. Privacy Settings do not mention Groups at all (as of June 2011).

Maybe the biggest concern, however, is that Facebook's fast-and-furious update tradition is at odds with the fundamental need to be meticulous when security is important.

Google+ came out with circles, which promptly changed all this. FB has now introduced new competitive features (groups), which I have been too lazy to bother with. (Part of the issue is that FB groups were invented to deal with larger-scale issues; as originally released they were an awkward fit for subsets of Friends.)

But the issue is not really whether they work. Here's a technical analogue: are NTFS file permissions better than Unix/Linux? Yes, in the sense that you can spell out who has access to what. But NTFS permissions are very difficult to audit and to keep track of; thus, in a practical sense, they have been a huge disappointment.



Finally, here is a lengthy essay by Eben Moglen, author of the GPL, on "Freedom in the Cloud: Software Freedom, Privacy, and Security for Web 2.0 and Cloud Computing": http://www.softwarefreedom.org/events/2010/isoc-ny/FreedomInTheCloud-transcript.html. Mr Moglen adds some additional things that can be inferred from Facebook-type data: You get free email, free websites, and free spying too!

Mr. Zuckerberg has attained an unenviable record: he has done more harm to the human race than anybody else his age.

Because he harnessed Friday night. That is, everybody needs to get laid and he turned it into a structure for degenerating the integrity of human personality and he has to a remarkable extent succeeded with a very poor deal. Namely, “I will give you free web hosting and some PHP doodads and you get spying for free all the time”. And it works.Takehome midterm

Later:

I’m not suggesting it should be illegal. It should be obsolete. We’re technologists, we should fix it.

Did Google+ fix anything? Does anyone trust google more than Facebook?




Here are some of the June 2010 Facebook privacy settings (that is, a month after the May 2010 shift), taken from privacy settings => view settings (basic directory information). Note that there is by this point a clear Facebook-provided explanation for why some things are best left visible to "everyone".

Your name, profile picture, gender and networks are always open to everyone. We suggest leaving the other basic settings below open to everyone to make it easier for real world friends to find and connect with you.

* Search for me on Facebook
This lets friends find you on Facebook. If you're visible to fewer people, it may prevent you from connecting with your real-world friends.
      Everyone

* Send me friend requests
This lets real-world friends send you friend requests. If not set to everyone, it could prevent you from connecting with your friends.
      Everyone

* Send me messages
This lets friends you haven't connected with yet send you a message before adding you as a friend.
      Everyone

* See my friend list
This helps real-world friends identify you by friends you have in common. Your friend list is always available to applications and your connections to friends may be visible elsewhere.
      Everyone

* See my education and work
This helps classmates and coworkers find you.
      Everyone

* See my current city and hometown
This helps friends you grew up with and friends near you confirm it's really you.
      Everyone

* See my interests and other Pages
This lets you connect with people with common interests based on things you like on and off Facebook.
      Everyone

Here are some more settings, from privacy settings => customize settings (sharing on facebook)

    * Things I share
          o Posts by me (Default setting for posts, including status updates and photos)
                Friends Only
          o Family:                                                 Friends of Friends
          o Relationships:                                        Friends Only
          o Interested in and looking for:                Friends Only
          o Bio and favorite quotations:                 Friends of Friends
          o Website:                                               Everyone
          o Religious and political views:                 Friends Only
          o Birthday:                                               Friends of Friends
         .
    * Things others share
          o Photos and videos I'm tagged in:                Friends of Friends
          o Can comment on posts:                             Friends Only
          o Friends can post on my Wall:                    Enable
          o Can see Wall posts by friends:                  Friends Only
    * Contact information
          o Friends Only

The core problem here is not that these settings are hard to do, or that the defaults are bad. The core problem is simply that you keep having to make new settings, as things evolve. Examples:
Another issue is whether the settings options are user-friendly. Here's a technical analogue: are NTFS file permissions better than Unix/Linux? Yes, in the sense that you can spell out who has access to what. But NTFS permissions are very difficult to audit and to keep track of; thus, in a practical sense, they have been a huge disappointment.



SCOTUS cases on privacy
-- Baase pp 69ff


1928: Olmstead v United States
The 4th amendment does NOT apply to wiretaps

1967: Katz v United States
The 4th amendment does too apply to wiretaps! Privacy may still exist in a public area.
Katz was using a pay phone; the FBI had a microphone just outside the phone booth. To the appellate court, the fact that the microphone did not intrude into the phone booth was significant in finding for the FBI, but the supreme court reversed.

Doctrine of "reasonable expectation of privacy" (REoP) replaced the doctrine of "physical intrusion"

Problem with REoP: as technology marches on, isn't our reasonable expectation diminished? And does this then give the government more license to spy?


1976: US v Miller
information we share with others (eg our bank) is NOT private. Government can ask the bank, and get this information, without a warrant. (However, the bank could in those days refuse.)

1979: Smith v Maryland
Reduction of REoP by the police is not SUPPOSED to diminish our 4th-amendment rights. However, in that case the supreme court ruled that "pen registers" to record who you were calling did NOT violate the 4th amendment.

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CASE&court=US&vol=442&page=735


Application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a "legitimate expectation of privacy" that has been invaded by government action. This inquiry normally embraces two questions: first, whether the individual has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, whether his expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."

First, we doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must "convey" phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial....

If you want to keep a number private, don't call it!

Note the crucial issue that the defendant voluntarily shared the number with the phone company!

Justices Stewart & Brennan dissented

The telephone conversation itself must be electronically transmitted by telephone company equipment, and may be recorded or overheard by the use of other company equipment. Yet we have squarely held that the user of even a public telephone is entitled "to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." Katz v. United States

What do you think of this distinction? Is there a difference between sharing your phone number with the phone company and sharing your actual conversation with them?


2001: Kyllo v United States

Thermal imaging of your house IS a 4th-amendment search! This is a very important case in terms of how evolution in technology affects what is a REoP

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-8508.ZS.html

Held: Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment “search,” and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.

How long into the future will this hold? Could it be that part of the issue was that the general public was not very aware of the possibility of thermal imaging? If thermal imaging were to come into not only general public awareness but also general public use (eg by equipping cellphones with IR cameras), would the situation change?

I believe there was a trial-level civil case in which a judge ruled that eavesdropping on someone else's phone call made on an old-fashioned cordless phone (remember those?) was not an invasion of privacy because no one had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" when using a cordless phone because "everyone" knew that it was easy to listen in to someone else's call simply by playing with the channel button. However, I cannot find this case.

2012: United States v Antoine Jones

Jones was an alleged cocaine dealer in the Washington, DC area. Police attached a GPS tracker to his car while it was parked in the driveway. By following him over a 30-day period, the police were able to build a strong case against him. But Jones argued that such tracking was unreasonable warrantless search, despite a 1983 Supreme Court ruling that allowed wireless tracking for single trips. The Department of Justice argued that no one has a REoP regarding his or her movements on public streets. The DoJ also pointed to the 1983 US v Knotts case in which police had the manufacturer attach a radio beeper to a drum of chloroform. When Knotts purchased the drum, police used the beeper to track him to his cabin in the woods.

In August 2010, the DC Court of Appeals agreed with Jones, and overturned his conviction.

The ninth circuit and the seventh circuit (including Illinois) had ruled otherwise, however.

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in January 2012 that "the Government’s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment." As such, a warrant would be required.

However, by 5-4 the court also ruled that the issue here was the government's trespass onto private property to install the GPS tracker. That is, the court did not rule broadly (by explicit choice!) on the question of whether sustained GPS tracking itself violated a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, arguing that rules against government trespass should coexist with the REoP approach, and that this particular case could be decided on trespassing grounds without the need to consider REoP (which others on the court agreed was a problematic standard). Note that the trespass ruling makes the decision consistent with Knotts.

Jones will be tried again, but this time without the GPS evidence.


The FBI and cellphone location records
nearest-tower (cell-handoff) records v GPS records
Supposedly the Justice Department gets warrants for GPS data (nearest few feet), but usually does not for nearest-tower data (which positions you to within a few miles at worst, a few hundred feet at best).

Another distinction is between realtime data (where you are now) and "historical" data (where you were).

The federal government has tried to claim that nearest-tower data simply amounted to "routine business records". Are they?

Note that the Jones opinion does not apply here as the police do not trespass when they acquire GPS phone records.



Video surveillance -- Baase p 72


This is a big issue in Chicago, where there are both "obvious" and "hidden" cameras.

2001 Super Bowl: Tampa police used facial-recognition software on all 100,000 fans. It didn't work terribly well.

London: heavy camera use to:

London in 2005:
What about the rate of false positives?

Should the London cameras be used to track lesser crimes, such as pickpocketing? Supposedly the Chicago street cameras have been quite effective in handling minor crimes.



Baase p 61: case study on federal DB on all US college students. The database would list all courses taken, with grades; it would also include loan and scholarship records.

Good example of a fairly common situation: creation of a new database containing confidential information.

Benefits:

Drawbacks:

Is such a database a good idea?

What if in 2012 a law is passed giving prospective employers access to the data, if the job applicant signs a consent form? What do you think would happen if you refused to sign?

Related "database-matching" issue: should the government be able to link databases of:



Joe the Plumber

aka Samuel Joseph Wurzelbacher

He went to an Obama rally and asked a serious question about Obama's tax plan (in which he apparently confused income with profit). Obama made his "spread the wealth" remark in response. After this was in the press, McCain ran with it, and referred to him multiple times in the debate, as a symbol of middle-america and small businesses.

One reporter (in a print newspaper column I failed to save) argued that Wurzelbacher should have no expectation of privacy. At what point does this become true? Is it true of Obama? Was it true for Palin, or McCain? Wurzelbacher did try to capitalize on his sudden fame, and some might argue that in doing so he lost his expectation of privacy. But suppose he had tried to remain a private citizen?

Allegations about him:
Lucas county clerk of courts: http://apps.co.lucas.oh.us/onlinedockets/Default.aspx

Search for "Wurzelbacher".

Is the availability of this kind of search appropriate?

See also Baase, §2.3.5, on Public Records. Her examples include:

What of the above is legitimate to talk about for a private citizen?
At what point did Wurzelbacher stop being a private citizen?

Wurzelbacher asked Obama a financial question. Does this make W's income and taxes fair game? What about his child-support records?

Aw, to hell with facts: see http://www.slate.com/id/2202480


Search records and computer forensics

In 2002, Justin Barber was found shot four times on a beach in Florida. None of his injuries were serious. His wife April, however, had been shot dead. Barber described the event as an attempted robbery.

There were some other factors though:
Police searched Barber's computer for evidence of past google searches. They apparently did not contact google directly. Barber had searched for information on gunshot wounds, specifically to the chest, and under what circumstances they were less serious. Barber was convicted.

More at: http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10150669-38.html


Case of Lee Harbert:
Harbert's vehicle struck and killed Gurdeep Kaur in 2005. Harbert fled the scene. When arrested later, his defense was that he thought he had hit a deer. But his on-computer searches were for
    "auto glass reporting requirements to law enforcement"
    "auto glass, Las Vegas" (the crime was in California)
    "auto theft"
He also searched for information on the accident itself. Harbert too was convicted.
   
more at http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10143275-38.html


Case of Wendi Mae Davidson
Police found her husband's body in a pond at the ranch where Davidson boarded her horse. Police found the ranch itself by attaching a GPS recorder to her car. Davidson also used an online search engine to search for the phrase "decomposition of a body in water".

More at http://news.cnet.com/Police-Blotter-Murderer-nabbed-via-tracking,-Web-search/2100-7348_3-6234678.html

Case of Neil Entwistle

Entwistle's wife Rachel and daughter Lillian were found shot to death in January 2006. Neil had departed for England. Besides the flight, there was other physical evidence linking him to the murders. However, there was also the google searches:

A search of Entwistle's computer also revealed that days before the murders, Entwistle looked at a website that described "how to kill people" ....

More at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neil_Entwistle

How do such cases relate to the AOL search-data leak, and Thelma Arnold?
While none of the AOL individuals was charged with anything, some of their searches (particularly those related to violent pornography) are rather disturbing.


Where is google-search-history stored on your computer? Is it stored anywhere, anymore?




Theories of Privacy

Is it obsolete?

See Baase, p 92. Is it true that "young people of today" are not as concerned about privacy?

WHY?

Warren and Brandeis, 1890

(Louis Brandeis later became a supreme-court justice.) They argue for the principle of "inviolate personality" that gives everyone specific rights regarding their personal information. Their primary concern was apparently newspaper gossip columns. Their argument was that repeating "private" information about someone violated a fundamental right. Baase, p 106.

Problems arise here because Warren and Brandeis were not able to formulate precisely what was meant by an "inviolate personality", or to explain at what point your rights to your inviolate personality give way to the Public's Right To Know. For government officials, for example, the right of the voters to know what they are really like might be very important.

Another issue is that WB seemed most concerned with publication of data that violated our privacy. What if it is just made available to a selected few? Employers? People on some committee at our church? Car-rental agencies? People with some self-defined Need To Know, such as our annoying neighbors? This is not normally understood to be publication.

Thomson, 1975

Judith Jarvis Thomson argued against the WB position, claiming that every time a privacy right is violated, there is in fact some other, more concrete, right being violated. Hence, we do not need special privacy rules. One of her examples is the Magazine Scenario: if you don't want people to read it, you can keep it private. If they break into your house, they have broken the law. If someone interrogates you violently and thus obtains private information, the real issue is the violence and not the privacy invasion. If a company reveals information about you in a way that is contrary to their own privacy policy that you accepted, they are violating your contractual rights. A less-clear example is the Shower Scenario: she argues that if someone peeps at you while you shower, they have violated your "right to your person". Is this just a WB-style privacy right, or is the "right to your person" more concrete and limited?

Others have tried to find examples where your right to privacy was violated, but no other rights were. What if someone reads your email? Are there other rights involved besides your right to privacy?

Transactions

On pp 108-109, Baase describes a scenario involving Joe, Maria, and some potatoes. Joe buys the potatoes from Maria; Maria sells the potatoes to Joe. Who owns the information about the transaction? Either party might want the information kept private; does the other party then have an obligation to keep it so? Or does the privacy-concerned party have to add that into the contract up-front, so that if Joe wants it private then he might have to pay more, or if Maria wants it private then she might have to charge less?

Who is the transaction about?

Another example is the making of "connections" visible to Everyone on Facebook: which party is in charge here?

In the real world, sellers are often large corporations. When we as individuals buy things, the balance of power is skewed in favor of the larger seller. Does this change things?

Property Rights to Personal Information

Do we have such rights? What about "negative" information, such as
One immediate issue is the transactions one: is a tenant's late-payment history their property, or the landlord's? Judge Richard Posner (Seventh Circuit appellate judge who has written several opinions involving economic arguments) has said that personal information that is not "expensive" in the economic sense should receive more protection.



Theories of Privacy 2

Free-market privacy

[Baase 114] The argument here is that our information is something we have a right to sell. We are informed consumers, and if we want to sign up for a Dominick's Preferred Card, we have a right to. Similarly, we have the ability not to share our personal information with websites that do not have good privacy policies, and Baase has argued that many websites have as a result of this become very interested in their privacy policies [Baase p 77, p 104]. Or is it just that companies don't want the bad publicity that comes with a bad privacy policy plus an incident?

This approach to privacy means that we just accept that we can't get the lowest prices and privacy, or we can't get certain websites without advertising, or certain jobs without waiving our rights to certain private information, or use certain social-networking sites without sharing some of our private information with the world.

In terms of protection of our personal data in the hands of corporations, this approach suggests that businesses will protect our data because they don't want the liability that comes with accidental release. Specific regulations are not necessary.

Our right to privacy here is the negative right, or liberty, not to share our personal information.

Question: is it wrong to offer poor people the option of selling away their fundamental rights? We do not, for example, allow poor people to sell their kidneys, and we do not allow them to let their children go to work at age 14. W e do not allow workers covered by Social Security to take the money and invest it privately.

But we do allow better-off consumers to "sell" some of thethoseir privacy in exchange for lower grocery prices; why should worse-off consumers be denied this? Or should everyone be denied this?

Consumer protection and privacy

[Baase 115] The alternative approach is that we need lots of government regulations to protect ourselves, because we just can't keep track of all the implications of revealing each data item about us. There should be rules against keeping certain data, even with our consent, because society can't be sure such consent is freely given.

A central idea of regulations is that we are denied the right to do certain things (eg sell some of our private information), on the theory that most people will not understand the full scope of the transaction, and there is nothose practical way of separating those who don't from those who do.

Large corporations with our data have an unequal share of the power. We need fundamental positive rights that say others have an obligation to us not to do certain things with our data (like share it).

This approach is likely to lead to an "opt-in" requirement for use of private data, rather than an "opt-out".

Are we hiding something?

Well, are we? If we do not consent to surveillance of everything we're doing, are we hiding something? The obvious answer is "yes", but are we hiding something that our neighbors or the government have a right to know?


Workplace privacy of email

One fairly basic principle the courts have used is whether or not one has a "reasonable expectation of privacy". However, this doesn't always mean quite what it seems.

Smyth v Pillsbury, 1996

Summary: Michael Smyth worked for Pillsbury, which had a privacy policy governing emails that said Pillsbury would NOT use emails against employees, and that emails "would remain confidential and privileged". Specifically, Pillsbury promised that e-mail communications could not be use against its employees as grounds for termination or reprimand.

Smyth and his boss exchanged emails in which marketing employees were discussed in an unflattering light. The phrase "kill the backstabbing bastards" appeared.

Smyth and his boss got fired, based on the contents of their emails to each other.

Smyth sued for wrongful termination. He lost.

Circumstances when you CANNOT just fire someone:

Does OWNERSHIP of the email equipment matter? No!!


Bourke v. Nissan:

California similar case: Bourke worked for Nissan; email was reviewed, it was highly personal, she got low evaluation. The email probably but not definitively contributed.

Shoars v. Epson: California

Alana Shoars was involved in email training at Epson. She found supervisor Hillseth had been printing and reading employee emails. She objected, and removed some of the printouts from Hillseth's office. She also reported the incident to Epson's general manager. Hillseth then had Shoars fired, allegedly because she had asked for a private email account that was not accessible by Hillseth. Epson had informed employees that email was "private and confidential". California had a law prohibiting tapping of telephone lines. The law may have covered other communications, but that part was dismissed on a technicality: tapping alone didn't constitute eavesdropping, and the eavesdropping issue was never brought up.